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# PHILOLOGICAL STUDIES

WITH

ENGLISH ILLUSTRATIONS.

BY

JOSIAH W. GIBBS,  
PROF. SAC. LITER., YALE COLLEGE.



NEW HAVEN:  
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## P R E F A C E.

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THE writer of the following pages has here brought together various grammatical and philological principles, which he has found more or less useful in his course of teaching. They have been derived for the most part from distinguished German philologists, particularly from the writings of Dr. Karl Ferdinand Becker, and are here illustrated from our own language. Although many of these principles are now current in our schools of learning, the writer hopes that the publication may not be amiss.

May, 1857.



## CONTENTS.

---

	Page.
Art. I.—On the Scientific Study of the English Language,	1
Art. II.—The New Philology, - - - -	4
Art. III.—The New Philology, - - - -	7
Art. IV.—Language of the Intellectual World, or Faded Metaphors, - - - -	14
Art. V.—On Cardinal Ideas in Language, - - -	17
Art. VI.—Development of Language, - - -	21
Art. VII.—Natural Development and Classification of Propo- sitions, - - - -	23
Art. VIII.—Natural Development and Nomenclature of Pro- positions, - - - -	26
Art. IX.—Development of the Parts of Speech from the Proposition, - - - -	36
Art. X.—The Three Syntactical Combinations, - -	39
Art. XI.—The Three Syntactical Combinations, - -	41
Art. XII.—Greene's Analysis of the Proposition, - -	46
Art. XIII.—Notional Words and Form-Words, - -	48
Art. XIV.—The Verb and its Species, - - -	49
Art. XV.—The Substantive and its Species, - -	51
Art. XVI.—The Adjective in English, - - -	53
Art. XVII.—Table of Correlative Adjectives, - -	54
Art. XVIII.—The Adjective more fully developed, -	55
Art. XIX.—The Substantive in Apposition, - -	60
Art. XX.—The Attributive Genitive in English, - -	63
Art. XXI.—The Attributive Substantive, not in Apposition,	64
Art. XXII.—Origin of the Term Case in Grammar, -	68
Art. XXIII.—The Factitive Relation in English, - -	69

	Page.
Art. XXIV.—The Factitive Relation more fully developed,	70
Art. XXV.—On Prepositions, - - - -	76
Art. XXVI.—On Adverbs, - - - -	82
Art. XXVII.—On the Origin and Formation of Adverbs, -	84
Art. XXVIII.—Doctrine of Participials, - - -	85
Art. XXIX.—The English Participle in <i>ing</i> , - -	87
Art. XXX.—The Gerund, - - - -	90
Art. XXXI.—The Latin Ablative Absolute, - -	92
Art. XXXII.—The Infinitive Mode in English, - -	94
Art. XXXIII.—The Supine, or the Infinitive Mode with <i>to</i> ,	95
Art. XXXIV.—The Accusative and Infinitive or Supine, -	96
Art. XXXV.—The Substantive Participial in <i>ing</i> , -	98
Art. XXXVI.—Origin of the English Forms in <i>ing</i> , -	102
Art. XXXVII.—Syntactical Rules, - - - -	103
Art. XXXVIII.—Concord or Agreement, - - -	104
Art. XXXIX.—Rection or Government, - - -	106
Art. XL.—Collocation, - - - -	110
Art. XLI.—Compound Propositions, - - - -	114
Art. XLII.—Subordinative Compound Propositions, -	116
Art. XLIII.—Substantive Propositions, - - -	118
Art. XLIV.—Adjective Propositions, - - -	120
Art. XLV.—Adverbial Propositions, - - -	121
Art. XLVI.—The Species of Adverbial Propositions, -	124
Art. XLVII.—Conditional Propositions, - - -	132
Art. XLVIII.—Co-ordinating Compound Propositions, or Co- ordination, - - - -	137
Art. XLIX.—The Copulative Compound Proposition, or the Copulative Combination, - - - -	138
Art. L.—The Adversative Compound Proposition, or the Ad- versative Combination, - - - -	141
Art. LI.—Causal Compound Propositions; or the Causal Combination, - - - -	142
Art. LII.—The Period, - - - -	144
Art. LIII.—Contraction of Propositions, - - -	146
Art. LIV.—Conjunctions and Conjunctives, - -	149
Art. LV.—Remarks on Conjunctions, - - -	153



	Page.
Art. LVI.—Some Special Conjunctions considered,	159
Art. LVII.—Collocation of Compound Propositions,	167
Art. LVIII.—The Moods, - - - -	168
Art. LIX.—Particles of Assent and Negation, - -	170
Art. LX.—Auxiliary Verbs, - - - -	177
Art. LXI.—The Interrogative Mood, - - - -	182
Art. LXII.—The Imperative Mood, - - - -	183
Art. LXIII.—On Euphony in Prosaic Composition, -	188
Art. LXIV.—The Figures of Speech, - - - -	190
Art. LXV.—Tropes. The Synecdoche, - - - -	192
Art. LXVI.—Tropes. The Metonymy, - - - -	195
Art. LXVII.—Tropes. The Metaphor, - - - -	197
Art. LXVIII.—Tropes. Prosopopœia or Personification, -	198
Art. LXIX.—Other Figures of the Logical Thought, -	199
Art. LXX.—Figures of the Logical Form, - - - -	205
Art. LXXI.—Figures of Reduplication, - - - -	206
Art. LXXII.—Phonetic and Kindred Figures, - - - -	207
Art. LXXIII.—The Paronomasia, - - - -	209
Art. LXXIV.—The Antanaclasis, - - - -	211
Art. LXXV.—Figures of Feeling, - - - -	214
Art. LXXVI.—Rhetorical Devices, - - - -	215
Art. LXXVII.—Figures of Argumentation, - - - -	216
Art. LXXVIII.—On English Idioms, - - - -	218
Art. LXXIX.—On Synonyms, - - - -	219
Art. LXXX.—On English Punctuation, - - - -	223
Art. LXXXI.—The Truthfulness of Language Defended, -	224
Art. LXXXII.—Method of Instruction in English Grammar,	228
Art. LXXXIII.—The Logical Analysis of Sentences, -	232
Tab. I.—Classification of Notions as expressed in Lan- guage, - - - -	240
Tab. II.—Relations of Notions classified, - - - -	241
Tab. III.—Forms of the Objective Relation, - - - -	242
Tab. IV.—Forms of Subordination, - - - -	243
Tab. V.—Forms of Co-ordination, - - - -	244



## PHILOLOGICAL STUDIES.

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### ART. I.—ON THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

Der Buchstabe ist die Brücke, die in das Reich des Geistes führt.

J. FÜRST.

Language is the avenue to the kingdom of thought.

WHILE every branch of natural science is pursued with ardor and success, while the literature of every age and clime is brought to enrich our own, and while our writers are neither few nor small, it is somewhat surprising, that the language which is the vehicle of so much that is really good should be almost entirely neglected as an object of scientific study.

It is indeed the glory of our nation, that good English is almost universally spoken, and that no inconsiderable part of our population can write it decently. Still it is evident that our common English grammars are mere registers of useful rules, and that the English language, even in our higher schools and colleges, is taught as a mechanical art for practical purposes.

The present state of comparative philology, which within a few years has been put on a solid basis, the philosophic spirit which pervades every other department of knowledge, and the thorough investigations which are making of some kindred European languages, loudly demand that something should be done for our own.

The two principal elements of the study which I would recommend, are, first, an exact and thorough comparison of the kindred dialects; and secondly, a correct and philosophic view of the origin and development of language.

The knowledge of a single dialect no longer satisfies, in the present state of European learning. A survey of all the European dialects is requisite, in order to bring the scattered rays to a focus, and to produce distinct vision. Certain results can be

obtained only by surveying the whole field. He who knows only a part, must either draw no conclusions, or, if he draw them, will often find it necessary to reject them as hasty.

The results obtained by philology are not yet generally known. Language is a cast of the human mind. Every special language is a set of intellectual phenomena, which exhibit to the philosophical observer peculiarities worthy of his attention and admiration. The English language, when scientifically studied, is to be supposed to yield the same rich results as any other language.

We shall now suggest some reasons for the prosecution of this study.

1. The living import of a word lies in the root, and in the modifications which the same undergoes by internal inflection, by affixes, suffixes, and composition. He who has a clear perception of the root, and of all the changes to which it has been subjected, will have a quicker sense of the meaning of the word than he who embraces it merely as a whole. Take, for example, the words *circumnavigation*, *philanthropist*. One acquainted with Latin and Greek will have a much better conception of their meaning, than one who is ignorant of those languages. The want of some such tact has occasioned a recent author to term his work, containing a description of the constellations, *The Geography of the Heavens*.

2. Few men are complete masters of the English language. Most people would be surprised to find how small a part of the whole vocabulary of the language, the words which they spontaneously use would form. Yet this is all that can be justly expected, while the language is learned by dint of memory and usage. A more full philosophic study of the language in early youth, with a distinct notation of the roots, and of all the changes to which the root is liable, would greatly enlarge one's vocabulary, and increase his power of expression.

3. Without deciding the problem whether we can think without signs of thought, we may safely affirm that few men have thoughts beyond their means of expressing them, and that the thoughts of the most intelligent would have but little permanency, unless aptly recorded in suitable language.

4. The English language is to us the medium of social intercourse, and the instrument of the most important influence which man exerts on man. Whatever explains the nature of

this medium fully, and produces facility in the use of this instrument, must increase moral power, the tendency of which is to elevate man above brute force, and thus give him his true rank in the scale of being.

Sept. 1837.

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The study of remote languages was formerly regarded only in a practical light, as facilitating the intercourse of nations. Such is the commercial character of our people, that in this respect linguistical information has to us an ever increasing importance.

Philological knowledge was afterwards regarded as an handmaid to ethnography, as throwing light on the history of our race and shewing the origin and relationship of nations. In this respect it is still an object of intense interest to the literary and scientific world.

But now comparative philology is regarded as of high importance in itself, as embodying, as it were, the philosophy of man. Since the commencement of the present century, and especially within the last fifteen years, the philosophy of language has been pursued with great ardor, and the learned on the continent of Europe, by following the grand Baconian principle of induction, have placed this science on a solid basis, and are in the way of most important discoveries. These discoveries are modifying the grammars and lexicons of every language, and affecting education in every stage, from the first rudiments taught in our common schools to the text-books employed in our colleges and universities.

May, 1838.

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I subjoin an interesting passage from the (Lond.) *Quarterly Review*, Sept. 1835. vol. liv. p. 296, although the writer rests the value of philology, not on itself, but on its bearings on other sciences.

“They who are properly qualified to appreciate the matter, know that philology is neither a useless nor a trivial pursuit,—that, when treated in an enlightened and philosophical spirit, it is worthy of all the exertions of the subtlest, as well as most comprehensive intellect. The knowledge of words is, in its full and true acceptation, the knowledge of things; and a scientific acquaintance with a language cannot fail to throw some light

on the origin, history, and condition of those who speak or spoke it."

The remarks in this article respect the etymological, rather than the syntactical side of language, yet I place them here, as being introductory to the whole subject.

April, 1853.

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## ART. II.—THE NEW PHILOLOGY.

Most persons conversant with the study of language are aware that considerable changes are going on in this department of knowledge. As the nature and extent of these changes are not so generally known, much less appreciated, I propose to notice a few traits of the new method of instruction.

1. The new method differs essentially from the old. The new method is not a difference merely in the arrangement of declensions or conjugations, or in the classification of subordinate propositions, or in the naming of the parts of speech, but it consists in viewing language from a different stand-point and in an entirely different light. It cannot be concealed, that the most diligent student of the old method has much to unlearn, which greatly impedes his ready apprehension of the new. Nor can the results of the new philology be united advantageously with the old grammars. For one change in the old grammars usually makes the necessity of another more apparent.

2. The new grammar does not consist in a few practical rules to guard the student against plausible errors in speaking or writing the vernacular language, nor in the most minute or mechanical rules for imitating the Latinity of Cicero, but it is the science of language. To understand a language is to understand its forms, whether of words or propositions, historically in their origin, philosophically in the want or occasion which called them into existence, and practically in the various application of these forms in present use. It is, as it were, language itself subjectively conceived, apprehended, appreciated.

3. The new method inquires into the philosophical nature of the terms employed; as, *pronoun, adjective, particle, adverb, preposition, conjunction, interjection, agreement, government, apposition*. The old method is satisfied with names and definitions, involving only external or accidental circumstances; as,

*pronoun*, "a word used instead of a noun;" *interjection*, "a word thrown in between the parts of speech."

4. The new method aims directly at the thought or meaning of words, as exhibited in connected discourse, and makes the form subordinate thereto. Hence it develops the distinction between the idea or conception of *existence* and that of *activity*, as seen in the substantive on the one hand and the verb or adjective on the other, the highest distinction in language;—the distinction between *notional words*, which express conceptions, and *form-words*, which express only relations of our conceptions;—the relations of conceptions *to each other* and *to the speaker*;—the distinction of *pronominal roots* and *verbal roots*;—the three syntactical relations, *the predicative*, *the attributive*, and *the objective*;—the doctrine of *the factitive relation*;—the distinction of *co-ordinate* and *subordinate propositions*, etc., distinctions which are passed over in the old method. The old method proceeding from the study of dead languages, and being founded on the parts of speech so called and their inflection, follows the same order in the syntax as in the etymology. Hence the syntax is labored but imperfectly; and the meaning of the word or form as it exists in the proposition, which is the important point, is thrown into the back-ground, and made subservient to the meaning of the word or form as it exists by itself.

5. The new method of grammar has a thorough and proper unity, because it commences with the proposition, as the central point. The value of every word and of every form is made to depend on its relation to the proposition. This develops the organic relations of language, and gives to the new method a scientific form. The old method commencing with insulated words, as if language were a mere juxtaposition of words, has no proper unity. It heaps up materials without a definite object.

6. The new method begins with the analysis of the proposition, as the unit in language, and of course is the same for all languages. Different languages may all be analyzed in the same way. Here is a prodigious saving of time and labor. The old method begins with the forms, and builds up the language synthetically. As the forms in every language are different, so this synthesis differs, and grammars are endlessly varied.

Sept. 1847.

Since the publication of the preceding remarks on the new philology, the following works on English Grammar have appeared in this country, each making some progress in the direction indicated above.

*A Treatise on the Structure of the English Language; or the Analysis and Classification of Sentences and their Component Parts.* By Samuel S. Greene, A.M. Principal of the Phillips Grammar School, Boston. Philad. 1849. 12mo.

*A Concise Practical Grammar of the English Language.* By J. T. Champlin, Professor in Waterville College. New York, 1850. 12mo.

*English Grammar. The English Language in its Elements and Forms.* By William O. Fowler, late Professor of Rhetoric in Amherst College. New York, 1850. 8va.

*A Hand-Book of the English Language.* By R. G. Latham, M.D. F.R.S. late Professor of the English Language, Univ. Coll. London. New York, 1852. 12mo.

Mr. Greene adopts two principal and three subordinate elements in a sentence, each of which may exist in the form of a *word*, of a *phrase*, or of a *subordinate clause* or *proposition*. He divides subordinate clauses or propositions into *substantive*, *adjective*, and *adverbial*. His fundamental principle will be considered hereafter.

Prof. Champlin adopts four parts of the sentence or proposition; treats of substantive, adjective, and adverbial sentences; distinguishes between the ancient and modern conjugation of verbs; etc.

Prof. Fowler has, in two special chapters, referred succinctly to the three syntactical combinations, to the doctrine of co-ordinate and subordinate sentences, and to the classification of subordinate sentences according to the part of speech which they represent.

There are, moreover, many important principles introduced into Prof. Fowler's work, which have not entered into our current English grammars, and which will be gratifying to the friends of improvement.

(1.) The genesis of vowel sounds in English, as illustrated by the vowel *a*, see Fowler's *English Grammar*, § 74, and that of consonant sounds as illustrated in the word *dispossesses*, see § 75. This is a new chapter in English grammar.

(2.) The arrangement of the English alphabetic sounds according to the order of their development, see § 84.

(3.) The doctrine of significant elements, as *bl*, *str*, *wr*, etc., see § 84, and that of pronominal elements, see § 336, both distinguished from proper verbal roots, see § 335.



(4.) The varied forms assumed by the same verbal root, according to the language from which we derive it, illustrated in the verbs, *to wit*, and *to know*, see § 339.

(5.) The exact nature of the formation of words by prefixes, see § 345, and that of the formation of words by composition, see § 360, as distinguished from the formation of words by suffixes, stated and illustrated.

(6.) The origin of some suffixes explained; as, *head*, see § 341, *ship*, see § 343, etc., and the meaning of prefixes developed; as, *be*, see § 348, *for*, see § 349, *re*, see § 354, etc.

(7.) The meaning of the verb, as expressing *action*, developed, see § 251.

(8.) Adverbs of locality are arranged in the order of their development, see § 324; so prepositions, see § 328, instead of the usual alphabetical order, which is unphilosophical.

These points are not in Latham.

Prof. Latham has an excellent tact for the historical development of language, as consisting of words; he has given a healthy impulse to the study of this part of English grammar; he has brought out many new principles, but not exactly those to the promulgation of which this little work is devoted. He seems not to have attended to the philosophy of language, which is concerned with syntax.

A few years after the above date (Sept. 1847,) the writer attempted again to draw out the *salient* points of the New Philology, and published the same in the *New York Observer*. See Art. III. infra.

April, 1853.

### ART. III.—THE NEW PHILOLOGY.

[With Notes and Illustrations added April, 1853.]

I PROPOSE to notice a few traits of the new method of philological instruction.

1. The new philology detaches orthography, or the notation of language, from the rest of grammar, and makes it a mere supplement or appendix to the same. A spoken language is an organic whole, complete in itself; and that, whether reduced to writing or not. This reduction to writing is a subsequent event, an incidental circumstance, not affecting the philosophy or essential structure of the language. The study of the written language trammels us in many ways. It leads us to regard

some sounds as simple, because expressed in writing by one character;<sup>1</sup> it leads us to regard other sounds as compound, because expressed by two characters;<sup>2</sup> it obscures the regular form of the interrogative element in *who*, *what*, *how*, by a negligent orthography;<sup>3</sup> it obscures to the eye the beautiful correlation of the nouns, *breath*, *life*, *house*, to the verbs, *to breathe*, *to live*, *to house*;<sup>4</sup> it obscures the true nature of the parenthesis, because the parenthetic marks are omitted with the shorter parentheses;<sup>5</sup> etc.

(1.) Our written language leads us to regard the sound of *j* in *join*, or *g* in *gentle*, (which is a compound sound,) as simple, because expressed by one character; whereas the monographic writing of *j* or *g* (*dzh*) only shows the historical development of the former from the Latin, Greek, or Shemitish *y*, and of the latter from the Latin or Greek *g* hard. On the development of the sound *dzh* from *g* hard, see *Amer. Journ. Science*, Apr. 1833, vol. xxiv. p. 90. Comp. Fowler's *E. G.* p. 127.

(2.) Our written language leads us to regard the sound of *sh* in Teutonic words, and *ti* or *si* in Roman words, (which is equally simple with the sound of *s*,) as a compound sound; whereas its being written as a digraph merely shows its genesis or origin, in the former case, from the meeting of Teutonic *s* and *k*; and in the latter, from the meeting of Latin *t* or *s* and *i* or *y*.

(3.) The interrogative pronouns, *who*, *what*, *how*, now apparently so irregular, if reduced to a uniform orthography, *huo*, *huat*, *hau*, would, beautifully, and at once, exhibit the interrogative element, *hu*. See *Amer. Quart. Register*, Nov. 1842, vol. xv. p. 170, where a full etymological analysis of all the English interrogatives is given.

(4.) In the derivation of verbs from nouns directly, without internal change of vowel, and without suffixes or prefixes, the final consonant sound of the stem is sometimes softened, by changing the surd into the corresponding sonant, or the accent is transferred to the final syllable. This happily expresses the verbal idea. Thus (1.) *f* is changed into *v*; as, *to halve* from *half*; *to calve* from *calf*; (2.) *s* is changed into *z*; as, *to glaze* from *glass*; *to graze* from *grass*; *to house* from *house*; *to prize* from *price*; (3.) *th* is changed into *dh*; as, *to breathe* from *breath*; *to mouth* from *mouth*; and (4.) the accent is transferred to the final syllable; as, *to augment* from *aug'ment*; *to colleague* from *col'league*; *to confine* from *con'fine*; *to consort* from *con'sort*; *to ferment* from *fer'ment*; *to torment* from *tor'ment*.

(5.) The *parenthesis*, (from Gr. *παρεΐσις*, 'an insertion,') in grammar, is the insertion or introduction into a writing of matter foreign to the immediate context, which thus interrupts or suspends for a while, in some cases, the course of the thought, and, in others, also the grammatical connection of the words. Thus

John i. 14, "And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us (and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father,) full of grace and truth."—Here the parenthesis is inserted between parenthetic marks.

"When I read the several dates of the tombs,—of some that died yesterday, and some six hundred years ago,—I consider the great day, when we shall all of us be contemporaries."—Here the parenthesis is distinguished by a dash before and after.

"Study, I beseech you, to store your minds with the exquisite learning of former ages."—Here the parenthesis is distinguished merely by commas.

"Thirst for glory, says Wollaston, when that is desired merely for its own sake, is founded in ambition and vanity."—Here the parenthesis is distinguished merely by commas.

Notwithstanding the different notation, the two latter examples are as truly parenthetical as the two former.

2. On the other hand, it regards the intonation, (the rising and falling inflection, the suspensive pause, etc.) as an important part of the language, although not expressed in the writing. Our grammatical investigations, being mostly directed to the classic languages, have been confined to the dead letter. The written page has been regarded as exhibiting the whole of language. But the written imperative, according to the mode of utterance, expresses very different moods or states of mind;<sup>1</sup> the intonations bind most closely together the members of the *loose sentence*, erroneously so called;<sup>2</sup> the omission of conjunctions often serves for the closest union;<sup>3</sup> the protasis and apodosis of the full formed period is indicated by the longer pause, and the appropriate inflection;<sup>4</sup> etc.

(1.) See Art. on the Imperative Mode, *infra*.

(2.) The following sentences are given by J. Walker in his *Elements of Elocution*, p. 31 ff. as examples of what he calls the *loose sentence*.

"Persons of good taste expect to be pleased, at the same time they are informed; and think that the best sense always deserves the best language."

"The soul, considered abstractedly from its passions, is of a remiss and sedentary nature; slow in its resolves, and languishing in its executions."

"Foolish men are more apt to consider what they have lost, than what they possess; and to turn their eyes on those who are richer than themselves, rather than on those who are under greater difficulties."

But these sentences are not *loose sentences* in the sense intended by Mr. Walker, nor indeed in any important sense; for the intonation, (which is a part of the living language,) effectually binds together the whole sentence. The copulative combination too implies, not a relation between the members combined, but a common relation to a third member.

(3.) On the effect of omitting the copulative *and*, see Art. on the Forms of the Copulative Combination, *infra*.

(4.) On the full formed period, see at the close of this article.

3. It regards language as proceeding in part from other faculties of the soul, and not altogether and directly from the intellect; as, for example, *the interjection*,<sup>1</sup> *the imperative mode*,<sup>2</sup> and *the interrogative mode*.<sup>3</sup> Thus *Ah me!* is not exactly equivalent to 'I grieve;' nor *go thou*, to 'I command thee to go;' nor *goest thou?* to 'I would know about thy going.'

(1.) On the relation of the interjection to formal language, see Fowler's *E. G.* § 333.

(2.) The imperative proceeds, not from the intellect, but from the desires of the mind acting appropriately; for it is a great mistake to consider language as the offspring of the intellect only. See Art. on the Imperative Mode, *infra*.

(3.) The interrogative mode differs from the indicative only in collocation. It is, strictly speaking, an imperfect proposition proposed to another to fill up.

4. The new philology distinguishes the relations of our conceptions to other conceptions, and to the speaker himself. This is a very extensive topic. It can here only be named.

See this subject beautifully exhibited in a Table from Dr. Becker, *infra*.

5. It distinguishes between *pronominal elements*, which are mere indigitations, and *verbal roots*, which have a logical significance. This distinction has wrought a great change in the whole field of etymology.

On the true nature of pronouns, see *Am. Journ. Science*, July, 1838, vol. xxxiv. p. 337.

6. It develops the distinction between the idea or conception of *existence* and that of *activity*, as seen in the substantive on the one hand, and the verb or adjective on the other,—the highest distinction in language, and when combined, the *summum genus* in the ordinary logic. This is an interesting consideration.

This point is thus stated by J. D. Morell: "The whole sum of our notions may be reduced to two great classes:—those which relate to *being*, and those which relate to *power* or *activity*. All *notional* words, accordingly, must be words denoting either, 1st, some real or supposable *existence* [as substantives]; or, 2dly, some real or supposable *action* [as verbs and adjectives]."

7. It distinguishes between *notional words*, which express notions or general abstract conceptions, and *form-words*, which express only relations of our conceptions.

A Table of Notional Words will be given *infra*.

8. It unites *conjunctives* (relative words) to the proper *conjunctions*, as making one part of speech.

The *proper* conjunction connects propositions, and shows the relation between them, but itself involves no part of any proposition. The *conjunctive*, besides expressing the connection, involves some element or factor of the proposition itself. Relative words are conjunctives. Compare Greene's *Analysis*, p. 242.

9. It finds in the proposition only three syntactical combinations, one essential, namely, *the predicative*, and two incidental, namely, *the attributive*, and *the objective*. This analysis of the proposition is the grand discovery of the new method of philology. It is the hinge on which the whole system turns. The reality and importance of the discovery is now very generally admitted. It cannot be controverted with any plausibility.

See Art. on the Three Syntactical Combinations, *infra*.

10. It develops the *factitive* as one of the complementary objective relations. This important relation has been overlooked by grammarians, because expressed neither by a peculiar case, nor by a peculiar preposition.

See Art. on the Factitive Relation, *infra*.

11. It distinguishes objective relations into *complementary*, (or such as are necessary to complete the idea predicated by the verb,) usually expressed by oblique cases of the noun, or by a preposition and noun; and *supplementary*, (which merely modify the idea of the verb,) usually expressed by adverbs of place, time, manner, etc. That is, as the action expressed by any verb is conceived of as motion, so the relations of the action expressed by the verb are conceived of and expressed as directions of such motion.

This point is thus stated by Mr. Morell: "The predicate requires to be *completed*, whenever the verb does not suffice to convey an entire notion of the action which we affirm of the subject."—"The predicate, in addition to being completed, may also be more accurately defined or determined. This takes place when any of the circumstances are expressed, which tend to render its signification more *specific* or distinct."

How adverbs of time, place, manner, etc. express an object of the verb, see Art. on the Adverb, *infra*.

12. It regards all composition and combination as *bimembral*. The only exception is the copulative combination, which on

that account is justly considered as imperfect. The full and adequate conception of this truth that all composition is bimembral, would alter at once the style of many persons essentially for the better. But on this we cannot dwell.

On *binary* or *bimembral* composition, see Fowler's *E. G.* § 860.

13. The new philology distinguishes three kinds of causal relations; viz: *the real ground*; as, 'he went to London, being carried thither;' *the moral ground*; as, 'he went to London, wishing to engage in business there;' and *the logical ground*; as, 'he went to London, being seen there by many persons.' Such distinctions bring grammar into harmony with logic.

This point, I believe, is not noticed by Mr. Morell.

14. The new philology embraces *the participle*, *the infinitive*, *the gerund*, and *the supine*, all under the general name of *participials*. This is a happy thought; for these classes of words have a general character. They partake of the nature of the verb, and also of the noun, either substantive or adjective. They make the transition from the simple to the compound proposition. The proposition formed by means of a participial may be termed an *intermediate* proposition, i. e. intermediate between the simple and compound proposition. This gives to the discussion of these topics its appropriate place in the syntax.

The infinitive is as really a participle, as the forms which bear that name. Comp. Greene's *Anal.* p. 224.

On the subject of *Intermediate* Propositions, see the Articles on the Simple Infinitive; on the Supine, or Infinitive with *to*; on the Active Participle in *ing*; on the Ablative Absolute; on the Object of Concomitant Action; *infra*.

15. The distinction of *subordinate* and *co-ordinate propositions*, adopted by Becker, places the student of compound propositions on the vantage-ground. Zumpt, the Latin grammarian, however excellent in other respects, does not guide us here. He leaves compound propositions to take care of themselves. This distinction of subordinate and co-ordinate propositions has prepared the way for the first satisfactory classification of conjunctions.

See Art. on Co-ordinate and Subordinate Propositions, *infra*.

16. The division of subordinate propositions into *substantive*, *adjective*, and *adverbial propositions*, according as they corre-

spond to *substantives*, *adjectives*, or *adverbs*, in the simple proposition, has been regarded as a brilliant discovery in the new philology. It has given new life and spirit to the investigation of language.

See Greene's *Anal.* p.129. Champlin's *Eng. Gram.* p. 169. Fowler's *E. G.* § 577.

17. The new philology takes up the proper *compound sentence*, which consists of co-ordinate propositions. Here the propositions are equally prominent on the tablet of language, the thoughts are thoughts of the speaker himself at the time of speaking. The living sense of a judgment of the human mind *in actu*, as distinguished from an old judgment, or a judgment *de facto*, will give to the mind having this consciousness a vital principle hardly known before to be possessed. This bringing of language to consciousness, is much thought of by the new school.

This point is thus stated by Mr. Morell: "A sentence is called compound when it contains two or more assertions co-ordinate with each other."—"Becker divides clauses into two kinds—subordinate and co-ordinate. A principal sentence with one or more *subordinate* clauses, we have already named *complex*. A principal sentence with one or more *co-ordinate* clauses we denominate *compound*; it being really made up of two or more independent assertions."

18. The new philology, passing over the merely *compound sentence*, comes to the *period*, simple and compound.

The period consists of a protasis and apodosis, separated by a longer pause, and is that form of a sentence which is naturally adapted to express the thought combined with its logical or adversative ground. Here the proposition receives its fullest expansion, and the thought its most perfect development. This is a new field for investigation, unexplored by the philological naturalist, and known to the grammarian only in dark surmises. Yet it abounds with the richest productions, and its indifferent specimens often attract the admiration of mankind. The zealous student will not suffer himself to be repelled by the novelty of a few technical terms. He will readily see that instruction is very important in developing the intricate logical relations of thought. The new philology discusses the significancy and form of the period, shows wherein its beauty and its symmetry consist, and also exhibits the nature of the *compound period*.

I despair of seeing this subject exhibited in a definite and tangible form, in an English dress. It requires a knowledge of the Higher Calculus, which few persons possess.

June, 1850.

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#### ART. IV.—LANGUAGE OF THE INTELLECTUAL WORLD, OR FADED METAPHORS.

“Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius in sensu.”—THE SCHOOLMEN.

IN all language pertaining to the intellectual world there is a literal physical meaning, which differs from the meaning intended by the writer. The existence of a few words whose original significancy is now lost, does not affect our general proposition. What we have here advanced applies as well to the language of the Bible as to that of common life.

Thus the verb *to comprehend*, which is taken in a physical sense Is. 40 : 12, is used in an intellectual sense Job 37 : 5.—*To apprehend*, which is taken in a physical sense Acts 12 : 4, is used in an intellectual sense Phil. 3 : 12.—*To receive*, which is taken in a physical sense Mat. 17 : 24, is used in an intellectual sense Ps. 6 : 9. Rev. 3 : 3.

The same thing is rendered much more evident by referring to the original Hebrew and Greek words.

Thus Heb. *shaphal*, *to be made low*, in a physical sense, Is. 40 : 4, is used in a spiritual sense Is. 2 : 17.—Heb. *hhata*, which signifies *to miss the mark* Judg. 20 : 16, in other places signifies *to sin*.—Gr. *tarasso*, *to trouble*, in a physical sense, John 5 : 4, 7, is used in an intellectual sense Mat. 2 : 3.—*Gehenna*, which denotes *the valley of Hinnom*, near Jerusalem, Josh. 15 : 8, is used for *hell*, or *the place of future punishment*, Mat. 10 : 28.—*Paradise*, which in the oriental languages denotes *a garden or park*, and is applied to *the garden of Eden* by the Septuagint translators Gen. 2 : 8, is used for *the abode of the blessed after death*, Luke 23 : 43. 2 Cor. 12 : 4.—Heb. *ruahh*, *a breath or wind*, Job 9 : 18. Gen. 8 : 1, is used elsewhere to denote *the soul*.—Gr. *pneuma*, *a breath or wind*, 2 Thess. 2 : 8. John 3 : 8, is used elsewhere to denote *the spirit*.

This transfer or metaphorical use of words is very important. In most languages it is so evident as to need little illustration. But in English, owing to the mixed character of our language,



and the disguised appearance of our roots, the subject is so obscured as to require a more extended consideration.

Man is a citizen of two worlds; *the world of sense*, in which he is surrounded by physical objects, which operate on his senses variously, and awaken the corresponding sensations and perceptions; and *the world of intellect*, in which he rises above the physical world, and becomes aware of objects, operations, and relations, which do not strike the external senses. Whether we regard man in his individual or social capacity, he is first introduced to the physical world, and, even when introduced to the higher spiritual world, still continues, as to a large portion of his existence, a citizen of the former world, and subject to its laws.

To meet the wants of man as a sentient being, and striving to make these wants known to his fellows, there is a world of sounds most happily adapted. Whatever strikes the ear may be directly imitated, as all the natural cries of men and animals. Whatever strikes the eye solely, but is in any manner physically connected with sound, may be expressed by the associated sound. Besides this, whatever in the visible world is smooth or rough, weak or strong, broken or continuous in its motion, has its analogy in smooth or rough, weak or strong, broken or continuous sounds. Natural instinct enables man also to distinguish the deep tones of anguish from the elevated tones of joy; the hissing of abhorrence and the denunciations of anger, from the cooing of love and the soothing of affection. In short, there is hardly a sensual want, which language is not naturally adequate to express.

But when man enters the world of intellect, there is no longer a physical relation between sounds and the ideas he may wish to communicate. Here imagination comes to his aid. Words which originally belonged to the world of sense, and denoted sensible objects, operations, and relations, are transferred, by a metaphor depending on a perceived analogy, to the world of intellect to express mental objects, operations, and relations.

Thus the *spirit* in its literal import is *breath* or *wind*. The essential powers and properties of this spirit are drawn from the material world; as, its *intellect* or *understanding*, its *susceptibilities* and *propensities*, and its *choices* or *elections*. In short, its *states* are *standings*, its *emotions* are *movements*, its *sensibilities* are *feelings*, its *views* and *ideas* are *sights*, its *conception* and *per-*

*ception* are a *taking*, its *apprehension* and *comprehension* are a *holding*, its *reflection* is a *turning back*, its *purpose* is an *exhibition*, its *inference* is a *bringing in*, and its *conclusion* is a *shutting up*.

So, in the moral world, *obedience* is a *giving ear*; *rectitude*, *righteousness*, or *uprightness*, is *straightness*; *error* is a *wandering*; and *transgression* is a *going over*.

Adjectives or epithets, applied to the powers and operations of spirit, are derived from the same source; as, *ardent* emotions, *clear* ideas, *strong* conceptions, *intense* feelings, *pernicious* purposes, *bright* hopes, *unshaken* confidence, *corroding* cares, etc.

So some of the most abstract, generic, and complicated terms in the intellectual world. Thus language is a *tongue*, education a *drawing out*, religion a *going over again*, imagination a *making of images*, poetry a *creating*, etc.

So the parts of the intellectual world. Thus Lat. *cælum* is the *hollow arch* over our heads; *heaven* is *what is heaved or arched*, etc.

These metaphors are employed from necessity, for the expression of intellectual objects, operations, and relations, as these could not otherwise be designated. They differ from rhetorical metaphors, which are used for embellishment. They may be called faded metaphors, as the literal or physical sense is lost in the mind of him who uses the term.

It is a remarkable fact that in Chinese writing, the primary characters or keys denote physical objects, while objects of the intellectual world are necessarily expressed by the combination and metaphorical use of these keys.

NOTE.—The views exhibited above have an important bearing on some religious controversies. The Universalist, perceiving that *gehenna*, in its primary acceptation, denotes *the valley of Hinnom*, near Jerusalem, claims that it never denotes *hell* or *the world of punishment*. He seems not aware that all language relating to the intellectual world is derived from the sensible world. To be consistent, he should hold that *paradise* never means *heaven*, that the Greek *hamartia* (sin) is always *a missing the mark*; and in short, he should blot the whole spiritual world out of existence.

Dec, 1838.

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This article is placed here as preparatory to Art. V.

## ART. V.—ON CARDINAL IDEAS IN LANGUAGE.

THE analysis of human language, ideologically considered, is exciting attention among modern philologists, as having an important bearing on the science of grammar.

The origin of ideas in the human mind, and their subsequent development, has ever been an interesting problem to the philosopher. Nearly allied to this is the development of ideas in language from a few cardinal or generic ideas. The mind receives ideas and thoughts from the external world, and expresses them again in language. This development of ideas in language is analogous to the development of ideas in the mind. Language therefore helps us to understand the mysterious process by which ideas are received into the mind.

Ideas, which constitute language, by no means stand insulated from each other, as independent existences; but have, without doubt, been developed from each other.

In this inquiry interjections are excluded, as being merely instinctive cries, adopted into language without having passed through the intellect.

Certain pronominal elements, as those of interrogation and demonstration, are also excluded as being merely instinctive, and not forming proper linguistic ideas.

Our inquiry is principally concerned with nouns and verbs, which express ideas, and not merely the relations of ideas.

Dr. Noah Webster was aware of the importance of the inquiry, and has thrown out many useful hints in the Introduction to his American Dictionary.

The later philologists have arrived at some interesting results, which I will endeavor to state.

There are five distinct processes in the analysis referred to, each of which rests on its own foundation.

1. *Intellectual and moral ideas, as expressed in language, are derived from physical.*

As man acquires ideas and thoughts of the existing world, he asserts, as it were, his dominion over it by clothing such ideas and thoughts in language. As his first and earliest ideas are those acquired by the senses, so those first expressed by language are of the same kind. Language has no immediate expression for intellectual ideas. It can express them only by

giving them a physical form. They are made a part of the system of physical ideas.

Primary ideas in language, therefore, are physical, or such as strike the external senses, and not intellectual or moral, which are withdrawn from the external senses. Intellectual and moral ideas, so far as they exist in language, are developed from physical, and that by regular organic laws. This is now universally admitted. It naturally arises from the fact that man is a child of sense, and first introduced to the external world, and it shows itself abundantly in the very structure of language. Every word expressing an intellectual or moral idea, it may be safely assumed, originally expressed a physical one.

This process is two-fold. (1.) The inward feeling is denoted by the outward expression; as, *to exult, to incline, to suspect, to obey, to regard, to respect*. (2.) A term is used metaphorically; as, *to wit*, originally, 'to see;' *to conceive, to apprehend, to comprehend*.

The development of intellectual and moral ideas from physical, constitutes an important part of *semasiology*, or that branch of grammar which treats of the development of the meaning of words. It is built on the analogy and correlation of the physical and intellectual worlds. [See Art. IV. *supra*.]

## 2. *Substantives and adjectives are derived from verbs.*

Things are known from the impressions made upon us. Substances are known from their attributes or activities. The kinds of things are known and named from these activities, and these activities are verbal ideas.

Primary ideas in language, therefore, are verbs, and not nouns. That is to say, all proper roots are verbs. Substantives and adjectives develop themselves from verbs by regular organic laws. Where a noun appears to be radical, it may be safely assumed that it is derived from a verb. This is now the prevailing view among philologists. It is here that the formation of the substantive corresponds with the formation of the idea denoted by the substantive; as, *band* and *bond* from *to bind*; *share* and *shire* from *to shear*; *cake* from *to cook*; *dole* from *to deal*; *doom* from *to deem*; *clock* from *to clack*.

The substantive, adjective, and verb, here concerned, are considered, not as distinct ideas, but as different forms of the same idea. Thus *lux* and *luceo*; *rex, rego, and regnum*; *vivus* and *vivo*; *fidus, fido, and fides*; are considered as different forms

of the same idea, having the same general import. These forms of ideas are creations of the human mind. They are not perceived by the senses. Their development by the external form of the word constitutes the *formation and inflection of words*.

3. *Many verbs may be reduced to a simpler form, both in thought and expression.*

This reduction may take place in several ways :

(1.) Verbs are sometimes derived from nouns, and those nouns from other verbs ; as, Gr. *timao* from *time*, and *time* from *tio* ; Lat. *statuo* from *status*, and *status* from *sto* ; Eng. *to augment* from the noun *augment*, and the noun *augment* from Lat. *augeo*, 'to increase ;' Eng. *to witness* from the noun *witness*, and the noun *witness* from *to wit*, 'to know.'

(2.) Compound verbs are derived from simple ; as, *to pretend*, *to intend*, and *to extend*, all from *to tend* ; *to commit*, *to permit*, and *to remit*, all from Lat. *mitto*, 'to send.'

(3.) Different species or forms of the verb may be reduced to the more simple, like the derivative conjugations in Hebrew to the Kal ; as, *to bait* from *to bite* ; *to fell* from *to fall* ; *to chatter* from *to chat* ; *to gabble* from *to gab*.

(4.) Different forms, as, *to strain*, *to strive*, and *to stretch*, are traced back to their original or primeval form.

Verbs, and of course all words, are reducible to a comparatively small number of *roots or radical verbs*, which are all monosyllabic.

The number of such roots in German is said to be about five hundred. The number in English, owing to the mixed character of our language, is about one thousand.

This development of words from their roots is distinct from the formation of words, strictly so called. It is properly termed *etymology*.

4. *These roots or radical verbs, though differing in expression, may be classified in groups, or reduced to cardinal ideas.*

Cardinal ideas in language are those which come nearest to the general idea of the verb. Specific ideas develop themselves from the general.

Dr. N. Webster has made a list of thirty-four primary or cardinal ideas, all of them expressing motion. These he afterwards reduces to nine ; viz. *to send*, *to throw*, *to thrust*, *to strain*, *to stretch*, *to draw*, *to drive*, *to urge*, *to press*.

Dr. C. F. Becker, in his *Organism der Sprache*, specifies twelve primary ideas :

1. *To go*, as the motion of a sentient being ;
2. *To flow*, as the motion of water ;
3. *To blow*, as the motion of air ;
4. *To shine*, as the motion of light ;
5. *To sound*, as the motion of ether ;—referring to the five forms of matter.
6. *To grow*, as an internal organic motion ;
7. 8. *To give*, and *to take*, as the opposite actions of person and thing.
9. 10. *To bind*, and *to separate*, as the opposite actions of subject and object.
11. 12. *To injure*, and *to defend*, opposite ideas.

All ideas of physical activity, it is said, are referable to these cardinal ideas.

This process of grouping is assuming great importance in language, and promises useful results.

The ideas exhibited in language form a natural system. One original idea develops itself into genera and species. Every special idea must be considered as a species under a genus. This natural system throws light on the meaning of words, particularly on the distinction of synonyms.

5. *These cardinal ideas in language, and others, if they should be found to exist, may be reduced by abstraction to the generic idea of motion.*

These ideas are all included in the idea of motion, as the species in the genus. But this generic idea is not wanted for the common purposes of language. It is arrived at, only as an after-thought, by a later process of analyzing.

As it is the nature of the verb to express action, and a physical action is motion, and an intellectual action is conceived of as such, so every verb, linguistically considered, whether it expresses a physical or an intellectual idea, denotes motion. Even rest, and other ideas, at first view most opposed to motion, do etymologically express it ; as, *to repose* from *re* and *pono*, 'to put ;' *expire* from *ex* and *spiro*, 'to breathe.'

Thus it appears that as in natural philosophy all changes in bodies ultimately reduce themselves to motion ; so in language the most general idea is *to go*.

This generic idea of motion, though not itself expressed in language, is the initial-point from which the development of ideas in human speech proceeds.

March, 1847.

## ART. VI.—DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE.

THE development of language begins with simple propositions. It consisted for a while at first, as the language of children still does, only of simple propositions; compound propositions are a later growth.

This may be illustrated by taking a course of thought, and examining the different modes in which it may be expressed.

First mode. "There was once a king. He was very rich in gold and silver. He regarded himself as the happiest of men. There came to his court a man. He was very wise. To him he showed his treasures."

Here every thought or sentiment is expressed as a distinct thought or sentiment, and forms a distinct proposition. In this way children, deaf and dumb persons, and persons generally in the early stages of mental cultivation, express themselves.

Second Mode. "A king, very rich in gold and silver, regarding himself as the happiest of men, showed his treasures to a very wise man coming to his court."

Here several thoughts or sentiments are reduced to the form of ideas or notions, and made subordinate to the thought or sentiment of the leading clause. The whole is a simple proposition. In this way persons of advanced mental cultivation express themselves.

Third Mode. "A king, who was very rich in gold and silver, as he regarded himself as the happiest of men, showed his treasures to a man who was very wise, when he came to his court."

This is a compound proposition. But it is not to be regarded as made up of simple propositions, already extant in the language, united to form a whole; but as an organic development of the preceding simple proposition. The different clauses or members of the simple proposition are themselves enlarged to propositions. But these propositions are subordinate propositions, and express merely ideas or notions, like the forms out of which they are developed, and not full thoughts or sentiments of the speaker. This mode of expression, aiming at greater philosophical exactness, indicates a still higher state of mental cultivation.

A correct style consists much in knowing how to combine and use these different forms of expression.

Oct, 1846.

[We subjoin the following in order to exhibit language in its decrepitude.]

There is, perhaps, no word in the English language capable of performing so much labor, and of affording at the same time a clear and intelligible sense, as the verb *to get*. The following specimen of its capabilities is said to be extracted from *Aristarchus, or the Principles of Composition*, a work of the ingenious, but eccentric Dr. Withers.

"I *got* on horseback within ten minutes, after I *got* your letter. When I *got* to Canterbury, I *got* a chaise for town; but I *got* wet through, before I *got* to Canterbury; and I *have got* such a cold, as I shall not be able *to get* rid of in a hurry. I *got* to the treasury about noon, but first of all I *got* shaved and dressed. I soon *got* into the secret of *getting* a memorial before the board, but I could not *get* an answer then; however, I *got* intelligence from the messenger, that I should most likely *get* one the next morning. As soon as I *got* back to my inn, I *got* my supper, and *got* to bed. It was not long before I *got* to sleep. When I *got* up in the morning, I *got* my breakfast, and then I *got* myself drest, that I might *get* out in time to *get* an answer to my memorial. As soon as I *got* it, I *got* into the chaise, and *got* to Canterbury by three, and about tea-time I *got* home. I *have got* nothing for you, and so adieu."

Every phrase in this paragraph is in popular and constant use by itself. Dr. Withers suggests the feasibility of writing a complete history of the world from the earliest times down, in this elegant style, by the aid of this single verb *to get*.

The use of the verb *to get* is here three-fold :

1. As a subjective or intransitive verb, modified only by circumstances of place and time; as, to *get on horseback*, to *get to Canterbury*, to *get within ten minutes*, to *get before noon*, etc.
2. As an objective or transitive verb, requiring a direct passive object in order to complete the sense; as, to *get a letter*, to *get a chaise*, etc.
3. As a factitive verb, requiring a factitive object in order to complete the sense; as, to *get wet through*, to *get rid of a cold*, to *get shaved*, etc.

It has also an idiomatic use with some adverbs; as, to *get up*, to *get out*, etc.

Sept. 1849.



## ART. VII.—NATURAL DEVELOPMENT AND CLASSIFICATION OF PROPOSITIONS.

[Revised April, 1853.]

LANGUAGE consists of propositions, the forms of which are almost endless. Many attempts have been made at a scientific classification of them, but with only partial success. The new philology enables us to exhibit them in the order of their historical development, which constitutes a sort of natural system.

I. *The imperfect proposition*, or that in which no logical subject is conceived of or expressed; as, 'it rains,' 'it is warm.' Here the mere event is affirmed without any reference to the agency by which it is effected. The pronoun *it* is merely the grammatical subject. The addition of a logical subject is necessary to make the proposition a *perfect* one. This kind of proposition is employed in describing the state of the weather and other operations of nature.

There are some varieties of this proposition, analogous to those of the perfect proposition, which it is unnecessary to consider here.

II. *The simple or naked proposition*, or the perfect proposition in its most simple form, contains a subject as well as a predicate; as, 'God exists.' This kind of proposition involves the predicative combination only, and not the attributive or objective.

The *subject* is capable of variation. It may be a noun, a pronoun, or an adjective used substantively, but these may be considered merely as varieties of the substantive.

The *mode or mood of the predication* is capable of variation. It may be affirmative, negative, interrogative, imperative, or conditional. But to avoid perplexity, we shall here consider only the positive forms of language.

The different species of this proposition, so far as the predicate is concerned, are as follows:

1. Where the predicate is a *verb*; as, 'man *dies*.'
2. Where the predicate is an *adjective*; as, 'man is *mortal*.'
3. Where the predicate is a *substantive*; as, 'Charles is a *physician*.'
4. Where the predicate is a *substantive with a preposition*; as, 'Paul was *at Rome*.'
5. Where the predicate is an *adverb*; as 'the fire is *out*.'

III. *The simple proposition involving also the attributive combination*, or the simple proposition with an enlarged subject; as, 'the good man is safe.'

This kind of proposition is capable of the variations given above of the simple proposition.

The different species of this proposition, so far as the attribute is concerned, are as follows :

1. Where the attribute is *an adjective*; as, 'a beautiful woman is admired.'

2. Where the attribute is *a substantive in apposition*; as, 'Christ, the saviour, died.'

3. Where the attribute is *a substantive in the genitive case*; as, 'Caesar's party was triumphant.'

4. Where the attribute is *a substantive with a preposition*; as, 'a friend to the cause is wanted.'

IV. *The simple proposition involving also the objective combination*, or the simple proposition with an enlarged predicate; as, 'God created the world.'

This kind of proposition is capable of the variations given above of the simple proposition.

The different species of this proposition, so far as the object is concerned, are as follows :

1. Involving the *complementary* object;

(1.) The passive object; as, 'Alexander conquered *Darius*.'

(2.) The dative object; as, 'John gave the book *to Charles*.'

(3.) The genitive object; as, 'he repents *of his folly*.'

(4.) The factitive object; as, 'they chose him *king*.'

2. Involving the *supplementary* object;

(1.) The place; as, 'Charles lives *here*;' 'John is gone *to Boston*.'

(2.) The time; as, 'John is *now* departing;' 'he rose *before sunrise*.'

(3.) The cause; as, 'Socrates died *from poison*;' 'she spoke *from malice*;' 'a bird is known *from its feathers*.'

(4.) The manner; as, 'he thinks *so*;' 'he eats *temperately*.'

V. *The simple proposition involving also both the attributive and objective combination*; as, 'a good man governs his passions.' This kind of proposition exhibits all the syntactical combinations. See Art. on the Three Syntactical Combinations.

The forms of this proposition are almost endlessly diversified.

VI. *The proposition intermediate between the simple and compound*, or the proposition involving a participial. The different species are as follows :

1. Where the participial is a *participle*; as, 'he *answering* said.'

2. Where the participial is a *gerund*, or a participle used adverbially; as, 'he came *riding*.'

3. Where the participial is a *nominative absolute*; as, '*the enemy advancing*, he retreated.'

4. Where the participial is a *supine*, or an infinitive with a preposition; as, 'he prepared *to go*.'

5. Where the participial is an *accusative and infinitive* or *supine*; as, 'he bade him *stay*,' 'I advised him *to go*.'

VII. *The subordinative compound or complex proposition*, in which one proposition is dependent on or subordinate to the other. The different species are as follows :

1. Having a *substantive* subordinate proposition ;

(1.) Denoting the subject; as, '*that God exists*, is true.'

(2.) Denoting the immediate complement; as, 'we know, *that God exists*.'

(3.) Denoting the second complement; as, 'the Bible teaches us, *that God is love*.'

2. Having an *adjective* subordinate proposition, answering to an adjective in the simple proposition; as, 'Balbus, *who had a sword*, drew it.'

3. Having an *adverbial* subordinate proposition, denoting an object, not complementary, but supplementary to the verb of the leading proposition :

(1.) Expressing the place; as, '*where thou lodgest*, I will lodge.'

(2.) Expressing the time; as, '*whensoever ye will*, ye may do them good.'

(3.) Expressing the cause; as, '*because he could swear by no greater*, he swore by himself.'

(4.) Expressing the manner; as, 'forgive us our debts, *as we forgive our debtors*.'

(5.) Expressing intensity; as, 'one is so near to another, *that no air can come between them*.'

VIII. *The co-ordinative compound proposition*, where the two propositions are co-ordinate or independent of each other, but still make but one thought. The species are as follows :

1. The *copulative* compound proposition, the appropriate conjunction for which is *and*; as, 'the sun shines, *and* the air is pleasant.'

2. The *adversative* compound proposition, the appropriate conjunction for which is *but*; as, 'he is not an Englishman, *but* a Frenchman; *yet*; as, 'the sun shines, *yet* the air is unpleasant;' or *or*; as, 'either the world had a creator, *or* it existed by chance.'

3. The *causal* compound proposition, the appropriate conjunction for which is *for*; as, 'God is to be loved, *for* he is good;' or *therefore*; as, 'God is good, *therefore* he is to be loved.'

NOTE.—When a relation of the logical or adversative ground exists between the members of the co-ordinative or subordinative compound proposition, as in some of the examples given above, then the whole compound proposition is brought under the dominion of a higher faculty of the human soul, namely, the reasoning power, and is called a *period*.

IX. *The compound period*, involving two or more simple periods.

'As we perceive the shadow to have moved along the dial, but did not perceive it moving; and it appears that the grass has grown, though nobody ever saw it grow: so the advances we make in knowledge, as they consist of such minute steps, are only perceivable by the distance.'

June, 1848.

#### ART. VIII.—NATURAL DEVELOPMENT AND NOMENCLATURE OF PROPOSITIONS.

I know not how it may seem to others, but to me the natural development of propositions is a very interesting subject. Language unfolds itself, as it were, before our eyes, from the simple proposition to the most complicated forms of human thought.

It is proposed to exhibit the natural development of propositions in their direct positive forms, which are the most important, and which are also a type of the rest. The negative, interrogative, imperative, and conditional forms of language, will be noticed afterwards.

A convenient appropriate name will be given to each form of proposition.

### 1. *Imperfect Proposition.*

'It rains.'

The imperfect proposition, or the so-called *impersonal verb*, exhibits language in its first or earliest effort. It consists of a predication only, having no logical subject conceived of or expressed. It is still employed to describe the state of the weather and other operations of nature.

Prof. Fowler, in his *English Grammar*, § 309, notices four classes of impersonal verbs, so called. We are concerned here only with the first class.

It is pleasant to find the learned and acute logician, Adolphus Trendelenburg, in a work dedicated to Dr. O. F. Becker, agreeing with him in the importance to be attached to the impersonal verb, as developing one of the earliest forms of human language. See his *Logische Untersuchungen*, (Berl. 1840.) vol. ii. p. 142 ff.

### 2. *Simple or Naked Proposition.*

'The sun shines.'

The simple or naked proposition, or the perfect proposition in its most simple form, contains a subject as well as a predicate. The subject or cause evolves itself, as it were, from the predicate or effect, in accordance with the mental law by which we come to the knowledge of substances or existences in the universe.

In the perfect proposition, the predicative relation, or the relation of the verb to its subject, is exhibited in its perfection. This is the most important of the three syntactical relations. The verb and its subject together constitute *the predicative combination*.

### 3. *Proposition with Copula and Predicate Adjective.*

'The sun is bright.'

In this proposition the predicate, by a curious and important process in language, is evolved from the predication, and expressed separately. This predicate is a sort of imperfect verb. Joined with the substantive verb *to be*, it is adapted to express the idea of the verb from which it is derived with greater logical force.

This proposition is best exhibited in Latin, where 'Deus est vivus' evolves itself from 'Deus vivit,' and 'puer est fidus' from 'puer fudit.'

4. *Proposition with Copula and Predicate Substantive.*

'Charles is a physician.'

The noun here is an attributive noun, and answers nearly the same purpose as an adjective.

5. *Proposition with Preposition and Substantive as a Predicate.*

'Paul was at Rome.'

So an infinitive with a preposition; as 'he is *to come* to-morrow.'

6. *Proposition with Copula and Predicate Adverb.*

'The fire is out.'

This form may be considered as elliptical; 'the fire is *out*,' standing for 'the fire is *gone out*.'

7. *Proposition with Attributive Adjective.*

'A good man is rare.'

If we compare 'the strong band' with 'the band is strong,' we shall find that in the former phrase, the adjective *strong* expresses a different syntactical relation from what it does in the latter. This is called the *attributive* relation.

The adjective is the primary form of the attribute, and is properly employed to reduce the genus to the species.

8. *Proposition with Attributive Substantive in Apposition.*

'Christ, the Saviour, died.'

The attributive substantive in apposition is naturally adapted to express identity, and that of one individual with another. Hence it serves not to reduce the genus to the species, but to reduce the genus to the individual. When it expresses an antithesis, it expresses the antithesis of the individual.

9. *Proposition with Attributive Genitive.*

'God's ways are inscrutable.'

The genitive case, being in its origin the adnominal case, or case joined to the noun, is adapted in its own nature to modify

or limit the force of the noun to which it is joined. It properly expresses the attribute of the individual.

#### 10. *Proposition with Attributive Preposition and Substantive.*

'A friend to the cause is wanted.'

Besides the attributive adjective, the attributive substantive in apposition, and the attributive genitive, there is another form of the attribute, namely, a preposition and its complement, or a substantive with a preposition; as, 'the merchant *in London* died.'

The preposition and substantive, like the other attributes, expresses a predicate, (comp. 'the merchant *dwelt in London*,') not as a full thought or predication, but in the form of an idea or notion.

This form of the attribute, as it involves a preposition, implies an adjective or participle understood, and thereby denotes an activity; as, 'a crown (made) of gold;' 'the letter (sent) to my father;' 'the bride (adorned) with a crown;' 'the wolf (described) in the fable.'

#### 11. *Proposition with Various Attributes.*

'An old man, from Italy, Caius' father, deceased lately.'

Here 'old' is the attributive adjective; 'father,' the attributive substantive in apposition; 'Caius,' the attributive genitive, and 'from Italy,' the attributive preposition and substantive.

#### 12. *Proposition with Accusative Object.*

'Alexander conquered Darius.'

Many verbs, in order to complete the idea which they predicate, require an *accusative* object, i. e. an object merely passive or suffering. This exists in three forms; as, (1.) 'Cain slew *Abel*;' (2.) 'Solomon built *a temple*;' and (3.) 'he lives *a happy life*.'

This proposition gives the antithesis of person and thing.

It also develops, and that happily, the objective relation, one of the three syntactical relations.

#### 13. *Proposition with Dative Object.*

'John gave the book to Charles.'

Many verbs, both transitive and intransitive, in order to complete the idea which they predicate, require a *dative* object, i. e. a personal object sympathizing with the subject; as, 'John wrote a letter *to you*;' 'the book is useful *to me*.'

The dative as compared with the accusative, has been called the *remoter* object. It is usually expressed in English by the prepositions *to* or *for*.

#### 14. *Proposition with Genitive Object.*

'He repents of his folly.'

Many verbs, for the same reason, require a *genitive* object, i. e. a real object, also acting on the subject, and calling out his activity; as, 'he is ashamed of *his conduct*.'

#### 15. *Proposition with Factitive Object.*

'They chose him king.'

Many verbs, for the same reason, require a *factitive* object, i. e. an object produced by the action of the verb on the accusative or merely passive object; as, 'they regarded him *as guilty*.'

#### 16. *Proposition with Object of Place.*

'John is gone to Boston.'

Any verb may have its idea individualized by a local objective relation, or by subjoining a local object; as, 'he lives *in the country*.'

#### 17. *Proposition with Object of Time.*

'He rose before sunrise.'

Any verb may have its idea individualized by a temporal objective relation, or by subjoining a temporal object; as, 'he died *after the war*.'

#### 18. *Proposition with Object of Cause.*

'Socrates died from poison.'

Any verb may be modified by a causal objective relation; as, 'he perished *from hunger*.'

The relation of cause and effect, or more generally of ground and consequence, is a relation inferred by the intellect, and not



first perceived by the senses. It exists between propositions or judgments, and is properly expressed by a compound proposition; as, 'Socrates took poison, and therefore died.'

But this relation is also expressed as a grammatical relation between words or ideas, as in the example given above.

### 19. *Proposition with Object of Manner.*

'He eats temperately.'

Any verb may have the generic idea which it predicates reduced to a specialty by the antithetic development of the manner of such predication; as 'James acted *wisely*.'

### 20. *Proposition with Various Objects.*

'Yesterday, in the palace, the king voluntarily relinquished the throne to his son.'

Here 'the throne' is the accusative object; 'to his son,' the dative object; 'in the palace,' the object of place; 'yesterday,' the object of time; and 'voluntarily,' the object of manner.

### 21. *Simple Proposition, with both Attributive and Objective Combination.*

'A good man governs his passions.'

This proposition exhibits all the syntactical combinations. Thus here 'man governs' is a predicative combination; 'good man,' an attributive combination; and 'governs his passions,' an objective combination.

### 22. *Intermediate Proposition with Simple Participle.*

'He answering said.'

The simple participle, by the objective modifications which it admits, forms propositions intermediate between the simple and the compound, or makes the transition from the simple to the compound.

The participle may be interchanged for a finite verb connected with the leading verb by the conjunction *and*. This is the most simple resolution of this participial construction.

The participle, thus used, may also be resolved into a subordinate proposition, and that expressing various relations.

### 23. *Intermediate Proposition with the Gerund.*

‘He came riding.’

The gerund, or adverbially used participle, does not express the relation of manner, like the adverbially used adjective, but the relation of the concomitant activity, under the form of the relation of time.

### 24. *Intermediate Proposition with Nominative Absolute.*

‘The enemy advancing, he retreated.’

This form is used when the subject of the participle is different from the subject of the proposition.

### 25. *Intermediate Proposition with the Supine.*

‘He prepared to go.’

The supine, or the infinitive with *to*, by the objective modifications which it admits, also forms propositions intermediate between the simple and the compound, or makes the transition from the simple to the compound.

As the infinitive represents the abstract idea of the verb as a substantive in the ground form, it is adapted, in its own nature, to express the subject, also the accusative or passive object, also the second accusative.

In English the supine, which is an oblique case of the infinitive, has usurped for the most part the place of the simple infinitive.

### 26. *Intermediate Proposition with an Accusative and Infinitive or Supine.*

‘He bade him stay.’

‘I advised him to go.’

The accusative is employed when the subject of the infinitive is different from the subject of the finite verb.

### 27. *Subordinative Compound Proposition, with Substantive Proposition denoting the Subject.*

‘That God exists, is demonstrable.’

In the progressive cultivation and refinement of a language, the subordinate proposition is naturally developed from the participial, or from the simple adjective or substantive. The participial sentence exhibits to advantage the unity of the whole thought, by making one proposition a mere member of the

other; the subordinative proposition exhibits better the logical worth of each member.

The substantive subordinate proposition expresses either the concrete; as, '*whoso hearkeneth unto me, shall dwell safely*;' '*what is right for one, is right for another*;' or the abstract; as, '*that God exists, is true*.'

28. *The Same, with Substantive Proposition denoting the Immediate Complement.*

'What men sow, they must expect also to reap.'

29. *The Same, with Substantive Proposition denoting the Second Complement.*

'The Bible teaches, that God is love.'

30. *Subordinative Compound Proposition, with an Adjective Proposition.*

'Balbus, who had a sword, drew it.'

This adjective proposition answers to an adjective in the simple proposition.

31. *Subordinative Compound Proposition, with Adverbial Proposition expressing the Place.*

'Where thou lodgest, I will lodge.'

The special forms of the adverbial proposition correspond to the special forms of the supplementary or adverbial object.

These subordinative propositions are generally expressed by the correlation of a demonstrative and relative; but when the adverbial proposition expresses the abstract idea of an activity, and corresponds to a substantive with a preposition, then the adverbial proposition is bound more loosely with the leading proposition.

32. *The Same, with Adverbial Proposition expressing the Time.*

'Whosoever ye will, ye may do them good.'

33. *The Same, with Adverbial Proposition expressing the Cause.*

'Because he could swear by none other, he swore by himself.'

This is a logical relation of thought, expressed in the form of a grammatical relation of ideas.

There are several varieties of this proposition:

(1.) To express the ground or reason; as, 'the stars appear small, *because they are distant from us.*'

(2.) To express the condition; as, 'I will not let thee go, *except thou bless me.*'

(3.) To express a concession; as, '*although we disregard it,* the evil day will come.'

(4.) To express the purpose; as, 'he changed his dress, *that he might escape.*'

(5.) To express the consequence; as, 'he is not man, *that he should lie.*'

34. *The Same, with an Adverbial Proposition expressing the Manner.*

'Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors.'

This form of proposition is sometimes expressed by a comparison of the assumed possibility; as, 'he looks *as if he were sick.*'

35. *The Same, with an Adverbial Proposition expressing Intensity.*

'One is so near to another, that no air can come between them.'

36. *Compound Proposition, with Various Subordinate Propositions.*

'The judge, that sat on the bench, was convinced, long before the cause was finished, that the prisoner was guilty of the crime with which he was charged.'

As the grammatical relations repeat themselves in the simple proposition, so the syntactical in the compound.

37. *Copulative Co-ordinating Compound Proposition.*

'The sun shines, and the air is pleasant.'

In the *co-ordinating* compound proposition, the two propositions are co-ordinate or independent of each other, yet still make but one thought.

In the *copulative* compound proposition, the members have no internal or immediate relation to each other, but only a common relation to a third proposition or sentiment, either expressed or understood.

The conjunction *and* is the type of this compound proposition.

38. *Antithetic Co-ordinating Compound Proposition.*

‘He is not an Englishman, but a Frenchman.’

In this form of proposition, the second member negatives the first.

The conjunction *but* is the type of this compound proposition.

39. *Restrictive Co-ordinating Compound Proposition.*

‘The house is convenient, but the garden is waste.’

Sometimes the restriction or limitation merely shuts out an inference; as, ‘he is rich, *yet not liberal*.’

The conjunctions *but* and *yet* are the types of this compound proposition.

40. *Disjunctive Co-ordinating Compound Proposition.*

‘Either the world had a creator, or it existed by chance.’

The conjunction *or* is the type of this compound proposition.

41. *Causative Compound Proposition.*

‘God is to be loved, for he is good.’

The conjunction *for* is the type of this compound proposition.

42. *Illative Compound Proposition.*

‘God is good, therefore he is to be loved.’

The conjunction *therefore* is the type of this compound proposition.

NOTE.—A compound proposition, which involves or shuts out an inference or deduction, constitutes a *period*; as, ‘God is to be loved, for he is good;’ ‘God is good, therefore he is to be loved;’ ‘he is rich, yet not liberal.’ So also some of the subordinative compound propositions. Comp. p. 26.

43. *Compound Period.*

‘Though I walk through the valley of death-shade, I will fear no evil; for thou art with me.’

Here ‘though I walk through the valley of death-shade, I will fear no evil,’ would of itself constitute a period. So ‘I will fear no evil, for thou art with me,’ is a period. The whole is a *compound period*.

We have thus given a regular series of propositions in their direct positive forms, with short and succinct notices as to their nature and use. But each of these forms, in order to be rightly appreciated, deserves a fuller treatment and more special investigation. We need to know the philosophical necessity which gives rise to each form, the meaning which appropriately belongs to it, and the abnormal or figurative use to which it may be applied.

This subject can be developed here only in part. In subsequent articles we shall select some of the more important topics, and hope to throw light on others in the way of analogy.

May, 1853.

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#### ART. IX.—DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH FROM THE PROPOSITION.

THE development of the parts of speech in the gradual building up of the proposition is an important, and to one who is curious in such matters an interesting topic.

Language, or continuous speech, is made up of propositions. The longest discourse may be reduced to propositions. But the proposition is the unit in language. It is capable of no further analysis in the same way. The proposition is a logical whole, and must be divided into logical parts. A sentence may be cut up into words, but this is not strictly an analysis.

Such being the nature of the proposition, the value of the parts of speech, or kinds of words, must depend on their relation to the proposition as a whole. The different parts of speech do not elicit themselves at once, but are elicited as the proposition is enlarged or built up. As some parts of speech are necessary to every proposition, and some parts of speech are exhibited only in the more complicated, and even compound propositions, it seems desirable to exhibit the order of their development.

I propose to exhibit a series of propositions, beginning from the more simple, each of which shall develop a new part of speech.

A just conception of this subject will help us to conceive of the formation and development of language, and will answer

in some measure the cavils of Dr. Charles Kraitsir against the so-called parts of speech, in his *Glossology* just published.

1. *Pluit*, 'it rains.' This is an imperfect proposition, consisting of a predication only, and having no logical subject conceived of or expressed. This form of speech is employed to describe certain operations of nature or states of the weather. It exhibits language in its first or earliest effort. It however develops the *verb*, (from Lat. *verbum*, 'the word,' because of its importance in a sentence,) or that part of speech which predicates or affirms action.

The natural origin of such verbs is sometimes clearly seen, as in *tonat*, 'it thunders,' where *ton* imitates in some measure the sound of thunder.

2. *Sol lucet*, 'the sun shines.' This is a perfect proposition, consisting of a predicate and subject combined, and that in its most simple form. We see the subject or cause evolving itself, as it were, from the predicate or effect. This proposition develops the *substantive*, (from Lat. *substantia*, 'substance,') or that part of speech which denotes a being, substance, or essence. The verb and the substantive are the two most important parts of speech. The action and the substance which they denote constitute the highest antithesis in nature.

This evolution of the substantive from the verb, or of the substance from the action, is often exhibited etymologically; as, *lux* (*luc*) *lucet*, 'the shiner shines,' both from *luc*; *rex* (*reg*) *regit*, 'the governor governs,' both from *reg*; *flumen fluit*, 'the flower flows,' both from *flu*.

3. *Sol est lucidus*, 'the sun is bright.' In this proposition formed from No. 2, the predicate is evolved from the predication, and expressed separately. This enables the mind to rest the better upon it. This predicate exhibits the *adjective*, (from Lat. *adjectus*, 'added,' because it may be added directly to a substantive,) or that part of speech which expresses an attribute or quality of the substantive.

In the same way *Deus est vivus* is developed from *Deus vivit*, where *vivus* and *vivit* both come from *viv*.

4. *Sol lucet splendide*, 'the sun shines brightly.' Passing over propositions whose predicate is modified by a complementary object, (i. e. an object necessary to complete the sense,) as an accusative or dative case, we come to this proposition whose predicate is modified or enlarged by an object not complement-

ary. This modifying word is the *adverb*, (from Lat. *ad verbum*, 'to the verb,') or that part of speech which is joined to a verb. It may be regarded as a substantive with a case-ending; comp. *raro*, 'rarely,' *subito*, 'suddenly.'

The verb, the substantive, the adjective, and the proper adverb, all express ideas or notions, and are called *notional words* in the Beckerian nomenclature. They differ from the other parts of speech which denote mere relations of ideas, and are called *form-words*.

5. *Sol lucet in cælo*, 'the sun shines in heaven.' Here again the predicate is modified or enlarged by an object not complementary, or necessary to complete the sense. But instead of the case-ending merely of the substantive, the relation of the substantive to the predicate is expressed by a separate word. This word is the *preposition*, (from Lat. *prepositio*, 'a placing before,' because placed before the substantive,) or that part of speech which expresses the relation between the verb and its object.

6. *Ille vivit*, 'he lives.' Here the subject is not named, as in the substantive, from some permanent quality, but is demonstrated or pointed out, as it were, from its relation to the speaker. Such a word is a *pronoun*, (from Lat. *pro nomine*, 'instead of a noun,' because used for a noun,) or that part of speech which points out, but does not name objects.

7. *Multi peccant*, 'many sin.' Here the subject is not named, as in the substantive, from some permanent quality, but from its mass or quantity, as viewed by the speaker. Such a word is called a *numeral* or *quantitative* by Becker, and is regarded as a distinct part of speech.

8. *Sol est globus*, 'the sun is a globe.' The abstract or substantive verb here, having lost its force to express an idea or notion and expressing only a relation, is called by Becker the *predicate-word*.

9. *Sol lucet, et aer est calidus*, 'the sun shines, and the air is warm.' Here two thoughts or propositions are connected with each other. The particle *et* 'and' is a *conjunction*, (from Lat. *conjunctio*, 'a joining together,') or that part of speech which shows the relation of propositions to each other, without belonging to either of them.

10. *Ah, ego pereō*, 'Ah, I perish.' Here an instinctive exclamation, which in itself forms no part of language, is intermina-



gled with discourse. It is called an *interjection*, (from Lat. *interfectio*, 'a throwing in,' because thrown in between other words,) or that part of speech which consists of instinctive exclamations.

In this discussion we have had reference only to the direct forms of language, where the verb is in the indicative mood. Interrogative, imperative, optative, and conditional sentences, are propositions only indirectly, or in a qualified sense.

Oct. 1852.

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#### ART. X.—THE THREE SYNTACTICAL COMBINATIONS.

THE sentence or proposition constitutes the soul and essence of language, and is the central point of all grammatical investigations.

The analysis of the proposition continues to engage the attention of the philosophic grammarian, and the results of his investigations should be early imbibed by the youthful mind.

The sentence or proposition does not consist directly of words. Words brought together by mere juxtaposition do not constitute a sentence. They are merely the rude material. Something more is necessary to make them an organic whole.

According to the view of modern philologists, a sentence or proposition is made up immediately, not of words, but of syntactical groupings or combinations of words. These syntactical combinations are of three kinds only, viz. *the predicative*, *the attributive*, and *the objective*. Not every phrase or grouping of words is a syntactical combination, or a combination which enters immediately into the structure of the sentence.

I. The first syntactical combination is *the predicative*; as, 'God exists.' It consists of two factors, the subject and the predicate.

*The subject* is a substantive, i. e. the idea of a substance, or of something conceived of as such, concerning which something is affirmed; as, 'God.'

*The predicate* is a verb, i. e. the idea of an action or activity, which is affirmed concerning the subject; as, 'exists.'

The subject and the predicate, by means of this relation between them, are combined by the speaker, at the moment of

speaking, into a unit or whole. It is the nature of the predicative combination, that the predicate and subject together form *one thought*, and that thought a *judgment* or affirmation of the human mind.

According to the different forms of the predicative combination, the predicate may be,

1. A verb ; as, '*glass breaks.*'
2. An adjective ; as, '*the glass is green.*'
3. A substantive ; as, '*John is a physician.*'
4. A substantive with a preposition ; as, '*he is in good spirits.*'
5. An adverb ; as, '*the fire is out.*'

The unity of the thought is evident in all these combinations or groupings.

A predicative combination alone constitutes a simple proposition in its crude or naked form ; but the other syntactical combinations are necessary, in order to enlarge and expand the simple proposition, and the repetition of the predicative combination is necessary, in order to constitute a compound proposition.

II. The second syntactical combination is *the attributive*; as, '*Almighty God.*' This consists of two factors, viz. a substantive, or the idea of a substance ; as, '*God ;*' and the attribute, which involves the idea of an action or activity ; as, '*Almighty.*' These two factors are combined, not necessarily by the speaker, nor necessarily at the moment of speaking, into *one idea* (not *one thought*.) and that *the idea of a substance*.

According to the different forms of the attributive combination, the attribute may be,

1. An adjective ; as, '*the virtuous man.*'
2. A substantive in apposition ; as, '*my brother, the physician.*'
3. A substantive in the genitive case ; as, '*the sun's course.*'
4. A substantive with a preposition ; as, '*an enemy to his country.*'
5. A substantive used adjectively ; as, '*the marriage act.*'
6. An adverb ; as, '*the under side.*'
7. A participle ; as, '*running water.*'
8. A pronoun ; as, '*this book.*'

All these groupings or combinations, it is evident, constitute *one idea*, and that *the idea of a substance*.

III. The third syntactical combination is *the objective*; as, 'made man.' This consists of two factors, viz. a verb or adjective, involving the idea of action; as, 'made;' and an object to which such activity is directed; as, 'man.' The two factors are combined so as to make *one idea*, and that *an idea of action or activity*.

According to the different forms of the objective combination, the object may be expressed,

1. By a substantive in an oblique case; as, 'made *man*.'
2. By a substantive with a preposition; as, 'gave *to him*.'
3. By an adverb; as, 'acted *wisely*.'
4. By an infinitive; as, 'desires *to go*.'
5. By a pronominal word; as, 'killed *him*.'

All these combinations or groupings, it is evident, constitute *one idea*, and that *the idea of action*.

The complex sentence, 'The father, anxious about the child, wrote a long letter,' may be analyzed thus:

'The father wrote,' is a predicative combination.

'The anxious father,' is an attributive combination.

'Wrote a letter,' is an objective combination.

'Anxious about the child,' is an objective combination.

'A long letter,' is an attributive combination.

In this way, sentences may be developed to an indefinite extent.

Feb. 1850.

## ART. XI.—THE THREE SYNTACTICAL COMBINATIONS.

[More fully explained.]

"Every sentence, to whatever extent the relations which it comprehends may have been multiplied, is composed of only three kinds of combinations, *the predicative, the attributive, and the objective*."

C. F. BECKER.

WERE I to point out a new proposition which is destined to exert a powerful influence on the intellectual culture of man, from its earliest to its highest stages, I might, without impropriety, adduce the preceding sentence from the learned and philosophic Becker. The discovery involved therein is now engaging the labors of learned philologists abroad, and remoulding the form, I may almost say, the very substance of

grammatical instruction. It is now the basis of arrangement in all the new treatises on syntax, as being alone accordant with the true nature of language.

I propose to make some remarks on the nature and bearing of this new Beckerian doctrine.

Every sentence or thought consists of words or ideas. But words or ideas merely continuous in time or space, while they remain isolated in the mind, cannot form a sentence. They merely constitute its matter. There is evidently wanting some act or energy of the mind to attach each additional word to some preceding word in the sentence, and thus to make a whole. This first gives to the sentence its form, and constitutes its organization. Now the question arises, whether this act or energy of the mind is the same in every combination of words or ideas, or whether it varies in different cases; and if it varies, of how many varieties it consists. This important question Becker has endeavored to answer by saying, that there are three syntactical relations between words or ideas, giving rise to the three syntactical combinations mentioned above, and that these three are all. This conclusion, if true, cannot fail to be a very important one.

I. The first syntactical relation is already familiar to us. It is the *predicative relation*, or the relation of the predicate to the subject; as, 'Deus amat,' God loves. Every proposition or sentence necessarily has two constituent parts: the subject and the predicate. *The subject* is an idea of existence of which something is affirmed; *the predicate* is an idea of action which is affirmed of the subject. The subject and predicate, at the moment of speaking, are connected by means of this relation, and constitute one thought. We speak here of a leading proposition or sentence. In a subordinate proposition the two factors form one idea or notion.

There are three kinds of subjects; (1.) real existences, or existences which are found in nature, and have an external reality; (2.) things that exist only as conceived of, or merely in our conceptions, yet aside from language; and (3.) things existing merely in language, or for the purposes of human speech, and having no farther place in our conceptions. But with these distinctions we are not specially concerned here.

The different forms of the predicative combinations are the following:

(1.) The predicate may be a verb; as, '*glass breaks.*' This is the appropriate form of this combination, when the more general idea expressed by the predicate is reduced to a more special one by means of the subject, as in the example just given.

The verb expresses both the predicate and the combination of the predicate with the subject.

The predicates which follow require the intervention of the substantive verb or copula, which has the inflection of the verb.

(2.) The predicate may be an adjective. This is the appropriate form, when the more general idea expressed by the subject is rendered more special by means of the predicate; as, '*the glass is green.*' The adjective, however, is sometimes used as the verb above; as, '*glass is fragile.*'

The adjective is adapted to express an antithetic correlation; as, '*the man is rich,*' i. e. '*he is not poor.*'

(3.) The predicate may be a noun; as, '*he is a physician,*' '*man is dust.*' This form interchanges with the preceding, and answers nearly the same purpose.

(4.) The predicate may be a substantive with a preposition; as, '*he is in good spirits.*' So an infinitive with a preposition; as, '*he is to come to-morrow.*'

(5.) The predicate may be an adverb; as, '*the fire is out,*' i. e. '*the fire is gone out.*' This form may be considered as elliptical.

A sentence may be formed by a predicate and subject, i. e. by a predicative combination only. But when the sentence is extended we have other syntactical relations.

II. The second syntactical relation is *the attributive*. This term also is found in our current grammars, although too limited in its application, and not defined with sufficient exactness. Any substantive in a sentence may have a word or phrase joined to it attributively; and any word or phrase, which is capable of being used predicatively by means of the substantive verb *to be*, may be used attributively without such verb.

The object of the attributive, like that of the predicate, is to limit more exactly, or specify more minutely, the force of the substantive to which it relates, and thus to reduce the more general to the more special. But it presupposes a judgment, does not express one. It expresses a predicate, not as a full thought or predication, but in the form of an idea or notion. The substantive and attribute are not first joined at the moment

of speaking, but the attributive combination makes use of a past or former predication.

The different forms of the attributive combination are the following:

(1.) The attributive adjective; as, 'the *virtuous* man.' This is the primary form of the attributive combination, and is properly employed to reduce the genus to the species, as in the example just given. But many attributive adjectives are mere epithets; as, 'the *eloquent* Cicero;' or contain a judgment or decision of the human mind; as, 'he preferred this *ungrateful* son to all the others,' i. e. notwithstanding he was ungrateful.

March, 1845.

The following are merely varieties of the attributive adjective:

(1.) The attributive participle; as, 'running water;' 'the *caught* thief.'

(2.) The attributive pronoun; as, 'this book.'

(3.) The adverb, used as an adjective; as, 'the *under* side;' 'an *off-hand* manner.'

(4.) The substantive used as an adjective; as, 'the *marriage* act;' 'a *savings* bank;' 'a *gold* ring;' 'a *barn* door;' 'Tuesday night.'

2. The attributive substantive in apposition; as, 'my brother, the *physician*.' This form of the attribute is naturally adapted to express identity, and that of one individual with another. Hence it serves not to reduce the genus to the species, but to reduce the species to the individual. When it expresses an antithesis, it expresses the antithesis of the individual. See this subject more fully developed in Art. on Substantive in Apposition, *infra*.

3. The attributive genitive; as, 'the *sun's* course.' This case, being in its origin, the adnominal case, or case joined to a noun, is adapted in its own nature to modify or limit the force of the noun to which it is joined. It properly expresses the attribute of the individual, but also expresses the attribute of kind.

So far as it is the attribute of the individual, it properly precedes, as in English, with the subordinate tone. Compare 'Israel's sons' with 'sons of Israel;' 'the sun's light' with 'light of the sun;' 'God's word' with 'word of God;' 'the king's speech' with 'speech of the king;' 'the Lord's day' with 'day of the Lord;' where the first form of each couplet, it is thought, is more individualized than the last.

4. A substantive with a preposition; as, the crown of the king; the march of an army; the father of the girl; the roof of a house; a man of honor; a rod of iron; an enemy to his country; a friend to his cause; milk for babes; the man in the moon; the love of our country; the injuries of the *Helvetii*.

The preposition *of*, in some cases, is nearly equivalent to a genitive.

This form has arisen, in some cases, from a predicate enlarged to an objective combination.

III. The third syntactical relation is *the objective*, or the relation of the object to a verb or adjective. This term also is familiar to us. But it is taken by Becker in a more extended sense than by common grammarians. It includes, according to him, not only the direct object, the indirect object, and the second object; but also the circumstances of place, time, manner, and causality. The *object* is any thing to which the action implied in the verb or adjective is referred. As the action which lies in the verb or adjective is conceived of as motion, so every reference of the action is conceived of as the direction of that motion to some object. The object is declined in order to express the relation.

As the attributive combination expresses only one idea, and that a substantive or the idea of a substance; so the objective combination expresses only one idea, and that a verb or the idea of action. The objective combination expresses an idea formed for the moment of discourse, by the combination of the object with the verb or adjective to one idea.

The different forms of the objective combination are as follows :

1. The object may be expressed by a noun in an oblique case. This is the appropriate form to express the complement of the verb or adjective, or the higher spiritual relations.

2. The object may be expressed by a preposition with a noun following. This, it is well known, is equivalent to and interchanges with the cases. It is appropriated to the expression of place, time, and causality.

3. The object may be expressed by an adverb. The adverbs are a sort of case-form. They are adapted to express the manner.

4. The object may be expressed by an infinitive. The infinitive is a noun, and the prefix to it is a preposition.

5. The object may be expressed by a pronoun or pronominal adverb.

These are the special forms of the object.

On the syntactical combinations in general, we observe,

1. That each of them is the reduction of the general to the special. Thus '*glass breaks*' is a more specific thought than '*there is a breaking*'; '*a virtuous man*' is a more specific conception than '*a man*;' and '*acted wisely*' is a more specific action than simply '*acted*.'

2. That this reduction is effected by the antithesis of substance and action; ideas of substance being reduced by ideas of action, and ideas of action by those of substance.

3. That the most appropriate division of syntax depends on these three syntactical combinations.

4. That each of these syntactical combinations is a combination, i. e. forms an unity.

5. That they are named from their internal nature.

May, 1853.

## ART. XII.—GREENE'S ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSITION.

MR. S. S. GREENE, in his elaborate *Treatise on the Structure of the English Language*, lately published by Thomas, Cowperthwait & Co., has attempted a new and philosophical analysis of the sentence or proposition.

As the proposition is the unit or central point in language, and the value of every word and of every form depends on its relation to the proposition, the problem proposed becomes intensely interesting, and if rightly solved, cannot fail to have an important influence on our views of language, and through them on our conceptions, thoughts, and reasonings.

According to Mr. Greene, there are in a sentence or proposition, five elements or component parts, viz. the *subject* and the *predicate*, which are indispensable, and cannot be repeated in a simple sentence, and the *adjective* element, the *objective* element, and the *adverbial* element, which are incidental, and may be repeated in the same sentence. These are said to be all the elements, which a sentence or proposition can contain within itself.

The following is given as a model of a simple sentence :

'Constant boasting always betrays incapacity.'



Here 'boasting' is the *subject*; 'betrays' is the *predicate*; 'constant' is the *adjective* element; 'incapacity' is the *objective* element; and 'always' is the *adverbial* element.

But if we follow out our author in his principle of grouping words, and look more to the thought than to the external expression, these five elements may be reduced to three syntactical combinations or groupings.

For, in the first place, the adverbial element is merely a species or variety of the objective element. The objective element of the author embraces the *complementary object*, or what is necessary after an objective verb to complete the idea of the verb, and the adverbial element embraces the *supplementary object* after a verb whether objective or subjective.

In the second place, the subject and predicate are merely factors of the same syntactical combination or grouping, to wit, the predicative.

According to these views, a sentence may contain three syntactical combinations or groupings, the predicative, the attributive, and the objective, and the sentence, 'constant boasting always betrays incapacity,' would be analyzed thus :

'Boasting betrays' is a *predicative* combination, in which 'betrays' bears to 'boasting' the predicative relation.

'Constant boasting' is an *attributive* combination, in which 'constant' bears to 'boasting' the attributive relation.

'Betrays incapacity' is an *objective* combination, in which 'incapacity' bears to 'betrays' the objective relation.

'Betrays always' is another objective combination.

Every sentence, to whatever extent the relations which it comprehends may have been multiplied, is composed of only these three kinds of combinations.

But besides these elements which enter into the proposition itself, we have in continuous discourse the *compellative* or *vocative*, and the *interjection* or *exclamation*, which are thrown in between the parts of a sentence, and the *conjunction*, which exhibits the relation of sentences to each other.

Dec. 1849.

The doctrine concerning *phrases*, as exhibited by Mr. Greene in a long chapter, I regard as unfortunate. The use of *one* word, or of *two* words, to express a particular idea, does not authorize the broad distinction which he makes between a word and a phrase.

May, 1853.

## ART. XIII.—NOTIONAL WORDS AND FORM-WORDS.

THE term *parts of speech* has been for some time an object of opprobrium; (1.) on account of the impropriety of the expression, as implying that all words are immediate parts of speech or discourse; (2.) on account of the anomalous classification, as not being founded on one uniform principle; and (3.) on account of the inadequacy of the names given to them, as indicating only their external relations.

The way has been prepared for a better understanding of the subject, by showing the *gradual*, not *coetaneous*, development of the kinds of words or parts of speech. See Art. IX. *supra*.

Still more important is Dr. Becker's general division of words into *notional words* and *form-words*.

By *notional words* he understands words which express notions, or general abstract conceptions; and by *form-words*, or *relational words*, words which express only relations of our conceptions.

Notional words are the following:

1. *The verb*, which expresses the idea of activity, and also the act of predication which unites the idea of activity with the idea of a substance or thing into one thought; as, 'the child *sleeps*;' 'the tree *grows*;' 'the horse *runs*.'

2. *The substantive*, which expresses the idea of a substance or thing; as, '*child*,' '*tree*,' '*horse*.'

3. *The adjective*, which expresses an attribute, i. e. an activity by which the kind of thing is reduced to a species, but without a predication; as, 'the *beautiful* child;' 'the *green* tree;' 'the *swift* horse.'

4. *The notional adverb*, which expresses the manner, time, or place of action, absolutely, or without reference to the speaker; as, 'the child sleeps *sweetly*;' 'the tree grows *slowly*;' 'the horse runs *swiftly*;' 'he will arrive *early*;' 'the troops march *eastward*.'

Form-words, or relational words, are the following:

1. *The auxiliary verb*, which expresses no proper predicate; including (1.) the predicate-word or copula, *to be*; (2.) the auxiliary verb of time, as, *to have*, etc. and (3.) the auxiliary verb of mode, as, *may*, *can*, etc.

2. *The article*, which is placed before a substantive to limit its signification ; as, 'a man;' '*the* child.'—This part of speech was not noticed in Art. IX. as the examples were taken from the Latin language.

3. *The pronoun*, which expresses the relation of personality, the demonstrative limitation, or the interrogative limitation ; as, 'James saw *him*;' '*this* book is useful;' '*what* book is that ?'

4. *The numeral* or *quantitative*, which expresses the number or quantity, as viewed by the speaker ; as, '*many* people;' '*much* good.'

5. *The preposition*, which connects an object with its verb or adjective, and shows the relation between them ; as, 'I go to England;' 'he lives *in* France;' 'he is content *with* his fate.'

6. *The conjunction*, which connects two sentences or propositions, and shows the relation between them ; as, 'my father arrived, *and* I met him;' 'he was poor, *but* he lived comfortably.'

7. *The relational adverb*, which limits the signification of the predicate by relations to the speaker ; as, 'he lives *here*;' 'he departs *now*;' 'he speaks *thus*;' 'he will *perhaps* come.'

8. *The interjection*, which is merely an instinctive exclamation ; as, '*Ah*, I perish.'

May, 1853.

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#### ART. XIV.—THE VERB AND ITS SPECIES.

THE verb is a notional word, which expresses the idea of an activity, and also the act of predication by means of which the idea of activity becomes united with the idea of a thing into one thought ; as, 'the sun *shines*;' 'the tree *grows*;' 'the cord *binds*.'

We have already shown (see Art. V. supra) that all roots or radical words are verbs, and that all radical ideas express activities, subordinate to the generic idea of motion. For states of rest are only special forms of motion. They are activities checked by counter activities. They are often expressed in language by the activity of which they are the result ; as, *to exist*, from Lat. *existo*, 'to stand out;' *to repose*, from Lat. *repono*, 'to place back.'

The generic idea of activity is often reduced by another idea to a specific or particular activity. This other idea is called the

object of the activity; as, 'the boy eats *an apple*;' 'the horse runs *swiftly*.'

Verbs, which express activities which can be conceived of without an object to complete the sense, are called *subjective* verbs; as, 'the child *sleeps*;' 'the horse *runs*.'

Many verbs express activities, which cannot be conceived of without a thing by means of which the idea is reduced to a specific or particular activity. These are called *objective* verbs, and the object is called a *complementary* object; as, 'he enjoys *his food*;' 'he drinks *wine*;' 'he escapes *from danger*.'

This is the most important distinction in verbs; the other classes of verbs may be readily reduced to these.

A *transitive* verb is an objective verb which requires after it a *suffering* or *passive* object to complete the sense; as, 'he *smites* the dog;' 'he *plants* a tree;' 'he *shears* the sheep.'

A *causative* verb is a transitive verb whose passive object is so changed by the subject as itself to become active; as, 'he *fells* (causes to fall) a tree;' 'he *wakes* (causes to awake) the sleeper.'

A *passive* verb, or a verb in the *passive* voice, may be regarded as a subjective verb; as, 'the man *was injured*.' The passive form is convenient, when it is more important to exhibit the object than the agent of an action. The use of it enables us to avoid changing the subject of discourse.

A *reflexive* verb in which the agent truly and properly acts upon himself, as 'to examine one's self,' needs no special notice. A reflexive verb in which the agent does not truly and properly act upon himself, as 'to fret one's self,' is merely an expedient for forming an intransitive out of a transitive verb. See Fowler's *E. G.* § 308, where the subject of reflexive verbs is fully discussed.

An *impersonal* verb constitutes an imperfect proposition; see p. 27, *supra*.

The verb *to be*, when employed to express merely the copula, is called the *predicate-word*, and is no longer a notional word; as, 'God *is* wise.' The same is true of *the auxiliary verbs of time* and of *the auxiliary verbs of mode*.

May, 1853.

## ART. XV.—THE SUBSTANTIVE AND ITS SPECIES.

THE substantive may be treated, it is thought, more philosophically than is done in our common English grammars.

The substantive is a notional word, which expresses the idea of a substance or thing, having an actual existence; as, *horse, book, river, God, angel*; or of something merely conceived of as such; as, *play, sleep, youth*. The former are the proper substantives.

Substantives are either *names of persons*; as, *father, son, friend*; or *names of things which are not persons*; as, *stone, book*.

Names of men, male animals, and masculine offices, are masculine; names of women, female animals, and feminine offices, are feminine; and other words are neuter.

But many names of things, and many abstract nouns, have retained to the present day the gender which they had in the original languages.

Substantives, properly so called, are either names of substances which exist as detached individuals; as, *house, John, people*; or names of substances which exist only in the aggregate; as, *gold, air, water*. All these are *concrete nouns*.

Names of substances, existing as detached individuals, are, in relation to number, either

(1.) *Common names*, i. e. names common to all the individuals of the class; as, *house, boy, hat, angel*. These substantives may be in the singular or plural number, according as one or more individuals are intended.

(2.) *Proper names*, i. e. names which have lost their generic application, and are now appropriated to one individual person or place; as, *David, Rome*. These can properly be only in the singular number.

A proper name does not become a common name by being applied to different individuals; since such individuals have nothing in common but the name, which is an incidental circumstance.

But a proper name may be used for a common name by a metonymy; as, 'he was a *Demosthenes*,' i. e. a great orator.

(3.) *Collective nouns*, which express many things together as one thing; as, *people, army*.

To every collective noun there naturally stands some other noun in the relation of a *nomen unitatis*; as, *man*, one of a *people*; *soldier*, one of an *army*; *sheep*, one of a *flock*; *ox*, one of a *herd*; etc.

Names of substances which exist only in the aggregate are called *nouns of the material*; as, *water*, *air*, *earth*, *rice*, *pulse*, *gold*. To these correspond not *nomina unitatis*, but phrases; as, *a drop of water*, *a particle of air*, *a grain of rice*, *a piece of gold*.

There are some peculiar nouns which are treated as nouns of the material; as, '*man is mortal*;' '*spirit hath not flesh and blood*;' '*flesh and blood shall not inherit the kingdom of heaven*.'

The plural number is often used to denote nouns of the material; as, *dregs*, *hops*, *weeds*, *clouds*, *means*, *news*, *wages*, *less*.

The other class of substantives is the *abstract noun*, which expresses the idea of an activity, taken apart from the substance to which it belongs; and considered as having an independent existence.

Abstract nouns include,

(1.) Names of actions, i. e. activities without continuance; whether single, as *a call*, *a run*, *a journey*, *a question*; or repeated, as *howling*, *beggary*, *play*.—The infinitive mode may be included here.

(2.) Names of states or conditions, i. e. activities, which after their nature are conceived of with more or less permanency; as, *joy*, *sorrow*, *war*, *peace*, *courage*, *fear*, *friendship*, *sleep*, *rest*, *life*, *death*.

(3.) Names of properties or qualities, i. e. immanent activities adhering to things; as, *beauty*, *deformity*, *wealth*, *poverty*, *strength*, *weakness*. These are developed generally in antitheses.

The distinction of genus and species is sometimes observable in abstract nouns; as, *justice*, a species under the genus *virtue*.

Many abstract nouns are used also as concretes; as, *a favor*, *a height*.

For adjectives used substantively, see Art. XVIII. *infra*.

The following are *substantive clauses* or *propositions*: '*Whoso findeth me findeth life*,' Prov. 8 : 35. '*He that sinneth against me wrongeth his own soul*,' Prov. 8 : 36. '*Then shall ye discern between him that serveth God and him that serveth him not*,' Mal. 3 : 18. *He* in these cases is no proper antecedent, but merely a *determinative*. See *Christ. Spect.* 1837, p. 119.

May, 1853.

## ART. XVI.—THE ADJECTIVE IN ENGLISH.

THERE are several uses of the adjective in English, which it is important to distinguish.

1. The primary use of the adjective is to express the predicate. If we compare *ille est vivus* with *ille vivit*, we shall find that the adjective differs from the verb, in that it expresses the predicate only, and not the predication also. It is a sort of imperfect verb, and joined with the substantive verb *to be*, is adapted to express the idea of the verb from which it is derived with more force or emphasis. The adjective form is especially appropriated to express antithesis. Hence adjectives are developed in pairs or couplets; as, *great* and *small*, *long* and *short*, *broad* and *narrow*, *high* and *low*, *deep* and *shallow*; and are capable of comparison; as, *great*, *greater*, *greatest*; *small*, *smaller*, *smallest*.

2. A second, but very common and very important use of the adjective, is to express the attribute. If we compare *vir bonus*, 'the good man,' with *vir est bonus*, 'the man is good,' we shall find that in the former phrase the adjective *bonus* expresses a distinct syntactical relation from what it does in the latter. The former is the attributive, and the latter the predicative relation.

3. The adjective, whether employed as an attribute or as a predicate, usually limits more exactly or specifies more minutely the force of the substantive to which it relates, and thus reduces the more general to the more special; but adjectives are sometimes used as mere epithets. Compare 'a cruel tyrant,' with 'a cruel prince;' 'a rich capitalist,' with 'a rich man;' 'the eloquent Cicero;' 'the most high God.'

4. Sometimes, by a rhetorical figure, the form of the attribute is employed to express a predication or judgment of the mind; as, 'he preferred his ungrateful son to all the others,' i. e. notwithstanding he was ungrateful.

It is important to discriminate these uses, as well as to know to what substantive the adjective belongs.

Aug. 1847.

## ART. XVII.—TABLE OF CORRELATIVE ADJECTIVES.

If we compare *ille est vivus*, 'he is alive,' with *ille vivit*, 'he lives,' we shall find that the adjective differs from the verb, in that it expresses the predicate only, and not the predication also. The form of the adjective, thus freed from the predication, is especially adapted to express antithesis. Every adjective stands in a direct or implied opposition, or antithesis, to some other. Hence adjectives are developed in pairs, or couplets, from distinct roots, the members of which stand in beautiful correlation to each other. This characteristic of the adjective may, with great practical benefit to the young, be exhibited in a table. Such a table, with incidental explanations, will help much to bring language to consciousness, which is one of the leading aims in the new or Beckerian philology.

This table will also show how that words, expressing intellectual or moral ideas, originally expressed physical ideas.

1. *Great* and *small*, in physical dimensions, (see Deut. xxv. 13,) or in whatever is conceived of as such, as worth or importance, (see 1 Sam. xx. 2.)

2. *Great* and *little*, in physical dimensions, (see Matt. xiii. 32,) or in whatever is conceived of as such, as worth or importance, (see Matt. xi. 11.)

3. *Much* and *little*, in continuous quantity, (see Deut. xxviii. 38,) or in intensity, (see Luke vii. 47.)

4. *Many* and *few*, in number or discrete quantity, (see Num. xiii. 18.)

5. *Long* and *short*, in linear extension, (see 1 Cor. xi. 14,) or in whatever may be conceived of as such, as time, (see Prov. x. 27.)

6. *Broad* or *wide* and *strait* or *narrow*, in extent from side to side, (see Job xxxvi. 16. Matt. vii. 13, 14,) or in whatever is conceived of as such, (see Ps. cxix. 96.)

7. *High* and *low*, in elevation, (see Deut. iii. 5,) or in rank, (see Ps. xlix. 2.)

8. *Thick* and *thin*, in a physical sense, (see 2 Kings viii. 15. Ex. xxxix. 3,) or in a metaphorical sense, (see Is. xvii. 4.)

9. *Fat* and *lean*, in regard to flesh, (see Is. xvii. 4,) or in a metaphorical sense, (see Num. xiii. 20.)

10. *Crooked* and *straight*, in direction, (see Is. xl. 4,) or in moral conduct, (see Deut. xxxii. 5.)



11. *Swift* and *slow*, in motion, (see Job ix. 26,) or in a metaphorical sense, (see James i. 19.)

12. *Hard* and *soft*, in a physical sense, (see Ps. lxxv. 10,) or in a metaphorical sense, (see Job xxiii. 16.)

13. *Heavy* or *grievous* and *light*, whether in a literal or metaphorical sense, (see Prov. xxvii. 3. Is. ix. 1.)

14. *Rough* and *plain* or *smooth*, in a physical sense, (see Is. xl. 4. Luke iii. 5.)

15. *Light* and *dark*, (see Matt. vi. 23. Luke xi. 36.)

16. *Strong* and *weak*, in a physical sense, (see Num. xiii. 18,) or in a metaphorical sense, (see 2 Cor. xii. 10.)

17. *Hot* and *cold*, in a physical sense, (see Gen. viii. 22,) or in a metaphorical sense, (see Rev. iii. 15; 16.)

18. *Warm* and *cool*, (see 2 Kings iv. 34.)

19. *Bitter* and *sweet*, (see Is. v. 20.)

July, 1848.

The antithetic adjective is sometimes formed by means of the negative prefix *un* or *in*; as, *like* and *unlike*; *certain* and *uncertain*; *convenient* and *inconvenient*; *noble* and *ignoble*.

Other antithetic adjectives become so by expressing a privation or defect; as, *blind*, *deaf*, *dumb*, *lame*.

In some cases the antithesis is less obvious; as, *red*, *green*, *yellow*.

May, 1853.

#### ART. XVIII.—THE ADJECTIVE MORE FULLY DEVELOPED.

It is proposed now to enter more fully into the doctrine of the adjective.

1. *The adjective is intermediate between the verb and the substantive.*

The verb expresses activity. The substantive expresses essence or substance. The verb expresses what is passing in time. The substantive what exists at an indivisible moment. Substance or essence and activity are the highest antithesis in nature, the most important distinction in language. Essence and activity are the only actualities in the universe. They and their relations constitute all our ideas.

The adjective is intermediate between them. It is an attribute, not now for the first time assigned to its subject, nor yet

become incorporated with it. Compare *flumen rapidum*, where *rapidum* is an adjective, on the one hand, with *flumen rapit*, where *rapit* is a verb, and, on the other, with *torrens*, (= *flumen rapidum*), where *rapidum* is already incorporated with the noun. The adjective has only a subjective existence. Hence adjectives are less contrasted with verbs and substantives, than they are with each other, and are less important as a part of speech.

All proper adjectives, being intermediate between verbs and substantives, are derived from verbs and substantives, and like them are general terms, denoting ideas of kind.

2. *Two classes of adjectives*.—There are two classes of adjectives which it is important to distinguish.

(1.) Primary adjectives, lying near the root, derived from radical verbs, and others derived from abstract nouns, which express the verbal idea, concreting, as it were, with the substantive.

(2.) Secondary adjectives, more removed from the root, derived from concrete substantives, (which are themselves derived from verbs,) and corresponding to an inflected noun.

3. *Adjectives as predicates and as attributes*.—Most adjectives are used both as predicates and attributes. Thus 'the king was *wise*' and 'the *wise* king,' where *wise* is a stem-adjective; 'the house was *angular*' and 'an *angular* house,' where *angular* is derived from a noun. To express the predicate they take the substantive verb.

But some adjectives are hardly used, except as predicates; as, *alike*, *alone*, *awake*, *aware*, *beforehand*, *mindful*, *worth*.

Other adjectives are hardly used, except as attributes; as, *daily*, *hourly*; *golden*; *thievish*; *childish*; *paternal*, *fraternal*.

4. *Primary adjectives derived from radical verbs, and others derived from abstract nouns*.—These denote activities proceeding from the subject to which the adjective refers, and correspond in some measure to active participles; as, 'a *wise* man,' i. e. knowing; 'a *sharp* knife,' i. e. cutting; 'a *faithful* man,' i. e. believing. So *green*, *hot*, *hard*, *soft*, *sharp*.

(1.) The following are examples of these adjectives: Lat. *fidus* from *fido*; *vivus* from *vivo*; *altus* from *alo*; *false* from Lat. *fallo*; *loud* from Germ. *lauten*, 'to sound'; *thin* from Germ. *dehnen*, 'to stretch out'; *wise* from *to wit*; *green* from *to grow*. These are, as it were, imperfect verbs.

(3.) The adjective denotes the predicate, but not the predication; comp. 'homo est *vivus*' with 'homo *vivit*,' 'nix est *alba*'

with 'nix *albet*.' Neither does the adjective express time. But such adjectives, derived from verbs, differ from verbs in expressing an antithesis of kind. See Art. XVII. *supra*.

(3.) Adjectives from abstract nouns resemble those from verbs; as, *sleepy, witty, vital, faithful, virtuous*.

5. *Secondary adjectives derived from concrete nouns.*—These correspond, as it were, to the genitive of such nouns, express an action emanating from the noun, and may be explained by a passive participle; as, 'a *royal* citadel,' i. e. possessed by a king; 'a *golden* ring,' i. e. made of gold; 'a *horned* animal,' i. e. furnished with horns; 'a *true-hearted* man,' i. e. endowed with a true heart.

(1.) The forms of these adjectives are various; as, *cloudy, muddy; wooden, golden; fatherly, kingly; horned, winged; sheepish, thievish; regal, paternal; angular, cellular; angelic, cosmic; tributary; adamantine*. They are, as it were, inflections of the nouns.

(2.) Such adjectives, formed from concrete substantives, are often equivalent to the genitive of the substantive; as, Lat. 'pueri *militares*' and 'pueri *militum*;' 'the *Cæsar*ian party' and 'Cæsar's party;' 'a *golden* ring' and 'a ring of *gold*.' This is only where the attributive genitive expresses an idea of kind.

(3.) But when the attributive genitive expresses the idea of an individual, they do not always thus accord; for a *son's* conduct is not always *filial*, nor a *father's* advice always *paternal*, nor a *neighbor's* act always *neighborly*; and there is a difference between a *prince's* house or donation and a *princely* house or donation.

6. *Attributive adjectives used as epithets, and for logical effect.*—The object of the attributive, like that of the predicate, is to limit more precisely, or specify more minutely, the force of the substantive to which it refers, and thus to reduce the more general to the more special. But many attributive adjectives are mere epithets; as, 'the *eloquent* Cicero;' 'the *most high* God;' 'pale death;' or contain a judgment or decision of the human mind; as, 'he preferred his *ungrateful* son to all the others,' i. e. notwithstanding he was ungrateful. See p. 53, *supra*.

Comp. 'a *sincere* reconciliation' with a *sincere* man;' 'a *faithful* friend' with 'a *faithful* man;' 'blind passion' with 'blind people;' 'pale death' with 'pale color.'

7. *The adjective used substantively.*—The use of the adjective for the substantive, in languages where the article and the adjective are inflected, is considerably extensive.

Thus in Greek; ὁ ἀγαθός, 'the good man;' (not ἡ ἀγαθὴ for 'the good woman;') τὸ ἀγαθόν, 'that which is good;' οἱ ἀγαθοί, 'the good;' τὰ ἀγαθὰ, 'good things;' τὸ καλόν, 'goodness.'

In German; ein Weiser, 'a wise man;' das Schöne, 'beauty' and 'the beautiful;' die Arme, 'the poor.'

So in Latin, which has no article; sapiens, 'a wise man;' (not bona, for 'a good woman;') malum, 'evil;' sapientes, 'wise men;' (not in dative and ablative;) multa, 'many things;' est dementis, 'it is the part of a foolish man.'

But the use of the adjective for the substantive in English is very limited. We are necessitated for the most part to subjoin *person, one, man, woman, thing*, etc. as, 'just persons,' 'little ones,' 'blind man,' 'young woman,' 'great things,' 'that which is good.'

The following cases, however, occur:

(1.) The neuter singular used substantively; as, 'good and evil,' 'right and wrong,' 'the chief good.'

(2.) The plural used of persons; as, 'the rich,' 'the poor,' 'the righteous and the wicked,' 'the quick and the dead,' 'the merciful,' 'the heathen.'

(3.) The neuter singular with the article, in imitation of the Greek and German; as, 'the beautiful, the true, and the good.'

(4.) 'That wicked,' for 'the wicked one,' 2 Thess. 2:8. 'the righteous,' for 'the righteous man,' Prov. 14:32. 'the wicked,' for 'the wicked man,' Prov. 14:32. 'a terrible,' Deut. 10:17. which are not to be imitated.

(5.) Adverbial phrases; as, 'in public,' 'in private,' 'in general,' 'in particular,' 'in common,' 'in vain,' where the neuter adjective is to be regarded as a substantive.

In French, this use is much restricted as in English.

8. *Collocation of the attributive adjective and the substantive.*—The natural order is for the substantive to precede, and the adjective to follow; as, Heb. אִישׁ חָכָם, 'a wise man;' Gr. ὁ ἀγαθός, 'a good man;' Lat. *Dii immortales*, 'immortal Gods;' Fr. *un homme aveugle*, 'a blind man.'

But in German and English the adjective precedes; as, Germ. *ein strenger Vater*, 'a strict father;' Eng. *red ink*; *a blind guide*.

The phrases, *Alexander the Great*; *Henry the Eighth*; *adjutant general*; *notary public*; *court martial*; *cousin german*; *letters patent*; are probably borrowed from the French.

The phrases, 'a mind, *conscious of right*;' 'a wall, *three feet thick*;' 'a being, *infinitely wise*;' 'a woman, *modest, sensible, and virtuous*;' are to be regarded as formed from adjective clauses, which are regularly placed after the substantive.

9. *Collocation of adjective of quality with other adjectives.*—In phrases, like the following, 'these my two learned friends,' there is a beautiful and philosophic principle, in English and in the Teutonic dialects generally, in regard to the various words modifying the noun. For the adjective denoting quality, or something inherent in the subject, is placed nearest to, or immediately before the noun; the numeral denoting quantity, which is something more external than simple quality, is placed before the adjective; the possessive adjective pronoun, as denoting an accidental quality, and the demonstrative adjective pronoun, as denoting an accidental relation, are placed before the numeral.

The phrases, 'my every hope,' 'my every fear,' appear to me improper.

10. *Adjective clauses or propositions.*—Certain clauses or propositions, subordinate to the main clause or proposition, and introduced by a relative pronoun or adverb referring to a proper antecedent in the main clause, are called *adjective clauses*. They are equivalent to an adjective or attribute. Thus 'the sluggard is wiser in his own conceit than seven men *that can render a reason*,' i. e. than seven *intelligent* men, Prov. 26 : 16. This clause is to be carefully distinguished from the substantive clause, '*he that sinneth against me* wrongeth his own soul,' Prov. 8 : 36, where *he* is no proper antecedent, but merely a *determinative* pronoun.

As the antecedent may be in any case, and also the relative in any case, the varieties of form, which the adjective clause may assume, are very numerous. Comp. *Christ. Spect.* 1837, p. 119, where these propositions are called *simple relative propositions*.

The adjective clause is to be placed, in all ordinary circumstances, immediately after the substantive to which it refers; as, 'the honor, *which is due to him*, I freely give; the right, *which he assumes to himself*, I absolutely refuse.'

Sometimes such a clause contains a logical argument; as, 'I did it out of regard to your person, not to your office, *which I abhor*.'

May, 1853.

## ART. XIX.—THE SUBSTANTIVE IN APPPOSITION.

1. BESIDES the attributive adjective and the attributive genitive, there is another form of the attribute, namely, *the substantive in apposition*; as, 'my brother, *the physician*.'

2. The substantive in apposition, like the other attributives, expresses a predicate, (comp. 'he is *the physician*,') not as a full thought or predication, but in the form of an idea or notion.

3. Like the other attributives, it is intended also to limit more exactly, or specify more minutely, the force of the substantive to which it relates, and thus to reduce the more general to the more special.

4. The substantive in apposition differs from the attributive adjective, in that it is a substantive and expresses an independent existence.

5. It differs also from the attributive genitive, or the attributive noun with a preposition, in that it coincides in some measure in meaning with the preceding substantive, and is thereby prepared to be attached to it by apposition, without the aid of inflection or of an intervening preposition.

6. This form of the attributive combination is naturally adapted to express identity, and that of one individual with another.

7. Hence it serves, not to reduce the genus to the species, like the attributive adjective; but to reduce the species to the individual. Owing to this, the substantive in apposition is often joined to a proper name, and usually has the article; as, 'John, *the baptist*;' 'William, *the conqueror*.'

8. Hence too, although the substantive in apposition, like the attributive adjective, expresses an antithesis, yet it expresses, not the antithesis of kind, but the antithesis of the individual; as, 'my brother, *the physician*,' not 'my brother, *the advocate*.'

9. The substantive in apposition is usually placed last, and has the tone. It is, therefore, more emphatic than the attributive adjective. Compare 'God, *the Almighty*' with 'the *almighty* God.'

10. The apposition is rendered more prominent by the use of such particles, as, *namely*, *to wit*, *as*.

11. We have seen that the legitimate or appropriate import of the substantive in apposition is to specify the individual.

But this is very far from being its constant use. We come now to consider its abnormal or figurative uses.

(1.) It is sometimes used not so much to express specification, as the subjective feelings of the speaker or writer in reference to the subject-matter; as, 'so Moses, *the servant of the Lord*, died there in the land of Moab,' Deut. 34: 5. 'Paul, *a prisoner of Jesus Christ*,' Philem. 1.

(2.) It is sometimes used for rhetorical embellishment, or for an epithet of ornament; as, 'thus saith the Lord, *your Redeemer, the Holy One of Israel*,' Is. 43: 14. 'the Lord, *the most high God, the possessor of heaven and earth*,' Gen. 14: 22.

(3.) It is sometimes used, especially after a personal pronoun, for the purpose of logical argumentation; as, 'I have killed the king, *my husband*,' i. e. although he is my husband; 'you have injured me, *your parent*,' i. e. although I am your parent.

(4.) It is sometimes used as a mere title, in which case it precedes the other noun, and is unemphatic; as, '*Doctor* Gall,' '*Prince* Eugene,' '*General* Washington,' '*Brother* John.'

12. The substantive in apposition agrees with the substantive to which it refers, in number and case, and if varied by gender, also in gender. This is the general rule. Some peculiar cases deserve to be noticed.

(1.) In English the rule appears to be, to inflect, for the expression of the genitive or of the plural, only one of the two nouns in apposition; as, 'at Johnson, *the bookseller's*,' 'the *Miss* Thomsons.'

(2.) The limiting noun may be distributed into parts, while the noun limited is not, or vice versa; as, 'the soldiers escaped, *a part into the woods, and a part into the city*,' 'M. Antony, C. Cassius, *tribunes of the people*.'

(3.) The apposition may be with a sentence or clause, when conceived of as an idea or notion, according to a general law of language; as, 'he recovered, *a result not expected*,' 'the weather forbids walking, *a prohibition hurtful to us both*,' 'the Mount of Olives shall cleave in the midst thereof towards the east and towards the west, *a very great valley*,' Zech. 14: 4.

(4.) In Greek, Latin, and perhaps other languages, the substantive in apposition sometimes refers to a genitive case implied in a possessive adjective; as, '*studium tuum adolescentis* perspexi,' I have seen the earnestness of you a young man. This is a *constructio ad sensum*.

13. The use of the substantive in apposition is extended in different languages differently.

(1.) The Hebrews extend it to the noun of the material; as, 'four rows *stones*,' for 'four rows *of stones*,' Ex. 28: 17. 'an ephah *barley*,' for 'an ephah *of barley*,' Ruth 2: 17. 'five thousand shekels *brass*,' for 'five thousand shekels *of brass*,' 1 Sam. 17: 5. So the Greeks: 'a contribution *five minæ*,' for 'a contribution *of five minæ*,' Xenophon; 'an income *sixty talents*,' for 'an income *of sixty talents*,' Xen. So in English, 'a dozen *eggs*.'

(2.) The Latin language extends it to various logical relations; (a) the circumstance of time; as, 'Cato *senex* scribere historiam instituit,' Cicero; (b) the cause; as, 'Dexagoridas a Gorgopa *proditor* interficitur,' Cic. (c) the occasion; as, 'nunc vero quid faciat Hortensius *patronus*,' Cic. (d) a concession; as, 'in oceano natare noluisti, *studiosissimus homo natandi*,' Cic. (e) the final object; as, 'cohortes quas Brundisium *praesidium* misi,' Cic.

(3.) The modern languages extend it to titles and names of kindred, as a part of the forms of refined intercourse, much more than the ancient.

(4.) The Germans employ the proper name of a city or country after an appellative, without the intervening preposition; as, 'the city *Paris*,' for 'the city *of Paris*.'

14. These principles may be useful in our own language in various ways:

(1.) *To determine when a substantive in apposition is properly employed.* It is used, as we have seen above, primarily, for the purpose of specifying the individual; and secondarily, for certain rhetorical or logical purposes. By knowing the occasions on which it may be used, we are enabled to determine when it is rightly used.

(2.) *To direct the pausing and punctuation in certain cases.* Whenever the substantive in apposition is employed to express the subjective feelings of the speaker, or for rhetorical embellishment, or for a logical purpose, then it should be separated by a pause in speaking, and by a comma in writing. On the contrary, when the noun in apposition is merely a title, being placed before the other noun, and without emphasis, then there should be no pause and no comma.

(3.) *To show how to use the sign of the genitive in certain cases.* Thus we write: 'at Johnson's, *the respectable bookseller*,' 'the psalm is David's, *the king, prophet, and priest of the people* ;'



because the noun in apposition here is not used for specification, but for some other purpose.

(4.) *To show how the plural form is to be used in certain cases.* Thus we say: 'the *Miss* Thomsons,' when the term *miss* is merely titular, but 'the *misses* Thomson,' when the object is to distinguish them as young ladies.

Feb. 1845.

## ART. XX.—THE ATTRIBUTIVE GENITIVE IN ENGLISH.

IN modern grammar, that adjective which is joined immediately to a substantive, to modify and restrict its meaning, is called an *attributive* adjective; as, 'a *splendid* temple.'

The genitive case, which is joined to a substantive for a similar purpose, is also called the *attributive*; as, 'Solomon's temple.'

This case, being in its origin the adnominal case, or case joined to a noun, is adapted in its own nature to modify or limit the force of the noun to which it is joined.

The use of this case in the ancient languages was much extended. In modern languages it is greatly restricted. It seems important to define, as exactly as may be, the present use of the English genitive or possessive.

1. The genitive case in English expresses the relation of an agent to an action or thing done; as, 'Solomon's temple,' i. e. the temple built by Solomon; 'the spider's web,' i. e. the web made by the spider; 'the army's march,' i. e. the march made by the army. (The genitive of the agent.)

2. It expresses the relation of a possessor to a thing possessed, the idea of possession, however, being somewhat extended; as, 'the king's crown,' i. e. the crown owned by the king; 'Jupiter's temple,' i. e. the temple dedicated to Jupiter. (The possessive genitive.)

3. It expresses personal mutual relations; as, 'the lady's sister,' 'the king's subjects.' (The genitive of kindred.)

It is to be observed that the relation indicated by the genitive case is, in a measure, indefinite, and left to be inferred from the nature of the factors.

This attributive genitive interchanges sometimes with the attributive adjective; as, 'Caesar's party,' and 'the *Cæsarian* party;'

'the *king's* speech,' and 'the *royal* speech;' or with a preposition and noun; as, 'the *king's* crown,' and 'the crown *of the king*;' or is expressed in a compound; as, '*horses*' hair,' and '*horse-hair*.' In other cases, however, very nice distinctions are expressed by these differences of form.

March, 1845.

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ART. XXI.—THE ATTRIBUTIVE SUBSTANTIVE, NOT IN  
APPOSITION.

THERE are three forms of this attributive substantive to be noticed; viz: (1.) the attributive genitive formed by inflection; (2.) the attributive genitive formed by the preposition *of*; and (3.) the attributive preposition and substantive.

I. *The attributive genitive*.—Concerning the attributive genitive in English, we observe,

1. It is naturally adapted, like adjectives formed from concrete nouns, (as, *royal*, *golden*, etc.) to express an activity proceeding from the attribute. The same also is indicated by the name *genitive*, from Lat. *gigno*, 'to produce.'

2. The English genitive is restricted to (1.) persons; (2.) animals having the semblance of persons; (3.) collective nouns involving persons; and (4.) certain inanimate objects, which have retained from the original languages the character and construction of persons; as, *sun*, *moon*, *saturn* (the planet,) *ship*.

3. The English genitive is restricted, for the most part, to express the attribute of the individual. Compare '*king's* speech,' a particular speech, with 'speech *of a king*,' or, '*royal* speech,' a kind or species of speech; '*father's* advice,' with 'advice *of a father*,' or '*fatherly* advice;' '*son's* conduct,' with 'conduct *of a son*,' or, '*filial* conduct;' '*Lord's* day,' a particular day of the week, with 'day *of the Lord*,' a kind or species of day; '*sun's* light,' or 'light *of the sun*,' a particular shining of the sun, with '*solar* light,' the kind or species of light.

4. The English genitive, like the adjectives formed from concrete nouns, (as, *royal*, *golden*, etc.) exhibits the activity which is required in an attributive relation, only in a general or indefinite way. But the nature of the activity is readily perceived and understood from the factors concerned, and sometimes from one

of them alone. Thus, 'the *sun's* coturse' is readily understood from the relation of the sun to his activity; 'Solomon's temple,' from the relation of a person to a structure built; 'the *prince's* garden,' from the relation of a person to a property or possession; 'the *lady's* sister,' from the term of consanguinity.

Any want of precision must be remedied by varying the expression.

5. The specific uses of this genitive, as stated in Art. XX. are,

- (1.) The genitive of the agent; as, 'the *army's* march.'
- (2.) The genitive of the possessor; as, 'the *king's* crown.'
- (3.) The genitive of kindred; as, 'the *lady's* sister.'

These are all comprehended under *the genitive of the subject*.

6. The limited noun is sometimes understood by an ellipsis; as, 'St. Paul's,' for 'St. Paul's church.'

II. *The genitive formed by the preposition of*.—When a substantive or noun is connected, by means of the preposition *of*, with another substantive or noun, the preposition and its complement constitute another form of the English genitive, and may be called the *Norman-French* genitive. As the genitive is generally regarded as the *whence*-case, the preposition *of* (= *from*, comp. Fr. *de*.) is naturally adapted to express the genitive relation.

This genitive is used much more extensively than the genitive by inflection. It is employed both for *the genitive of the subject* and for *the genitive of the object* of the classic languages.

1. It is used to express the relation of an agent to an action or thing done, like the inflected genitive, though not without discrimination; as, 'the temple *of* Solomon;' 'the web *of* the spider;' 'the strength *of* the lion;' 'the egg *of* the bird;' 'the march *of* the army.' Also where the inflected genitive is inadmissible; as, 'the approach *of* the plague;' 'the oppression *of* the government.'

2. It is used to express the relation of a possessor to a thing possessed, like the inflected genitive, though not without discrimination; as, 'the temple *of* Jupiter;' 'the crown *of* the king;' 'the keel *of* the ship.' Also where the inflected genitive is inadmissible; as, 'the smell *of* the flower;' 'the cedars *of* Lebanon.'

3. It is used to express personal mutual relations, like the inflected genitive, though not without discrimination; as, 'the sis-

ter of the lady ;' 'the subjects of the king.' Also where the inflected genitive is inadmissible; as, 'the king of the French.'

There is an increasing tendency in English to use the genitive formed by *of* instead of the inflected genitive. But this should be steadily resisted. The inflected genitive should probably be used, unless there exists some logical or rhetorical reason for a deviation. Thus '*Shakspeare's* Macbeth' is preferable to 'the Macbeth of *Shakspeare*;' '*Newton's* Principia' to 'the Principia of *Newton*;' '*Henry's* marriage' to 'the marriage of *Henry*.'

4. It is used to express the relation of the whole to a part; as, 'the bark of the tree;' 'the roof of the house.' When the whole is a person, then this case comes under No. 2.

5. It is used to express the predicate genitive, so called, of the classic languages; as, 'a woman of probity;' 'a man of great talents.' Comp. Hebr. 'son of perdition;' Lat. 'Titus fuit tantae facilitatis et liberalitatis;' Germ. 'Sie sind anderer Meinung.'

6. It is used to express the genitive of the object of the classic languages, or the relation of the passive object; as, 'the invention of gunpowder;' 'the creation of the world;' 'the creator of the world.' Comp. Fr. 'dégout du travail.' The limited noun in these examples is formed from a transitive verb. This genitive in many languages is expressed by an inflected genitive; comp. Lat. 'amans virtutis,' 'taedium laboris;' Germ. 'Erfindung des Pulvers.'

NOTE.—The combining of the genitive of the object with the genitive of the subject under one and the same form, is one of the most difficult problems in philology. Different methods have been taken to explain it. (1.) Some, as Schmitthenner, make the relation of the adnominal genitive to the other noun to be so general, as hardly to mean anything. (2.) Some, as Weissenborn, regard the susceptibility involved in the subject of a passive verb to be a sort of activity. (3.) Others, as Becker, consider the activity as hidden or implied in the limited noun..

III. *Attributive preposition and substantive*.—When a predicate verb or adjective, enlarged to an objective combination other than the passive or suffering, takes the form of a substantive, then the object with its preposition is transferred to that substantive, and becomes its attribute. This is true of the dative object; as, 'a gift to the people,' i. e. made to the people,.

comp. 'he gave *to the people*;' 'goodness *to Israel*,' i. e. *exhibited* to Israel, comp. 'he was good *to Israel*;' also of the *genitive* object; as, 'disgust *at the deed*,' i. e. *felt* at the deed, comp. 'he was disgusted *at the deed*;' 'uneasiness *about the child*,' i. e. *felt* about the child, comp. 'he was uneasy *about the child*;' of the *factitive* object; as, 'his appointment *as umpire*,' comp. 'he was appointed *as umpire*;' and of many *supplementary* or *adverbial* objects; as, 'Christ's death *on the cross*,' i. e. *taking place* on the cross, comp. 'Christ died *on the cross*;' 'the merchant *in London*,' i. e. *dwelling* in London.

Here the activity, and the direction of it, is indicated by the preposition; and the nature of the activity is evolved from the noun, whether it be a verbal or other noun.

The subject here discussed exhibits some marked contrasts, in phrases familiar to us; as,

'The *king's* choice,' where the attribute is the person choosing, compared with 'the choice *of a minister*,' where the attribute is the thing chosen.

'*Guttenberg's* invention,' where the attribute is a personal agent, compared with 'the invention *of printing*,' where the attribute is the real object.

'The *dog's* head,' where the attribute is the name of an animal, compared with 'the stem *of a rose*,' where the attribute is the name of a plant.

'The *Lord's* day,' with the attribute of the individual, denoting a particular day of the week, compared with 'the day *of the Lord*,' with an attribute of kind, denoting merely the kind or species of day.

'The *sun's* light,' or 'the light *of the sun*,' with an attribute of the individual, compared with 'solar light,' denoting merely a kind of light.

'The *king's* speech,' denoting a particular speech, compared with 'a *royal* speech,' denoting a kind of speech.

This subject also develops some ambiguities in human language.

Comp. Gr. ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ; 'the love of God to us,' 2 Cor. 13: 14. and 'our love to God,' Jo. 5: 42.

Comp. Lat. *desiderium patris*, 'the longing of the father,' and *desiderium filii*, 'the longing after the son.'

Comp. *the love of God*, the genitive of the subject, 2 Cor. 13: 14. and *the love of God*, the genitive of the object, Jo. 5: 42.

Comp. also Lat. 'pro veteribus Helvetiorum injuriis populi Romani,' Cæs. where we have both genitives in reference to the same noun.

June, 1853.

ART. XXII.—ORIGIN OF THE TERM CASE IN GRAMMAR.

THE grammatical term *case* is evidently derived from the Latin *casus*, 'a falling.' Compare the Greek name *πτῶσις*, which has the same meaning.

There is a disagreement among grammarians, as to the connection of thought between the name and the thing to which it is applied.

1. According to some, case is a variation in nouns and pronouns, which *falls* upon the termination. So Silvestre de Sacy: *Principes de Grammaire Générale*, Paris, 1815, p. 117.

2. According to others, it is the *fall* or final departure of a noun or pronoun from the mouth, which consists in enunciating the last syllable, or the termination. So Beauzée: *Grammaire Générale*, Paris, 1810, p. 453.

3. According to the ancient Stoics, cases denote *fallings*, upright or oblique, from the mind or discursive faculty. See Harris: *Hermes*, p. 278.

4. According to the more common and more correct explanation, case is properly a *falling off* from the nominative or first state of a word; the name for which, however, is now, by extension of its signification, applied also to the nominative. This is confirmed by other technical language applied to this subject; as, *declension*, a 'bending downward,' *casus recti*, 'the upright or independent cases,' scil. the nominative and vocative; *casus obliqui*, 'oblique or dependent cases,' scil. the remaining cases. This view is fully exhibited by Prof. A. Crosby: *Grammar of the Greek Language*, Bost. 1842, p. 76.

June, 1843.

With regard to the *naming* of the several cases in Latin, a curious suggestion has been made by Dr. C. Michelsen; see his *Kasuslehre der Lateinischen Sprache*, Berl. 1843. He supposes that the names of the cases may have been borrowed from processes of law, for which the Romans are known to have been distinguished. Thus the *vocative* is the case of *calling*, i. e. of one summoned to court; the *nominative* is the case of *naming*, i. e.

of one whose name appears in the declaration ; the *accusative* is the case of *accusing*, i. e. of one who is brought 'ad causam ;' the *casus interrogandi*, (for so the genitive was called by the Romans,) is the case of *interrogating*, i. e. of one concerning whom an investigation is made ; the *dative* is the case of *giving*, i. e. of one to whom the cause is given ; the *ablative*, (originally called the *sixth case*,) being so called at a later period on more scientific grounds.

But this theory seems to suppose that the Greek names of the cases were derived from the Latin, and that at a period when the Roman law had been fully developed.

June, 1853.

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#### ART. XXIII.—THE FACTITIVE RELATION IN ENGLISH.

THE *factitive relation* is a favorite technical term of the New or Beckerian Philology.

The factitive relation is a species of the complementary objective relation.

The *object* of a verb or adjective is that to which the action expressed by the verb or adjective is directed ; and the *objective relation* is the direction of that action.

A *complementary objective relation* is that objective relation which is necessary to complete the idea of the action expressed by the verb or adjective.

There are some verbs which, in order to complete the idea of their predication, require, besides the simple passive object or accusative of the thing, another object or accusative of the effect ; as,

'He makes his tent *a palace* ;' comp. 'he makes i. e. constructs his tent.'

'They called him *Peter* ;' comp. 'they called i. e. summoned him.'

'Avarice makes men *hard-hearted* ;' comp. God made i. e. created man.'

'He painted the door *green*.'

'They sent him *as an ambassador*.'

'They chose Marius *for a general*.'

'They made the wine *into vinegar* ;' comp. 'they made the wine.'

So in the passive voice; as, 'he was called *Peter*,' etc.

Also after neuter and reflexive verbs; as,

'He became a *general*.'

'He turned out a *villain*.'

'He talked himself *hoarse*.'

These examples have commonly been regarded as cases of simple apposition, or of nouns governed by prepositions. But this view evidently fails to exhibit their true nature.

The above are examples of the *real* factitive relation.

There are examples also of the *moral* factitive relation; as,

'He advised them *to peace*.'

'They excited him *to anger*.'

'He requested them *to go*.'

Also of the *logical* factitive relation; as,

'They call him a *hero*.'

'They consider him *innocent*.'

'They think him *guilty*.'

'They regard him as a *hypocrite*.'

'Would you make me a *liar*?'

Although it is the province of grammar to develop the force of the grammatical forms, yet this factitive relation has been neglected, as not having any peculiar case-form in language.

Aug. 1848.

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#### ART. XXIV.—THE FACTITIVE RELATION MORE FULLY DEVELOPED.

1. SOMETIMES the idea of activity in the verb or adjective involves in it a reference to an effect, in the way of causality, in the active voice, on the immediate object, and, in the passive voice, on the subject of such activity. This second object is called the *factitive* object. It is, of course, complementary, or necessary to complete the sense. The introduction of the relation of cause and effect is what gives the peculiarity to this objective relation.

2. The foundation of the factitive object lies in the idea of *the cause*, a relation which exists between a substance or agent acting and a substance or object acted upon. Such causality naturally involves two propositions. Thus 'he died *from poison*,' scil. as a cause, means 'he took poison, therefore he died.'



3. The *causative* verbs, so called, are closely connected with this subject. They are of various kinds. Comp. *to fell*, formed by internal inflection from *to fall*; *to admonish*, from *to remember*, where the derivation is disguised; *to bemoan*, formed by a prefix from *to moan*; *to bring* and *to come*, distinct roots; *to teach* and *to learn*, distinct roots; etc. But if the second or implied activity be intransitive, then the construction of these verbs would require no special attention. The same is true, if the activity, though transitive, be taken absolutely; as, 'he *baited* the horses.'

4. Under the factitive relation we include cases like the following: 'Julius Cæsar made himself *dictator*;' 'avarice makes men *blind*;' 'Romulus called the city *Rome*;' 'we account the wise man *happy*;' 'Minerva taught Cicero *all the arts*;' 'Racilius asked of me *my opinion*.'

So in the passive voice; as, 'Cicero was made *consul*;' 'all right affections of the mind are called *virtues*;' 'the wise are accounted *happy*;' 'the Latin legions were taught *Roman warfare*;' 'M. Porcius Cato was asked *his opinion*.' Also after neuter verbs; as, 'he became *a man*;' 'he continued *diligent*;' 'he turned *traitor*.'

5. The Latin verbs concerned in the factitive relation are such as *facio*, *efficio*, etc. *voco*, *nomino*, *saluto*, etc. *habeo*, etc. which are construed with the nominative case in the passive voice, and *doceo*, *educeo*, *celo*, etc. *posco*, *rogo*, etc. *interrogo*, *percontor*, etc. which are construed with the accusative in the passive.

Thus 'Cicero *consul factus est*;' 'omnes rectae animi affectiones *virtutes* appellantur;' 'sapientes *beati habentur*;' 'Latinae legiones longa societate *militiam Romanam* sunt edoctae;' 'M. Porcius Cato *rogatus est sententiam*.'

The construction of the accusative with the passive voice is to be explained thus: 'posco te *pecuniam*,' i. e. 'jubeo te *pecuniam dare*,' I make you give money; 'posceris *pecuniam*,' i. e. 'juberis *pecuniam dare*,' you are made to give money.

6. The factitive object is variously expressed in English,

(1.) By a concrete substantive; as, 'they called him *Peter*;' 'they took him *prisoner*.' This has the form of apposition.

(2.) By an adjective; as, 'they accounted Socrates *wise*;' 'they smote him *dead*.'

(3.) By an abstract noun; as, 'he labored *to weariness*;' 'it turned *to his praise*.'

(4.) By an infinitive with an auxiliary verb ; as, 'he should go ;' 'he can come.' This seems to be the origin of these combinations to form modes. So with the verbs, *bid*, *help*, *make*, *let*. The infinitive naturally expresses the factitive object.

(5.) By a participle ; as, 'he was seen *stealing*.' See Article on the Participle, *infra*.

(6.) By an accusative and infinitive or supine ; as, 'they advised him *to go*.' See Article on the Infinitive, *infra*.

(7.) By various prepositions, *about*, *after*, *for*, *to* or *into*, *on*, *to* ; as, 'they advised him *about peace* ;' 'he strives *after victory* ;' 'I took him *for his brother* ;' 'he turned the water *into ice* ;' 'he was resolved *on a division* ;' 'the plant grows *to a tree*.'

(8.) By the conjunction *as* ; as, 'they regarded him *as a liar* ;' 'they regarded him *as dead*.'

7. The factitive object needs to be distinguished from the other objects.

(1.) The factitive object is distinguished from the *accusative* or passive object in that it denotes the effect or consequence of the action of the verb on the immediate object. Comp. 'he made *his tent*,' where *his tent* is the passive object, with 'he made his tent *a palace*,' where *a palace* is the factitive object.

(2.) The factitive object is distinguished from the *dative* object, or the personal object sympathizing with the subject, in that it expresses a thing. Comp. 'he gave his life *for his prince*,' where *for his prince* is the dative object, with 'he gave his life *for a sacrifice*,' where *for a sacrifice* is the factitive object.

(3.) The factitive object is distinguished from the *genitive* object, or a real object acting on the subject. Comp. 'he is ashamed *of having done it*,' where *of having done it* is the genitive object, with 'he is ashamed *to do it*,' where *to do it* is the factitive object.

(4.) The factitive object is distinguished from the *final end* or *purpose*. Comp. 'he carries arms *for his security*,' where *for his security* denotes the final end or object, with 'he carries arms *as a show*,' where *as a show* is the factitive object.

(5.) The factitive object is distinguished from the object of *manner*. Comp. 'he appears *as a spirit*,' where *as a spirit* denotes the manner of his appearance, with 'he appears *as a liar*,' where *as a liar* is the logical factitive.

8. The factitive relation has been variously explained.

(1.) The older grammarians endeavored to explain it by supposing an ellipsis of a preposition, as a preposition is often found in German. But these prepositions are not found to have been ever actually in use.

(2.) Others have suggested that the second object is used adverbially. But this itself needs explanation.

(3.) Others have explained it as a mere case of apposition or concord. But the difference is easily seen by such an example as the following, 'Consul T. Manlium *fortissimum virum dictatorem* dixit.' Here, evidently, we must make a distinction between *fortissimum virum* and *dictatorem*, as it respects their relation to the rest of the sentence.

The true explanation lies in the introduction of a causality, or in the double activity implied in the original verb or adjective, as explained above.

There are three species of the factitive relation; viz. *the real*, *the moral*, and *the logical*.

### I. *The Real Factitive.*

1. The real factitive is when the effect or result of the action of the verb or adjective on the immediate object is a *real* or *physical* one. It may be either that into which something is made; as, 'he converted the water *into ice*;' 'they appointed him *dictator*;' or what is in any way effected; as, 'he serves to them *for a warning*;' 'it turns out to *his praise*.' It is used after verbs which signify to *make, create, appoint, choose, become, continue, remain*, etc.

2. It is expressed in English,

(1.) By a noun in concord or apposition; as, 'they appointed him *dictator*;' 'thou makest me *sad*,' i. e. a sad person.

So in the passive voice; as, 'he was appointed *dictator*;' 'I am made *sad*.'

Still the factitive object differs essentially from the simple attribute or apposition, in that it depends on the factitive verb.

(2.) By means of the preposition *to* or *into*; as, 'he converted the water *into ice*;' 'man turns *to dust*;' 'it turns out *to his praise*.'

(3.) By means of the preposition *for* (i. e. *in place of*;) as, 'he made the house *for a shelter*;' 'he serves *for an example*.'

So in the passive voice; as, 'the house was made *for a shelter*.'

(4.) Also in many promiscuous examples; as, 'he talked himself *hoarse*;' 'he wept his eyes *red*;' 'she sung the child *to sleep*;' 'he laughed himself *sick*.'

## II. The Moral Factitive.

1. The moral factitive expresses not a real or physical effect or result of the action of the verb or adjective on its immediate object, but a *willed* or *desired* effect, i. e. an effect dependent on moral freedom; as, 'he pants *after freedom*;' 'he advised them *to peace*;' 'he prepared himself *for the contest*;' 'he is resolved *on the deed*.' It is used after verbs which signify *to wish, desire; to ask, beg; to hope, expect; to advise, counsel; to strive, endeavor; etc.*

2. This factitive relation is expressed in English,

(1.) By means of the preposition *after*; as, 'he pants *after freedom*.'

(2.) By means of the preposition *to*; as, 'he advised them *to peace*;' 'he was willing *to labor*.'

(3.) By means of the preposition *for*; as, 'to prepare one's self *for the contest*;' 'to be earnest *for the victory*.'

(4.) By means of the preposition *on*; as, 'he was resolved *on a division*.'

(5.) By a simple noun; as, 'they plotted *my ruin*.'

3. The moral factitive is not always distinguished from the genitive object. But it is better distinguished in English than in German; comp. 'he is ashamed *to do it*,' with a moral factitive, and 'he is ashamed *of having done it*,' where we have the genitive object. Comp. also, Fr. 'songer à *faire* quelque chose,' with 'craindre *de voir* quelque chose.'

## III. The Logical Factitive.

1. The logical factitive expresses not a real or physical effect or result of the action of the verb or adjective on its immediate object, but an intellectual, i. e. an *adjudged* or *inferred* effect; as, 'he thinks himself *a gentleman*;' 'I took him *for his brother*;' 'they regard him *as a liar*.' It is used after verbs which either denote a judgment, as *to judge, hold, think, consider, regard, count, etc.* or the declaration of a judgment, as *to declare, acknowledge, pretend, represent, etc.*

2. This logical factitive is expressed in English,

(1.) As a noun in concord or apposition; as, 'they call him *a hero*;' 'they pronounced him *innocent*,' i. e. an innocent man.

So in the passive voice; as, 'he is called *a hero*;' 'he was pronounced *innocent*.'

Still the factitive object differs essentially from the simple attribute or apposition.

(2.) By means of the preposition *for* (i. e. *in place of*;) as, 'I took him *for his brother*;' 'they left him *for dead*.'

So in the passive voice; as, 'he was taken *for his brother*.'

(3.) By means of the conjunction *as*; as, 'they regard him *as a liar*;' 'I acknowledge him *as my master*.'

So in the passive voice; as, 'he was regarded *as a liar*;' 'he is acknowledged *as my master*.'

The conjunction *as* here is resolvable into a participle of manner; as, 'they regard him *as* they regard a hypocrite;' 'I acknowledge him *as* I acknowledge my master.' But this comparison of manner does not express the real force of the factitive.

3. The logical factitive is easily distinguished in sense from the real factitive. Comp. 'he makes his house *a palace*,' where we have the real factitive, with 'he regards his house *as a palace*,' where we have the logical factitive.

4. The logical factitive differs from the real factitive, in this that it is resolvable into a proposition; as, 'he thinks himself *a gentleman*,' i. e. 'he thinks *that he is a gentleman*;' 'they regard him *as a liar*,' i. e. 'they think *that he is a liar*;' 'I acknowledge him *as my master*,' i. e. 'I acknowledge *that he is my master*.'

5. The logical factitive is often confounded in language with the real factitive; as, 'he made him *a drunkard*,' scil. by teaching him to drink; and 'he made him *a drunkard*,' scil. by what he said or asserted about him. So, 'thou makest him *a traitor*.'

6. The logical and real factitive have, it is said, distinct forms in the Finnish language.

June, 1858.

## ART. XXV.—ON PREPOSITIONS.

1. PREPOSITIONS, although a secondary and less important part of speech, deserve more attention than is usually paid to them in our common grammars. They exhibit in a striking manner the analogy of the external or sensible world with the internal or intellectual.

2. The preposition, (from Lat. *præpositio*, 'a placing before,') is a word *placed before* a noun. This is merely an external definition, and does not indicate its internal nature.

3. Prepositions express neither essences, (like substantives,) nor activities, (like verbs and adjectives,) but only their relations. They express not the substance, but the form of our ideas. Hence they are ranked by Becker with form-words.

4. Prepositions are indeclinable, as the relations of things are external to the things themselves, and are not affected by the changes which take place in them.

5. Prepositions express relations between verbs whose original nature consists in activity or motion, or some other part of speech involving the verbal idea, and a noun expressing an essence. Of course, with very few exceptions, they denote local relations, or other relations conceived of as local relations by the mind.

6. The relations expressed by prepositions are either external or internal to the human mind. The external relations are of a physical nature and obvious to the senses. The internal relations belong to the province of the intellect. As these higher relations are subject to the same analysis as the sensible relations, and the mind supposes a close resemblance between the physical and intellectual worlds, so prepositions denoting the external relations are, for the most part, employed to express the internal.

7. Physical relations are for the most part local. Activity is motion. Relations of activity are directions of motion. These local relations arrange themselves in antitheses, forming a beautiful system; as, *in* and *out*, the only absolute relation of space; Lat. *cis* and *trans*; *before* and *behind*; *above* and *below*, relative relations of space; *to* and *from*, relations of direction; *into* and *out of*, a compound relation; etc. This system is too little regarded in our common grammars.

8. Intellectual relations are conceived of as physical, and are expressed by prepositions denoting physical relations. They are exhibited to others as they strike our own minds. This is shown,

(1.) In cases where the primary or physical meaning of the verb is lost; as, to copy *from* a picture; to rule *over* a country.

(2.) In cases where the physical meaning is not lost; as, to rely *on* another's promise; to tend *to* a given result; to insult *over* any one.

(3.) In cases where the force of the preposition had been already expressed in the verb; as, to consult *with* a person; to abstain *from* a thing; to concur *with* another; antipathy *against* another.

9. Prepositions thus exhibit a wonderful correlation between the intellectual and physical worlds; a correlation which shows that both worlds proceeded from the same author.

10. Prepositions exhibit the wonderful economy of language. The number of relations is almost infinite. Yet they are all expressed by a comparatively small number of prepositions, and this without any confusion or danger of mistake. We are guided in the meaning by the nature of the ideas between which the relation exists. But if one local relation were used for another, confusion would immediately arise.

11. As the object of prepositions is the same with that of cases in nouns, hence in those languages where there are no cases, there must be more prepositions; and *vice versa* in those languages which have numerous cases, fewer prepositions are necessary.

12. Whether the expression of relations by cases or by prepositions in the Indo-European languages is the more ancient, it is difficult to decide. With respect to the external and lower relations, it is natural to believe that prepositions were used at first. But with respect to the internal spiritual relations, the matter is doubtful. It would seem as if the language-makers had begun by expressing the internal relations by inflection, and the external by prepositions, and that the contest between these two principles has been the occasion of the endless variety of existing languages.

Jan. 1847.

13. There are two kinds of prepositions in English, viz. *the proper*, which are original particles denoting locality; and *the improper*, which are derived from them, or from other parts of speech.

14. The proper or original prepositions are very ancient. Some of them are common to all the Indo-European languages. Most of them may be easily traced and identified in languages very remote from each other. Thus

(1.) The particle *in* is found in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Teutonic, Lithuanian, and Celtic, which constitute the principal families of the Indo-European stock of languages. Comp. Sansk. *an*, (in *antar* = Lat. *inter*;) Gr. *ἐν*; Lat. *in*; Goth. *in*; Old Pruss. *en*; Welsh *yn*.

(2.) The particle *out* is found in the Sanskrit, Persian, Greek, Latin, Teutonic, Slavonic, and Lithuanian families. Comp. Sansk. *ut*; Pers. *ez*; Gr. *ἐκ*; Lat. *ex*; Goth. *ut*, *us*; Slav. *iz*; Lith. *isz*.

(3.) The particle *to* is found in the Sanskrit, Persian, Greek, Latin, Teutonic, Slavonic, and Celtic families. Comp. Sansk. *pati*; Pers. *ta*; Gr. *πρός*; Lat. *ad*; Goth. *at*, *du*; Pol. *do*; Gael. *do*.

(4.) The particle *of*, originally signifying 'from,' is found in the Sanskrit, Persian, Greek, Latin, Teutonic, and Lithuanian families. Comp. Sansk. *apa*; Zend *apa*; Gr. *ἀπό*; Lat. *ab*; Goth. *af*; Lith. *ap*, *api*.

NOTE.—Although these particles are very ancient as prepositions, yet their primary use seems to have been that of adverbs.

15. The identification of these prepositions in languages of the same family follows of course. Thus

(1.) Goth. *in*, Old Germ. *in*, Old Sax. *in*, Anglo-Sax. *in*, Old Fris. *en*, *in*, Old Norse *i*, Germ. *in*, Dutch *in*, Eng. *in*, Swed. *i*, Dan. *i*.

(2.) Goth. *us*, *ut*, Old Germ. *uz*, Old Sax. *ut*, Anglo-Sax. *ut*, Old Fris. *ut*, Old Norse *ut*, Germ. *aus*, Dutch *uit*, Eng. *out*, Swed. *ut*, Dan. *ud*.

(3.) Goth. *du*, Old Germ. *zi*, *zuo*, Old Sax. *te*, *to*, Anglo-Sax. *to*, Old Fris. *te*, *to*, Germ. *zu*, Dutch *te*, *toe*, Eng. *to*.

(4.) Goth. *af*, Old Germ. *aba*, *apa*, Old Sax. *af*, Anglo-Sax. *of*, Old Fris. *af*, *of*, Old Norse *af*, Germ. *ab*, Dutch *af*, Eng. *of*, Swed. *af*, Dan. *af*.

(5.) Goth. *ana*, Old Germ. *ana*, Old Sax. *an*, Anglo-Sax. *on*, Old Fris. *an*, Old Norse *a*, Germ. *an*, Dutch *aan*, Eng. *on*, Swed. *å*, Dan. *aa*.

(6.) Goth. *iup*, Old Germ. *ûp*, Old Sax. *up*, Anglo-Sax. *up*, Old Fris. *op*, Old Norse *upp*, Germ. *auf*, Dutch *op*, Eng. *up*, Swed. *up*, Dan. *op*.



16. Although the proper prepositions in their present state are form-words, yet they are undoubtedly derived from words expressing ideas or notions. This is shown, (1.) by their phonetic character, which differs widely from that of pronominal and interjectional elements; (2.) by their logical import, which is naturally kindred to that of verbal roots; and (3.) by the actual explanation of many of them in this way. Some of the more plausible derivations in different languages are as follows:

(1.) Lat. *trans*, 'beyond,' from Sansk. ✓ *tri*, 'to pass beyond.'

(2.) Gr. *ἀνευ* and Germ. *ohne*, 'without,' from Sansk. ✓ *ōn*, 'to take away,' and Gr. *ἄνω*, 'to end.'

(3.) Eng. *by*, from Norse *bua* and Anglo-Sax. *byan*, 'to dwell.'

(4.) Gr. *μετά* and Germ. *mit*, from Sansk. ✓ *med*, 'to accompany,' Goth. *gamotyān* and Eng. *to meet*. See Webster's Eng. Dict.

(5.) Germ. *nach*, 'after,' and Eng. *nigh*, from Germ. *nahen*, 'to approach.'

(6.) Germ. *durch* and Eng. *through*, from Gr. *ῥαδιω*, 'to bore,' and Russ. *deru*, 'to stick.'

(7.) Eng. *till*, from Anglo-Sax. *tillan*, 'to reach to.'

(8.) Germ. *zu* and Eng. *to*, from Germ. *ziehen*, 'to draw.'

NOTE.—Some of these derivations must be regarded as very uncertain.

17. It is important to distinguish these particles when used in their primary acceptance as adverbs, and in their secondary acceptance as prepositions. As adverbs, they express local relations to the speaker, and of themselves alone form a local object, or a factor of an objective combination; as, 'the smoke went *up*.' As prepositions, they are merely indices or exponents of local relations, and only in combination with a noun or pronoun constitute the factor of an objective combination; as, 'he went *up the mountain*.' As prepositions, they are substitutes for the cases of nouns.

18. As the radical verbs, from which the proper prepositions are derived, if not entirely obsolete, are yet no longer present to the mental conception, and as the form and signification of the prepositions are not fixed by a regard to their derivation; so is their form as well as their signification very liable to change, and the same preposition changes its meaning, not only in kindred dialects, but often in the same language. Comp. '*in earth*,' Matt. 7: 10. now '*on earth*,' 'known and read of all men,' 2

Cor. 3 : 2. now, 'known and read *by* all men ;' 'to learn *at* a person,' in Old English, now 'to learn *of* a person.' Yet in all languages there is a great general analogy in the signification of prepositions.

19. Of all the parts of speech, the prepositions, it is thought, have the greatest variety of meanings. Thus, Dr. Webster assigns to *for* twenty-nine different meanings, and to *to* the same number. Different expressions may be used for the same idea. Thus, we may say that a person did a certain act *in* envy, or *out of* envy, or *through* envy, or *for* envy, or *with* envy.

20. Besides the proper or original prepositions, which are of the first formation, there are others which may be called improper or secondary, which constitute a later formation. These are distinguished,

(1.) By their being compounded, whether written in one or in more words ; as, *into*, *unto*, *upon*, *until*, *out of* ; *because of*, *instead of* ; *along*, *amid*, *around* ; *before*, *behind*, *below*, *beneath*, *between*, *betwixt*, *beyond* ; *within*, *without* ; *about*, *above*.

(2.) By their having the inflection or termination of other parts of speech ; as, *during*, *notwithstanding*, *except* ; Lat. *inter*, *subter*, *super*, *infra*, *intra*.

(3.) By their not expressing, as prepositions, local relations ; as, *during*, *since*.

21. Improper or compound prepositions are more definite in their meaning, but less forcible or emphatic, than simple prepositions. Comp. 'in the room of' or 'instead of' with 'for ;' 'for the sake of' or 'on account of' with 'for ;' 'by means of' with 'through ;' 'for the purpose of' with 'to ;' 'according to' with 'after ;' etc.

22. A few prepositions, particularly those of a later formation, appear never to have denoted external relations. Thus, Gr. *ἀνευ* and Germ. *ohne*, (see No. 16, supra ;) Lat. *sine*, 'without ;' Eng. *during*, *since*.

23. The great variety of meanings, and that without confusion, to the same preposition, arises from the endless analogies which present themselves to the human mind. Thus, 'he lives *in* sin ;' 'he did it *out of* spite ;' 'he is *out of* danger ;' 'to travel *for* pleasure ;' 'to hope *for* assistance ;' 'to follow *after* peace ;' 'he did it *from* envy ;' 'he was pale *from* terror ;' 'to attain *to* honor ;' 'to depend *on* a person ;' 'I know nothing *about* it.'

24. A classification of these different uses would be very desirable. Thus, for example,

(1.) The preposition *from* denotes the commencing point of space; the initial point of time; original state; origin; cause; source; etc. as, 'to go *from* Boston to New York;' '*from* morning to evening;' '*from* childhood to manhood;' 'to be descended *from* Adam;' 'to be pale *from* terror;' 'to receive blessings *from* God;' 'intoxicated *from* wine;' 'to free *from* one's engagements;' 'to learn *from* any one;' etc.

(2.) *For* denotes direction in a very general way; also, substitution; the logical factitive; etc.

(3.) *In* denotes the place; time; condition; etc.

(4.) *On* denotes nearness of place; manner; etc.

(5.) *About* denotes the place; time; subject-matter, etc.

(6.) Gr. *ἀντί* denotes before; against; comparison; substitution; preference; etc.

25. The intellectual relations expressed by prepositions after verbs and adjectives are very numerous and varied. In some cases the choice of the preposition is attended with some difficulty. The following principles may be of service.

(1.) The Latin or Greek preposition already in composition is often a guide; as, to *absolve from* guilt; to *accede to* a proposition; to *concur with* a person; to *inhere in* a thing; to *impose on* any one; to *sympathize with* a person; *antipathy against* any one.

(2.) The physical meaning of the simple verb is also a guide; as, to *plunge into* debt; to *carp at* a composition; to *seek after* glory.

(3.) The symbol under which the intellectual idea is represented, often determines the preposition; as, to copy *from* a picture; to rule *over* a country.

(4.) The classic dative relation is naturally expressed by *to* or *for*; as, to yield *to* intemperance; to hope *for* assistance.

(5.) The classic genitive or ablative is naturally expressed by *of* or *from*; as, to rob one *of* his money; to be descended *from* kings.

(6.) The factitive relation is naturally expressed by *to*, *into*, *for*; as, 'it turned out *to* his disgrace;' 'he turned the water *into* wine;' 'he was taken *for* an honest man.'

26. From the doctrine of prepositions thus exhibited, it appears that intellectual relations, as well as intellectual objects

and operations, are conceived of as physical, and are presented to the minds of others by means of words drawn from the physical world. The words thus employed are used metaphorically. The transfer, or change of meaning, rests on resemblance or analogy. The meaning of the words, when stripped of the metaphor, it belongs to the philosopher and thinking man to investigate.  
June, 1853.

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#### ART. XXVI.—ON ADVERBS.

THE *adverb* (Lat. *adverbium*, as if 'joined to the verb,') is a part of speech *joined to the verb* in order to modify or limit the force of the same.

As the adverb modifies the verb or predicate, so it modifies an adjective or participle, which is a verb or predicate without the predication.

The adverb does not, like a verb, substantive, or adjective, express a peculiar form of an idea merely; as, 'he went from *home*,' nor like the numeral or preposition, a peculiar relation of ideas; as, 'to go *down* the hill;' but it denotes an objective factor in full as a member of the syntactical combination; as, 'he went *home*;' 'the sun went *down*.'

The adverb modifies the predicate by expressing an incidental or supplementary object. In this it differs from the necessary or complementary object. It involves a substance or essence, and the direction or tendency towards the same.

Although the limit of the adverb is well defined by the etymology of its name, and by the use to which it is applied, yet it embraces words considerably different from each other as to their nature, owing to their origination and different mode of formation.

1. The simplest form of the adverb is that which is derived from the substantive, which expresses a substance, or something conceived of as a substance. Thus

*Home*, 'to the house,' an accusative case used adverbially.

*Needs*, 'from necessity,' an ancient genitive used adverbially.

*Always*, 'at all times,' the accusative of time.

*Noways*, 'in no manner,' an ancient genitive used adverbially.

*Nightly*, 'by night,' with adverbial suffix *ly*.

*Beside*, 'moreover,' compounded of *by* and *side*.

*Away*, 'at a distance,' compounded of *a* for *on* and *way*.

*To-day*, 'on this day,' compounded of *to* and *day*. See Fowler's *Eng. Grammar*, § 317.

These are principally adverbs of place and time; also of cause, as *needs*; and of manner, as *noways*.

2. Another class of adverbs is derived from the adjective, which in this case is used as an abstract substantive. Thus

*Unawares*, 'with suddenness,' an ancient genitive used adverbially.

*Once*, 'at one time,' an ancient genitive used adverbially. So *twice*, *thrice*.

*Wisely*, 'with wisdom,' with adverbial suffix *ly*. So from most adjectives of quality.

*Right*, 'with rightness,' with loss of ancient adverbial suffix. So many others. See Fowler's *Eng. Grammar*, § 319.

*In vain*, 'with vanity,' compounded of *in* and *vain*. So *in secret*, *in public*, *in particular*, *in general*. These are adverbial phrases.

These are principally adverbs of manner.

3. A third class is derived from pronouns, in which the substantive idea, as place, time, cause, manner, etc. is involved in the form of the word. Thus

*There*, 'in that place.' So *here*, *where*?

*Thither*, 'to that place.' So *hither*, *whither*?

*Thence*, 'from that time.' So *hence*, *whence*?

*Then*, 'at that time.' So *when*?

*So*, 'after that manner.' So *as*, *how*?

*Therein*, *thereof*, etc. So *herein*, *hereof*, etc. *wherein*? *whereof*?

Adverbs derived from pronouns are either in an oblique case, or else have peculiar adverbial suffixes.

These adverbs derived from pronouns differ widely from the preceding. They denote impermanent relations, or relations to the speaker merely.

4. A fourth class of adverbs are those which are closely related to prepositions. The substantive idea is definite space as related to the speaker himself. Thus .

*In*, compounded emphatic form *within*.

*Out*, compounded emphatic form *without*.

*Up*, compounded emphatic form *above*.

*Down*, compounded emphatic forms *beneath* and *below*.

*Fore*, compounded emphatic form *before*.

*Back*, compounded emphatic form *behind*.

Also, *off*, *on*, *by*, *with*, *to*; *about*. See Fowler's *Eng. Grammar*, § 324.

Thus, 'he went down' = 'he went to space which was lower in regard to the speaker.'

5. Another class of adverbs is formed by trajection; they are called adverbs of *modality*. These modify the predication or affirmation, and not the predicate itself. They express all degrees of certainty or uncertainty. Thus, 'my brother will *not* come;' '*perhaps* he will come;' '*possibly* he may come;' 'he will *probably* come;' 'he will *certainly* come;' 'the sun had *scarcely* set.'

These sentences may be resolved thus: 'he will certainly come' = 'it is certain that he will come.'

This class of adverbs deserves attention.

The object of the preceding remarks has been to classify adverbs anew, and to clear up a difficult point, in the new or Beckerian philology, respecting the objective relation.

Jan. 1851.

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#### ART. XXVII.—ON THE ORIGIN AND FORMATION OF ADVERBS.

1. By *primitive* or *original* adverbs are intended those which, in the present state of our knowledge, cannot be traced to any other part of speech.

2. The following may be regarded as primitive adverbs: (1.) *far*; (2.) *nigh*; (3.) *oft*; (4.) *soon*, Old Eng. *sone*, *soone*, Anglo-Sax. *sona*; (5.) *well*, Anglo-Sax. *wel* or *well*, Germ. *wohl*, (see Heyse, 586, 820,) perhaps from *wollen*, 'to will.'

3. The following are used both as adjectives and adverbs, but the adjective is evidently original: *clean*, *cleanly*, *fast*, *hard*, *high*, *long*, *loud*, *late*, *right*, *sore*, *soft*, *thick*, *wide*, *ill* or *evil*, *ready*, from the Anglo-Saxon, and *clear*, *just*, from the Norman-French.

4. The following are used as adverbs and prepositions, but the adverbial use is the original: *of*, *on*, *up*, *out*, *by*, *for*, *in*, *with*, *to*.

5. The following involve a pronominal element: *so*, *as*; *here*, *hence*, *hither*; *there*, *thence*, *thither*, *then*, *thus*; *where*, *whence*, *whither*, *when*, *why*, *how*. These present a beautiful correlation.

6. Adverbs of quality are formed from most adjectives by adding *ly*; as, *honest, honestly; wise, wisely*.

7. Many adverbs are the genitives of nouns and adjectives; as, *unawares, needs, once*, etc.

8. Some involve the negative element; as, *no, not*; or the affirmative element; as, *aye, yea, yes*.

June, 1853.

#### ART. XXVIII.—DOCTRINE OF PARTICIPIALS.

1. THE participial, (from Lat. *participialis*, 'belonging to a participle,') is so called because it partakes, like the *participle*, of the nature of a verb and of a noun either substantive or adjective.

2. Under the general name of *participial* we include the participles, the infinitive mode, the gerund, and the supine; which are all formed from the verb.

(1.) The *participle* partakes of the nature of a verb and of an adjective noun, and is the ground-form of the adjective participial.

(2.) The *infinitive* partakes of the nature of a verb and of a substantive noun, and is the ground-form of the substantive participial.

The infinitive is naturally adapted to express the subject, the accusative or passive object, also the second accusative.

(3.) The *gerund* is an adverbial form of the participle, or an adverbially used participle.

The gerund in Old German had the termination of an adverb, which it has lost in modern German.

The Latin gerund, commonly so called, is properly a supine.

(4.) The *supine* is an oblique case of the infinitive.

In English the supine has usurped for the most part the place of the simple infinitive.

The participle and gerund are adjective participials, and the infinitive and supine are substantive participials.

3. Most known languages form participials of some sort; but different languages vary much as to their form and use. Thus

(1.) The Greek has participles, infinitives, also verbal adjectives in *τός* and *τέος*; but no gerunds or supines with distinct form.

(2.) The Latin excels in substantive participial forms, viz. the supines and the so-called gerunds.

(3.) The Teutonic languages, including the English, have a supine formed from the infinitive. The gerund in English differs not in form from the participle.

(4.) The Finnish language is said to abound pre-eminently in participial forms.

4. The participials differ from verbs in not expressing the predication, and from ordinary adjectives and substantives in expressing time, and also admitting an object after them like verbs.

5. Participials vacillate much between the active and passive voice; and the substantive and adjective participials seem sometimes to be interchanged.

6. Participial constructions are better adapted to express the unity of the thought, and are in themselves more emphatic and forcible, but they are less definite as to meaning than subordinate propositions.

Modern languages, as refinement advances, tend to the use of subordinate propositions instead of participials.

7. The nature of participials is thought by Dr. Becker not to have been rightly apprehended till modern times.

8. Propositions involving participials we have thought fit to denominate *intermediate propositions*, as forming the transition from simple to compound propositions.

9. Participial constructions are easily interchanged with subordinate propositions; as, '*nihil agendo male agere discimus*,' i. e. '*cum nihil agimus*, male agere discimus.'

10. Some verbal adjectives and substantives, in other languages, take, like participials, the construction of verbs.

July 1, 1853.

11. The French language has the different participials.

(1.) It has the simple participle; as, '*toutes les planetes circulant autour du soleil, paraissent avoir été mises en mouvement par une impulsion commune*.'

(2.) It has the gerund; as, '*elle paraît souffrante*.'

(3.) It has the participle used absolutely; as, '*Anselme se plaignant*;' '*mon père m'ayant appelé, je suis retourné*.'

(4.) It has the simple infinitive, as, '*attendre est impossible, agir ne l'est pas moins*;' '*j'ai manqué me trahir*;' '*vous pensez tout savoir*.'



(5.) It has the supine; as, 'il est doux *de revoir* les murs de la patrie;' 'il lui restait deux partis à *prendre*.'

(6.) It has the accusative and infinitive; as, 'je sens *ses larmes baigner* mon visage.'

Nov. 1855.

## ART. XXIX.—THE ENGLISH PARTICIPLE IN ING.

1. THIS participle, like the other participles, although derived immediately from the verb, has the form of the adjective, and like the adjective may be used either as an attribute or as a predicate.

Its use as an attribute is indicated solely by its location; as, 'the *setting* sun;' 'the sun *rising* in the east.' Its use as a predicate is indicated by the intervention of the predicate-word *to be*; as, 'the sun is *rising*.'

2. This participle, being derived immediately from the verb, retains several properties of the verb, which other adjectives have not; as, (1.) the indication of time, or rather of the continuance of an action; (2.) the indication of voice; and (3.) the rection or construction of the verb.

Hence it partakes of the nature of the verb and of the adjective, which gives to it the name *participle*, i. e. 'partaking.'

3. Participles in English express the action of the verb, not as present, past, or future in time; but as going on, completed, or commencing. The participle in *ing* expresses the action of the verb as going on.

Every English verb has a participle in *ing*, except some auxiliary verbs, as *shall*, *may*, *can*, *must*, *ought*, which express mere modality. These auxiliaries have lost the proper import of the verb which consists in action, and therefore do not admit a participle.

4. The participle in *ing*, derived from an active verb, is properly active; but is sometimes used passively; as, 'the money is *owing* to a laborer;' 'that nothing be *wanting* unto them;' 'the house is *building*.' This vacillation in the import of the participle has been ascribed to its ambiguous nature, as intermediate between the verb and the adjective. When contrasted with the past participle, so called, the participle in *ing* sometimes denotes the active voice; as, 'the *besieging* enemy,' and 'the *besieged*

city;' and sometimes merely time; as, 'the *falling* snow,' and 'the *fallen* snow.'

5. The participle in *ing* has the construction, both direct and indirect, of the verb from which it is derived; as, 'the master is *teaching his pupils geography by the map.*'

We see from this that the participle in *ing* on the one side refers to a subject, and on the other to an object; and thus accords with the verb.

We are now prepared to classify the different uses and acceptations of the English participle in *ing*.

6. The appropriate or primary use of the participle in *ing*, as distinguished from an adjective, is to express in the form of an attribute the verbal predicate which has been expanded to an objective combination. It now expresses the predicate, but not the predication. Its origin or formation from the verb prepares or fits it to perform this function. Thus, 'Jesus, *beholding him*, loved him;' compare 'Jesus *beheld him.*'

The idea expressed by the participle thus used is equivalent to the thought expressed by the finite verb. Hence the participle may be interchanged for a finite verb connected with the leading verb by the conjunction *and*. This is the most simple resolution of the participle. Thus, the Greek proposition, 'he answering said,' is rendered in our common version literally, Mat. 3: 15. Luke 6: 3. But in most passages it is resolved into two propositions, and rendered 'he answered and said,' Matt. 11: 4. 12: 39, 48. 13: 11, 37. 14: 28. 15: 24, 28. etc. and what is remarkable, in one passage it is rendered, 'he answered saying,' Luke 14: 5.

The participle thus used may also be resolved into a subordinate proposition, and that expressing various relations.

(1.) A relative proposition; as, 'Simon Peter, *having a sword*, drew it,' i. e. 'Simon Peter, *who had a sword*, drew it.'

(2.) A proposition denoting time; as, '*returning in a few minutes*, I missed him,' i. e. '*when I returned in a few minutes*, I missed him.'

(3.) A conditional proposition; as, 'children, *dying in infancy*, may be saved,' i. e. 'children, *if they die in infancy*, may be saved.'

(4.) A concessional proposition; as, '*being defamed*, we entreat,' i. e. '*though we be defamed*, yet we entreat.'

(5.) A causal proposition; as, 'I thank my God, *hearing of thy love and faith*,' i. e. 'I thank my God, *because I hear of thy love and faith*.'

(6.) A final proposition; as, 'they went to the temple, *suing for pardon*,' i. e. 'they went to the temple, *that they might sue for pardon*.'

7. The participle is often preceded by an adverb or conjunction. In this case it is merely an abridged proposition. Thus, 'A man is safe, *when* following the path of duty.'

8. The proposition formed with a participle may be considered as making the transition from the simple to the compound sentence, or as being intermediate between the two.

9. A secondary use of the participle in *ing* is as a predicate, by the intervention of the verb *to be*. Employed in this way, it forms in English very useful periphrastic tenses not known in other languages; as, *I am loving, I was loving, I shall be loving*. They express tenses of the continued action.

These tenses are not found in the auxiliary verbs, which have no participle in *ing*, nor are they wanted in those verbs, which of their own nature express continued action.

10. When the subject, to which the participle refers, is not found either in the subject or in the object of the leading proposition, then such subject must be specially expressed. This may be regarded as the third use of the participle in *ing*.

This subject is put in the nominative case, and is called *the nominative absolute*. The clause thus formed may be resolved into various subordinate propositions, as above.

11. The present participle often passes into other parts of speech.

(1.) The present participle is often used as an adjective; as, *charming, touching*. Compare *eloquent, diligent, fluent*, derived from Latin present participles.

The participle in *ing*, as such, does not admit of comparison; but when it becomes an adjective, it may be compared.

(2.) This participle is often used as a substantive; as, *friend*, (comp. Anglo-Sax. *freond* from *freon*;) *fiend*, (comp. Anglo-Sax. *feond* from *feon*;) *regent*, (comp. Lat. *regens* from *rego*;) *servant; attendant*.

(3.) This participle is sometimes used as an adverb; as, 'a *burning* red cloth.'

Nov. 1845.

12. *The house is being built.*—This mode of expression is becoming quite common, particularly in the public newspapers. It is beginning to be regarded as the appropriate form for the passive participle, when denoting present time or continued action.

It is liable, however, to several important objections.

(1.) It appears formal and pedantic. There is a stiffness about it. The easy and natural expression is, *the house is building.*

(2.) It is not found in the Common English Version of the Bible. Compare John ii. 20. 1 Cor. i. 18. 2 Cor. ii. 15. iv. 3. 1 Pet. iii. 20. Rev. xxi. 24: where there was occasion to use this participle. Indeed it is of quite modern origin.

(3.) The words *being built* thus used have a different meaning from what they have in the sentence, *the house, being built, will be rented.* There is no reason why the same words used as an attribute, and as a predicate, should differ in meaning. There is nothing in the phrase which fits it for this new use. The difficulty, which lies in the nature of the past participle, still remains.

(4.) It has not, so far as I know, the support of any respectable grammarian.

May, 1846.

#### ART. XXX.—THE GERUND.

ALTHOUGH the forms of language, in ordinary use, are sufficiently apprehended by the common mind for the general purposes of life, yet it may not be unimportant to awaken even more intelligent persons to a living sense of their value, and thus bring to consciousness the latent powers inherent in such forms. The coin is current enough; but its legend has become obscure, and its origin is forgotten.

I propose to examine the following propositions:

‘Ille mortem occubuit, pro patriâ pugnans.’ He fell fighting for his country.

‘Ille venit invitus.’ He came unwilling.

These forms of expression have occasioned not a little embarrassment to grammarians. They have not succeeded to explain them by their common terminology. The subject is still left in some obscurity.

Some, guided by the external form or grammatical construction, have thought it sufficient to consider *pugnans* as agreeing with *ille*, or *fighting* as connected with *he*. But it is evident that *pugnans* is not a mere attribute of *ille*, nor *fighting* of the pronoun *he*. The meaning of the first example is not exhausted by saying, 'the fighting person fell,' nor of the second example by saying, 'the unwilling person came.'

Others, aware of this difficulty, have supposed the participle or adjective to modify the predicate, like an adverb of manner. But it is evident that *fighting for one's country*, or *not fighting for one's country*, is not strictly a manner of *dying*; and that *willingness* or *unwillingness* is not precisely a mode of *coming*. Nor is the participle or adjective here a mere index of time.

Dr. Becker has been more happy in his explanation. He considers the participle or adjective here as *the object of concomitant action*. According to his view,

1. The participle or adjective modifies the predicate, and of course denotes an object, or exhibits an objective relation.

2. The participle or adjective modifies the predicated action by means of another separate, but concomitant, action or state. If we embrace fully in our minds this idea of an activity coexistent with the activity denoted by the predicate of the sentence, the force and beauty of these expressions will, I think, be appreciated, and not otherwise.

3. These forms of expression may be resolved into a compound co-ordinate proposition with the copulative conjunction *and*; as, 'he fell, and he was fighting for his country'; 'he came, and he was unwilling.' The co-ordinate form, however, exhibits the two thoughts to advantage, as distinct thoughts; while the original form exhibited best the subordination of one thought to the other.

This object of concomitant or coincident action may be,

1. A participle, whether active or passive; as,

'*Ovans* invit urbem.'

'He came in *singing*.'

'He fell at my feet *weeping*.'

'He lay *sleeping*.'

'He stood *confounded*.'

The participle thus used is said by Becker to be used gerundively, and is the appropriate expression for this objective relation.

As the participle used gerundively does not differ in external form from the ordinary participle, this objective relation has been neglected in our common grammars.

2. An adjective; as,

'Nemo saltat *sobrius*.'

'Castris se *pavidus* tenuit.'

'The maiden sat there *sad*.'

3. A noun implying action, preceded by a preposition; as,

'He talks *in his sleep*.'

'I arose *with a toothache*.'

'I think thereon *with aversion*.'

'I ceased not to warn you day and night *with tears*.'

'I live *without hope*.'

'He preaches *with a full house*.'

4. A noun of the agent, preceded by *as*; as,

'He stood *as a spectator*.'

'I came *as a suppliant*.'

See St. Paul's address to the elders of Ephesus, Acts 20: 18-38, in which this form of language is used repeatedly, and that with good effect.

Nov. 1849.

#### ART. XXXI.—THE LATIN ABLATIVE ABSOLUTE.

EVERY student of Latin needs to know something of the *ablative absolute*.

The Latin ablative absolute is employed in the following different ways:

1. To express the time of the action or event in the leading clause; as,

'Pythagoras, Tarquinio Superbo regnante, in Italiam venit,' Tarquinius Superbus reigning, or when Tarquinius Superbus reigned, Pythagoras came into Italy.

'Caesar, Galliâ relicta, Romam rediit,' Caesar, Gaul being left, or when he had left Gaul, returned to Rome.

'Aeneas, Trojâ a Graecis expugnata, in Italiam venit,' Aeneas, Troy being taken by the Greeks, or after Troy had been taken by the Greeks, came into Italy.

As the ablative absolute strictly denotes the continuance or completion of an action or event in the leading clause, the above is its simplest and most natural import.

The use of the ablative in this construction is easily explained, especially as the ablative by itself, as a substitute for the locative case, sometimes denotes time; comp. 'die quinto decessit.'

The other uses of the ablative absolute are regarded by modern philologists as gerundive, or partaking of the nature of the gerund.

2. To express a condition of the leading clause; as,

'Quaenam sollicitudo vexaret impios, sublato suppliciorum metu?' the fear of punishment being taken away, or if the fear of punishment were taken away, what anxiety would ever disturb the wicked?

The ablative by itself also denotes the state or condition; comp. 'pace,' 'bello.'

3. To express a concession affecting the leading clause; as,

'Perditis omnibus rebus, tamen virtus se sustentare posset,' all things else being destroyed, or though all things else were destroyed, yet virtue could sustain herself.

A concession is nearly allied to a condition; comp. Lat. 'etsi,' although, with 'si,' if.

4. To express a restriction affecting the leading clause; as,

'Nihil potest evenire, nisi causâ antecedente,' a cause not preceding, or unless a cause precede, nothing can take place.

A restriction is merely a negative condition.

5. To express the cause affecting the leading clause; as,

'Lupus, stimulante fame, captat ovile,' the wolf, hunger inciting, or because hunger incites, seeks the fold.

The ablative by itself, as the proper ablative, also denotes the cause; comp. 'aeger vulneribus.'

6. To express the mode or manner of the leading clause; as,

'Hostes, terrore percusso, occisi sunt,' the enemies, terror being impressed on them, or being struck with terror, were slain.

The ablative by itself, used for the modal case, denotes the mode or manner; comp. 'vi aut fraude.'

#### REMARKS.

1. The ground or reason for employing the ablative in this construction in Latin has been explained above.

2. This construction is called *the ablative absolute*, because the noun or subject to which the participle refers is found in its own clause, and is not to be sought for elsewhere.

3. The general object of this construction is to exhibit the logical relations of thoughts, not simply the grammatical relation of ideas to each other. The leading proposition is modified by a full thought in the form of an idea.

4. This construction expresses the adverbial objective relations, or those objective relations which are not directly complementary.

5. The use of the ablative absolute contributes to the compactness and unity of the whole thought; the use of the corresponding subordinate clause, by expressing the exact logical or grammatical relations, gives importance to the clause itself. The subordinate clause may sometimes be preferred also for the sake of euphony or the rhythmical form of the sentence.

6. This construction may be regarded as an abridged form of expression, making the transition from the simple to the compound sentence; or as a sentence subjected to internal inflection.

7. The Latin ablative absolute may be expressed in English by the nominative absolute; but much more elegantly by a subordinate clause, introduced by its appropriate particle, as in the examples above. But it is not resolvable into a mere relative proposition, nor into a final proposition.

8. The English nominative absolute occurs occasionally in King James' Version of the Bible.

Dec. 1845.

#### ART. XXXII.—THE INFINITIVE MODE IN ENGLISH.

THE simple or proper infinitive mode, although formerly of very extensive use, is now of rare occurrence in English. Its place has been usurped for the most part by the infinitive with *to* prefixed, which was formerly a dative case of the proper infinitive, and is now called by modern philologists a *supine*. I propose to exhibit the original meanings of the simple or proper infinitive, and thus show how far its place has been superseded by other forms.

1. The simple infinitive, as the *nomen verbi*, or the simple expression of the verbal idea in an abstract form, was formerly used with a finite verb, primarily to denote the subject or nominative in a sentence. So in Latin, '*mentiri est turpe*,' to lie is base; and in Anglo-Saxon, '*thus unc gedafnath ealle rihtwis-*



nesse *gefyllan*,' thus it becometh us to fulfill all righteousness, Matt. 3 : 15. But this usage does not exist in modern English. Its place has been supplanted either by the supine; as, '*to lie* is base;' or by the verbal noun in *ing*; as, '*lying* is never justifiable.'

2. The simple infinitive was also used to denote the immediate object after an active verb, as the accusative case of the neuter gender does not ordinarily differ from the nominative. So in Latin, '*cupio discere*,' I desire to learn; and in Anglo-Saxon, Matt. 12 : 38. But this usage has also been supplanted by the supine, except after the verbs *do*, *shall*, *will*, *may*, *can*, *must*, *dare*, *need*; which have become mere auxiliaries of mode or tense. Such verbs, expressing mere modality or time, no longer express action like other verbs. The infinitive which follows them has the same subject with the auxiliary verb, but cannot be interchanged, as after other verbs, for a subordinate proposition. This infinitive virtually expresses the predicate of the proposition, and the auxiliary receives into itself the indications of number and time.

3. The simple infinitive was also used to denote the second object after a factitive verb. This is now restricted in English to the verbs, *bid*, *help*, *make*, *let*. Why these verbs have been excepted from the fate of other factitive verbs, does not appear.

4. The simple infinitive has been used, and continues to be used after the verbs *see*, *hear*, *feel*, where we should expect a participle, which indeed appears to be the proper form. So in Anglo-Saxon and in English, Luke 24 : 39, '*As ye see me have*,' for '*As ye see me having*,' as in the Greek. So '*he has his sword hang* on his side,' for '*he has his sword hanging* on his side.' The supine, or infinitive with *to*, is not used in this sense.

March, 1846.

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#### ART. XXXIII.—THE SUPINE, OR THE INFINITIVE MODE WITH TO.

THE infinitive mode, as it now stands in English, is the dative case of the ancient infinitive, and is formed from the ancient infinitive by prefixing the preposition *to*. As this point is not fully understood by all, I propose to illustrate it by a scientific arrangement of the different uses of the modern infinitive, as they may be supposed to have arisen.

1. To express the final cause, that is, the end or object for which anything is done. This is its original and primary import, arising from the natural force of the preposition *to*. Thus Matt. 2 : 13, 'For Herod will seek the young child *to destroy* him.' Matt. 11 : 7, 'What went ye out into the wilderness *to see*?' This is its appropriate meaning in Meso-Gothic and Anglo-Saxon.

2. It is used to express the second object after a factitive verb, which is nearly allied to the preceding infinitive of purpose; as, 'I exhorted him *to do* it,' 'he made Israel *to sin*.'

3. To express the direct object or complement after a verb; as, 'he desires *to learn*;' Is. 7 : 15, 'That he may know *to refuse* the evil.' This is a greater departure from the primary meaning, but still somewhat of its force remains.

4. To express the nominative, whether subject or predicate; as, Phil. 1 : 21, 'To me *to live* is Christ, and *to die* is gain.' Prov. 14 : 8, 'The wisdom of the prudent is *to understand* his way.' Prov. 18 : 5, 'It is not good *to accept* the person of the wicked.' This use can be ascribed only to a certain lawlessness in language. It is comparatively modern.

5. It is used after other parts of speech which convey the import of the verb; as, 'desiring *to learn*,' 'desirous *to learn*,' 'the desire *to learn*.'

6. It is joined to a noun or subject to express an attributive relation; as, 'a house *to let*,' 'a letter *to be written*,' 'a task *to perform*.' These are equivalent to and may be expressed in other languages by participles.

7. The preposition *to* thus used with an infinitive often denotes necessity or possibility; as, 'I have *to lament*,' 'I have *to work* hard,' 'I have much *to write*.' This arises from the force of the preposition *to*, as given above.

Oct. 1845.

#### ART. XXXIV.—THE ACCUSATIVE AND INFINITIVE OR SUPINE.

1. THERE is another use of the participial which deserves attention, namely, the construction of the accusative and infinitive or supine. This construction occurs particularly, when the subject of the activity implied in the infinitive differs from the subject of the leading verb. Comp. the case absolute, Art. XXXI.

2. The accusative with an infinitive occurs very frequently in Greek and Latin, and occupies considerable space in our classic grammars. It is more rare in English and some modern languages. This is owing to the progressive logical development of language.

3. This construction has occasioned much difficulty and some diversity of opinion among grammarians, but is now thought to be capable of a ready solution.

(1.) As the accusative with the infinitive interchanges in German and English with a subordinate or dependent proposition, the older grammarians naturally regarded this construction as merely a substitute for a subordinate proposition. But they overlooked the fact that the subordinate proposition in this case stood itself in the objective relation to the leading verb, which was transitive and had no other object dependent upon it.

(2.) The general dependence of this construction on the leading verb being admitted, it was for a long time a matter of debate, whether the infinitive depended on the accusative, or the accusative by attraction on the infinitive. But both parties in this discussion went astray.

(3.) W. Wachsmuth, in a monograph on this subject, (Hal. Sax. 1815.) ascribes the origin of this construction to the contraction or abridgment of two distinct propositions. But this explanation is confused or obscure.

(4.) In later times the theory has been adopted by many grammarians that the accusative and infinitive constitute a double object, a direct and an indirect, each alike depending on the leading verb of the sentence. So A. Crosby and others. This is an approximation to the truth.

(5.) The doctrine now held by the more judicious grammarians is this, that the accusative with the infinitive is the appropriate form for the *logical factitive relation*. As the logical factitive (see *supra*, p. 74, 75.) expresses an adjudged or inferred effect, and is resolvable into a proposition, the infinitive, as involving the idea of a predicate without the predication, is adapted in its own nature to express this factitive. But the noun and the infinitive, though equally dependent on the leading or principal verb, constitute an apposition, which in this case is predicative, not attributive.

This construction, however, is sometimes used to express the real and the moral factitive; as, 'thou makest me to laugh;' '*militem abire jussit*.'

4. This construction is found in Greek and Latin not only after *verba sentiendi et declarandi*, etc. but also after phrases which are equivalent to such verbs; as, '*ad salutem civium inventas esse leges constat*,' a logical factitive; '*necesse est semper beatum esse sapientem*,' a real factitive; '*victorem parcere victis aequum est*,' a moral factitive.

5. Weissenborn makes a very proper distinction between the two propositions; *puto Cajum gratum*, 'I think Caius a grateful person,' where only the first accusative is the passive object, and *gratum*, 'a grateful person,' is properly the result of the activity implied in the verb *puto*, and *Cajum gratum esse puto*, 'I think Caius to be grateful,' where both *Cajum* and *gratum esse* 'the rise of gratitude' are passive objects after *puto*.

6. This construction is much restricted in the Teutonic dialects. Its use in English has probably been encouraged and promoted by the study of the Latin and Greek classics at school.

7. It ought to be observed here that in English the use of the simple infinitive is very rare; as, 'John bade him depart;' but the infinitive with *to*, i. e. the supine, is more common; as, 'I advised him to go.'

8. But the infinitive form which we have thus far examined does not cover the whole ground of the infinitive and supine, as we shall see by the next article.

Nov. 1855.

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#### ART. XXXV.—THE SUBSTANTIVE PARTICIPIAL IN ING.

1. BESIDES the ordinary infinitive, or substantive participial, which is formed from the ancient infinitive by dropping the infinitive termination *an* or *en*, there is another substantive participial, which is formed from the same ancient infinitive by strengthening the termination. Thus from the Meso-Gothic *bairan*, 'to bear,' we have *bear* (whence *to bear*) and *bearing*.

2. The legitimate functions of this substantive participial in *ing* it is difficult to state with exactness. It seems to be properly used in certain cases, particularly after prepositions, where the supine with *to* is inappropriate.

Thus 'I am weary of *bearing* them,' not 'I am weary to *bear* them,' (as in Is. 1: 14.) the preposition *to* not being adapted to express the relation between *weary* and *bear*.

'These are the four spirits of the heavens, which go forth *from standing* before the Lord of all the earth,' Zech. 6 : 5. not 'which go forth *to stand* before the Lord of all the earth,' for this would give a directly opposite meaning.

'This by no means hinders the book *from being* a useful one,' not 'this by no means hinders the book *to be* a useful one.'

'To prevent us *from rashly engaging* in arduous or dangerous enterprises.'

'She was engaged *in reading* Plato.'

'*By establishing* good laws, we secure our peace.'

3. This form in *ing* has been thought by some a true or proper infinitive, but the infinitive with *to* occupies that place already. It is rather a supine, or oblique case of the infinitive. It is only by a doubtful extension of the use of the form in *ing* that it becomes a proper infinitive; see *infra*.

4. This substantive participial in *ing* has been confounded by most grammarians with the adjective participial in *ing*. But these participials have a distinct origin, as will be shown in the next article.

5. The substantive participial in *ing*, as such, seems to admit neither an article, nor an adjective, nor a genitive to precede it; but if the form in *ing* be preceded by an article, or by an adjective, or by a genitive, it then becomes an abstract verbal noun, no longer governing an accusative directly, but having the construction of other verbal nouns. It is no longer a proper participial.

6. The principle aimed at by the old grammarians in their statements was probably this: the form in *ing*, while having the rection of a verb, may be modified by an adverb, but not by an article or an attributive; and while having the construction of a noun, may be modified by an article or an attributive, but not by an adverb. This is accordant with the principles of Becker.

Thus this abstract verbal noun takes an adjective instead of an adverb; as, 'useful for *the clear understanding* of the word of God;' comp. 'useful for *clearly understanding* the word of God.'

7. There is often an ambiguity in the use of the verbal noun; as, 'in the hearing of the philosopher;' 'in the preaching of Christ;' the periphrastic genitive being the genitive either of the subject or of the object. The ambiguity is removed in the first example by substituting 'in the philosopher's hearing,' or

'in hearing the philosopher;' and in the second example by substituting 'in Christ's preaching,' or 'in preaching Christ,' as the sense may require.

It is somewhat remarkable that the judicious Crombie should speak of an active meaning of the form in *ing*, in the phrase, 'in the philosopher's hearing,' and a passive one in the phrase 'in hearing the philosopher;' whereas the word *hearing* is equally active in both phrases. For the phrase 'in hearing the philosopher' is to be resolved grammatically into 'in one's hearing the philosopher,' and not into 'in the philosopher's being heard.'

8. This verbal noun, although it expresses action, expresses action more abstractly, or with less reference to time. Comp. Madvig on the distinction between *agere* and *actio* in Latin.

9. The abstract verbal noun, like any other noun, may be employed as the subject nominative, the predicate nominative, or the passive object, as occasion may require; as,

'*The worshipping of idols* is forbidden;' 'covetousness is a *worshipping of idols*;' 'we regard *the worshipping of idols* as sin;' as well as 'in *the worshipping of idols* there is sin;' 'such *worshipping of idols*;' 'their *worshipping of idols*.'

'*The sailing of ships* in winter is dangerous;' 'he thought *the sailing of ships* in winter dangerous.'

10. When verbals in *ing* denote an exercise or employment, rather than simple action, they are used freely in any situation, without an article, adjective, or genitive; as,

'I like *writing*.'

'He supposed, with them, that *affirming* and *denying* were operations of the mind.'

'Not rendering evil for evil, or *railing for railing*, or *striking for striking*, or *cursing for cursing*.'

The nouns thus used are *reading*, *writing*, *spelling*, *parsing*, *ciphering*, *surveying*, *drawing*, and many others.

11. When verbals in *ing*, by the figure metonymy, denote resultant states or concrete existences, they are employed of course, as other concrete nouns, with or without the article, as occasion may require. They are also capable of a plural; as, *writings*, *burnt-offerings*; and that without entirely losing their abstract character; as, *sighings*, *buffetings*, *proceedings*.

12. As the substantive participial in *ing* has the living force of a *nomen actionis*, which verbals of Latin origin have not, the common mind is disposed to use it on all occasions where such a noun is wanted. Thus

(1.) There is a strong tendency in popular language to employ the substantive participial in *ing* as a simple infinitive or subject nominative in the sentence; as,

'*Exciting* such disturbances is unlawful.'

'Rightly *understanding* a sentence depends very much on a knowledge of its grammatical construction.'

'Not *attending* to this rule is the cause of a very common error.'

'It finds that *acting* thus would gratify one passion; not *acting*, or *acting* otherwise, would gratify another. Campbell.

(2.) There is a strong tendency in popular language to employ the substantive participial in *ing* as a simple infinitive or predicate nominative; as,

'Another fault is *allowing* it to supersede the use of a point.'

'This was in fact *converting* the deposit to his own use.'

'If the case stand thus, 'tis dangerous *drinking*.' Collier.

'It will be but ill *venturing* thy soul upon that.' Bunyan.

(3.) There is a strong tendency in popular language to employ the substantive participial in *ing* as a simple infinitive or passive object, after the leading verb in the sentence: as,

'I intend *doing* it.'

'I remember *meeting* him.'

'She regrets not *having* read it.'

'One abhors *being* in debt.' Blair.

'Polite is employed to signify their *being* highly *civilized*.' Blair.

(4.) There is a strong tendency in popular language to employ the substantive participial in *ing*, even with a genitive noun or pronoun; as,

'Since the days of Samson, there has been no instance of a *man's accomplishing* a task so stupendous.'

'My going will depend on my *father's giving* his consent.'

But all these examples are disapproved of by Mr. Gould Brown, the Grammarian, who has examined them with great thoroughness and ability; see his *Grammar of Grammars*, New York, 1851. 8vo. It is doubtful, however, whether any authority can stem the current of this usage.

13. There has been a strong tendency, which is now greatly diminished, to employ forms in *ing* with the rection of a verb, even when preceded by an article; as,

'*The mixing them* makes a miserable jumble of truth and fiction.'

'It is *the giving different names* to the same object.'

'When we have in view *the erecting a column*.'

'The same objection lies against *the employing statues*.'

Such language is found in Lord Kames, Sheridan, H. Tooke, Dr. N. Webster, etc., but will, at the present day, be approved by no one.

14. There is evidently in some cases a broad difference between the accusative of a noun used before a participle, and the genitive of a noun used before a verbal noun; as, 'he felt his *strength declining*,' and 'he was sensible of his *strength's declining*.'

#### ART. XXXVL.—ORIGIN OF THE ENGLISH FORMS IN ING.

WRITERS on English Grammar universally, so far as I am acquainted, regard the termination of the present active participle in *ing* and that of the substantive participial, which is expressed by the same letters, as radically and identically the same. Hence they have made frequent statements in respect to those forms of words, which on any other supposition would appear highly absurd. But in my apprehension, these suffixes have no necessary connection. They are radically independent of each other, and have an entirely distinct origin. Their resemblance in sound and orthography is to be ascribed to pure accident, or a certain freak in language. This proposition may be proved by tracing the origin of each.

The source of the present active participle may be easily shown. Its parentage is clear and undoubted. Its heraldry is ancient and honorable. No princely family in Europe can boast equal antiquity.

Sansk. *bhar-ant*, (whence nomin. *bhar-an*, accus. *bhar-antam*,) bearing.

Zend *bar-ant*, (whence nomin. *bar-ans*, accus. *bar-entem*,) bearing.

Pers. *purs-an* and *purs-endeḥ*, asking.

Greek *φέρων*, (whence accus. *φέροντα*,) bearing.

Lat. *ferens*, (whence accus. *ferentem*,) bearing.

Goth. { *bair-ans*, (whence accus. *bair-andana*,) bearing.  
           { *bind-ans*, (whence accus. *bind-andana*,) bearing.

Old Germ. *pint-anter*, binding.

Old Sax. *bind-and*, binding.



Anglo-Sax. *bind-ende*, binding.

Old Norse, *bind-andi*, binding.

Germ. *bind-end*, binding.

Dutch, *bind-ende*, binding.

Old Eng. *doand*, 'doing;' *criande*, 'crying;' *lepande*, 'leaping;' *livand*, 'living,' in Chaucer; *glitterand*, 'glittering,' in Spenser.

Mod. Eng. *bearing*, *binding*, *doing*, *glittering*.

Thus the participle or adjective participial has an unbroken succession as to form and meaning from the early Sanskrit down to the last step, scilicet, the English, when the forms *doand* and *doing*, *livand* and *living*, have by an unaccountable freak of language been confounded.

The substantive participial or verbal noun in *ing* is radically distinct from the participle or adjective participial having the same termination, as is easily shown from the original languages.

Goth. infin. *bairan*, to bear; *bindan*, to bind.

Old Germ. *heil-unga*, a healing; *pifind-unga*, a finding.

Old Sax. *sigl-ing*, a sealing.

Anglo-Sax. *clæns-ung*, a cleansing; *brec-ung*, a breaking.

Old Norse, *horm-ung*, a grieving; *bind-ing*, a binding.

Mid. Germ. *warn-unge*, a warning.

Germ. *halt-ung*, a holding; *send-ung*, a sending.

Dutch, *baar-inge*, a bearing; *houd-ing*, a holding.

Eng. *a bear-ing*; *a bind-ing*; *a hold-ing*; *a send-ing*.

Thus the substantive participial goes back to the Gothic infinitive; whence arises its meaning and construction.

#### ART. XXXVII.—SYNTACTICAL RULES.

SYNTAX, besides explaining the syntactical combinations, or the constituent parts of a proposition, treats also of the different processes which, by exhibiting the relation of the words to each other, develop the meaning of the sentence.

These processes are concord or agreement, rection or government, and collocation.

*Concord* or *agreement* is the correspondence of one word with another in gender, number, case, or person. See Art. XXXVIII. where this subject is illustrated from the Latin language.

*Rection or government* is when one word requires another to be put in a certain case or mode; which, however, always depends on the significancy. See Art. XXXIX. where this subject is illustrated from the English language.

*Collocation* is the arrangement or position of words in a sentence. See Art. XL. where this subject is illustrated from various languages.

The rules of syntax, in our common grammars, are embraced under these three heads. They are distinct from each other, and exhaust the subject.

Collocation, however, includes also punctuation. And collocation and punctuation together accord with, or rather represent, the pauses and various intonations in spoken language.

Uninflected languages have no agreement, and very little government. They depend almost solely on collocation.

Nov. 1855.

#### ART. XXXVIII.—CONCORD OR AGREEMENT.

CONCORD or agreement is the correspondence of one word with another in gender, number, case, or person.

The grammatical concords were formerly regarded as of sufficient importance to merit a distinct consideration by themselves. But in some of our latest grammars the rules of concord have been so intermingled with the rules of government as to occasion not a little confusion. A philosophic explanation of the several concords may not be without its use.

##### 1. *Concord of a Verb with its Nominative.*

As the verb does not in its own nature involve number, gender, or person, but has admitted into itself inflections for them, on account of its relation to the nominative or subject, it must, in order to express such relation, agree with its nominative in all these respects; as, *mulier amata est*, the woman was loved.

##### 2. *Concord of an Adjective with a Substantive.*

As the adjective is inflected by number, gender, and case, in order to show its relation to the substantive which it modifies, it must agree with such substantive in these respects; as, *mulier bona*, a good woman.

### 3. Concord of a Substantive with a Substantive.

Two substantives, expressing independent existences, but standing in the like relation, are put in the same case; and if the annexed substantive is varied by gender, also in the same gender; as, *philosophia magistra vitæ*, philosophy the mistress of life.

### 4. Concord of a Pronoun with its Antecedent.

A pronoun, whether relative or other pronoun, if it be varied by gender, number, or person, agrees with the noun to which it refers in these particulars, but its case depends on the construction of the clause to which the pronoun belongs; as, *puer qui legit*, the boy who reads.

### GENERAL REMARKS ON THE FOUR CONCORDS.

1. A collective noun or pronoun, or noun of multitude, as being virtually a plural, may be construed as such; as, *pars epulis onerant mensas*, part load the tables with dainties.

2. Two or more substantives singular, connected by a copulative conjunction, or by the preposition *cum*, forming virtually a plural, may be construed as such; as, *grammatica quondam ac musice junctæ fuerunt*, grammar and music were formerly joined.

3. Where different genders are concerned, the masculine takes the lead of the feminine or neuter; as *pater mihi et mater mortui sunt*, my father and mother are dead; *tempus vitæ magister est*, time is the master of life.

4. The neuter gender, as being the most comprehensive, is employed in adjectives,

(1.) When used in the most general sense; as, *labor vincit omnia*, labor overcomes all things.

(2.) When referring to an indeclinable word, or to a clause; as, *vacare culpâ est suave*, to be free from blame is pleasant.

(3.) When referring to a noun, but without regard to its gender; as, *triste lupus stabulis*, the wolf is a destructive thing to the stalls.

(4.) When referring to things without life, but of different genders or numbers; as, *labor voluptasque dissimilia naturâ*, labor and pleasure are naturally unlike.

5. Substantives of the neuter gender, when they denote persons, sometimes have adjectives agreeing with them in the mas-

culine by a *constructio ad sensum*; as, *capita conjurationis caesi sunt*, the heads of the conspiracy were slain.

6. When a compound subject is made up of nominatives of different persons, the verb agrees with the first person rather than with the second, and with the second rather than with the third; as, *si tu et Tullia valetis, ego et Cicero valemus*, if you and Tullia are well, I and Cicero are well; *haec neque ego neque tu fecimus*, neither I nor you have done these things.

7. The following are cases of attraction,

(1.) Where the verb agrees with the predicate instead of the subject in number; as, *amantium irae amoris integratio est*, the anger of lovers is a renewal of love.

(2.) Where the verb agrees with the noun in apposition instead of the first noun; as, *Volsinii, oppidum Tuscorum, concrematum est*, Volsinii, a town of the Tuscans, was consumed by fire. Here is also a *constructio ad sensum*.

(3.) Where the relative pronoun agrees with a following noun instead of its antecedent; as, *Thebae, quod est caput*, Thebes, which is the capital.

Aug. 1844.

It was easy to conjecture that concord in its origin was a chiming of similar final sounds; as, *dominus bonus, domina bona, regnum bonum*. And this conjecture is now confirmed by the analogous fact, that, in the South-African dialects concord has arisen from alliteration, or a chiming of initial sounds. Thus in Swahere, one of these dialects, *kitu kidogo, negotium parvum*, plur. *witu widogo, negotia parva*; *miti midogo mitatu, tres tenues arbores*.

Nov. 1855.

#### ART. XXXIX.—RECTION OR GOVERNMENT.

This topic includes the government of verbs, the government of adjectives, and the government of particles. This last, however, falls under compound sentences.

Nov. 1855.

##### I. Government of Verbs in English.

The progress made in grammatical science makes a new exhibition of this topic desirable.

1. Subjective verbs, as their meaning is complete in themselves, require no complementary object; as '*John sleeps*;' '*Henry stands*.' They admit freely, however, like other verbs, supplementary or incidental objects.

2. Objective verbs, in order to develop their full meaning, require a complementary object after them. Thus

(1.) Some objective verbs, in order to develop their full meaning, require an *accusative* object, i. e. an object merely passive; as, '*they eat bread*;' '*God created the world*.' This is expressed in English by the objective case.

(2.) Some objective verbs, for the same reason, require a *dative* object, i. e. a personal object, also reciprocating the action of the subject, and interested therein; as, '*they yielded to the enemy*;' '*he gave the book to John*.' This is usually expressed in English by means of the preposition *to* or *for*.

(3.) Some objective verbs, for the same reason, require a *genitive* object, i. e. a real object, also acting on the subject, and calling out his activity; as, '*he repents of his folly*;' '*he is ashamed of his conduct*.' This is usually expressed in English by means of the preposition *of* or *from*.

(4.) Some objective verbs, for the same reason, require a *factive* object, i. e. an object produced by the action of the verb on the accusative or merely passive object; as, '*they chose him king*;' '*he was thought a tyrant*.' This is usually expressed in English by a noun in apposition.

Some verbs have two of these objects at the same time; as, '*he gave the book to him*;' '*they appointed him chairman*.'

These are supposed to be all the complementary or necessary objects.

3. Verbs, whether subjective or objective, admit without discrimination all the supplementary or incidental objects. Thus

(1.) Any verb admits an object of locality; as, '*the ball rolls on the ground*;' '*they wounded him in the street*.'

(2.) Any verb admits the object of time; as, '*he died in the winter*;' '*they summoned him yesterday*.'

(3.) Any verb admits the object of manner; as, '*he lived happily*;' '*he wrote the letter quickly*.'

(4.) Any verb admits the causal object; as, '*he died from poison*;' '*he shunned them from fear*.'

The same verb may admit several or even all of these supplementary objects; as, '*in the morning the enemy was quickly driven from the field by our guns*.'

The varieties of these supplementary objects are almost endless.

The same external form is often used to express very different objects; as, 'he fought *for his king*,' with a dative object; 'he contended *for the prize*,' with a genitive object; 'he was taken *for a rogue*,' with a factitive object; 'I contended *for an hour*,' with a supplementary object of time.

Jan. 1851.

## II. Government of Adjectives in English.

The government of adjectives may be treated in a manner analogous to that of the government of verbs.

Adjectives, like verbs, are either subjective or objective.

1. Subjective adjectives, as their meaning is complete in themselves, require no complementary object; as, 'white;' 'round;' 'awake.' They admit freely, however, like other adjective, supplementary or incidental objects.

2. Objective adjectives, in order to develop their full meaning, require a complementary object to accompany them; as, 'a heart-rending sight;' 'he was useful *to his country*;' 'he was desirous *of praise*;' 'mistaken *for an honest man*.' Thus

(1.) Some objective adjectives, in order to develop their full meaning, require a merely *passive* object. This happens, however, only in compound words; as, 'a soul-stirring event;' 'a heart-rending sight.'

(2.) Some objective adjectives, in order to develop their full meaning, require after them a *dative* object, i. e. a personal object, interested in and reciprocating the action of the subject noun. This object is expressed in English by means of the preposition *to* or *for* (the usual representatives of the ancient dative); also by *towards*, *against*, etc. as, 'good *to Israel*;' 'useful *for man*;' 'pious *towards God*;' 'offended *against his servant*.' After the adjectives *like* and *near*, it is expressed by a simple objective case; as, 'like *God*;' 'near *his friend*.'

(3.) Some objective adjectives, in order to develop their full meaning, require after them a *genitive* object, i. e. a real object, also acting on the subject, and calling out his activity. This object is expressed in English by means of the preposition *of* or *from* (the usual representatives of the ancient genitive); also by *about*, *at*, *for*, *in*, *on*, *over*, *to*, *upon*, *with*; as, 'ashamed *of his conduct*;' 'free *from crime*;' 'uneasy *about his child*;' 'disgusted *at the deed*;' 'sorry *for his fault*;' 'joyful *in our God*;'

'dependent on him;' 'victorious over the enemy;' 'accustomed to the habit;' 'relying upon his word;' 'pleased with the task.' After the adjective *worth*, it is expressed by a simple objective case; as, 'it was worth the price.'

(4.) Some objective adjectives, in order to develop their full meaning, require after them a *factive* object, i. e. an object produced by and resulting from the action expressed by the adjective. This object is usually expressed in English by a noun in apposition; also by means of the preposition *for* or *into*; as, 'taken prisoner;' 'mistaken for an honest man;' 'changed into wine.'

Some adjectives have after them two complementary objects at the same time; as, 'patient of fatigue for his friend;' 'fighting for liberty against the enemy;' 'devoted to death for his country.'

These are supposed to be all the complementary or necessary objects.

3. Adjectives, whether subjective or objective, admit without discrimination all the supplementary or incidental objects. Thus

(1.) Any adjective admits an object of locality; as, 'studious at school;' 'ashamed of his conduct at home.'

(2.) Any adjective admits an object of time; as, 'indolent in summer;' 'toiling all day for money.'

(3.) Any adjective admits an object of manner; as, 'dangerously sick;' 'zealously striving for glory.'

(4.) Any adjective admits an object of causality; as, 'economical from necessity;' 'subject to his master from fear.'

The same adjective may admit several, or even all these supplementary objects at the same time; as, 'he was, from obstinacy, busily engaged all day at Paris on his object.'

These are all the classes of supplementary objects, but the subordinate varieties are without number.

The government of adjectives is usually passed over in silence in our common grammars; yet it has some importance. Its place has been supplied in part, as in Hiley's English Grammar, and in Worcester's Dictionary, by tables of the construction of verbs and adjectives. The subject needs to be more fully labored.

Feb. 1851.

## ART. XL.—COLLOCATION.

1. BESIDES Concord or Agreement and Rection or Government, Collocation or Arrangement is an important part of Syntax.

2. By *collocation* is intended the definite order in which the members of the proposition, or the members of the syntactical combination, follow each other.

3. Concord and rection express the grammatical relations of the members of the syntactical combination; but collocation or arrangement exhibits (1.) the unity of the proposition, or of the syntactical combination, by bringing together the members of the same; and (2.) the subordination of one member of the syntactical combination to the other, by placing the leading member last, so that the stronger intonation may fall upon it. The collocation and intonation thus affect the logical form of the thought or idea.

4. Many encomiums have been passed by our best critics on a correct collocation. It adds a great charm to all language; but especially to writing, which has not the aid of the voice. It is the great secret of a clear and energetic style, to which, however, few fully attain. For it requires a practised as well as a discriminating mind to seize in continuous composition the correct relationship of all the words.

5. The general principle of collocation in all languages is, that the words most closely connected in thought should be brought nearest in location, in order that their relation to each other may appear. But this principle is too general to be of much practical utility. Besides it does not decide which of two related words is to have the precedence.

6. To understand fully the true nature of collocation or arrangement, we are not to consider single words directly, but to take words in groups; and that not at hap-hazard, but in accordance with the syntactical combinations, which have been already explained.

7. There is with grammarians a natural or logical order of the members of a sentence, according to which the modifying word follows the word modified, as if arranged thus: 'communications evil corrupt manners good.' Here *corrupt* comes after *communications*, i. e. the predicate follows the subject; *evil*



comes after *communications*, and *good* after *manners*, i. e. the attribute follows the substantive; and *manners* comes after *corrupt*, i. e. the object follows the verb. There is also a logical arrangement for the various kinds of attributes and for the various kinds of objects.

8. There is perhaps no language which follows the logical order altogether. Most languages deviate from it somewhat. Thus the Hebrew deviates as to the arrangement of subject and predicate; the English as to the arrangement of substantive and attribute; and the Latin as to the arrangement of verb and object.

9. Most languages, however, have a definite order of their own, which is followed when no disturbing force, as emphasis, change of modality, etc. intervenes. This appears to those speaking the language the natural order; and any infringement of such order is readily and immediately perceived by them.

10. The *Chinese* is an uninflected language. The following examples from Rémusat's *Grammaire Chinoise* will exhibit the Chinese collocation: '*ching jín*,' sanctus homo; '*wáng háo chén*,' rex amat virtutem; '*thián tchí mng*,' heaven of command, i. e. command of heaven; '*tseü hàn yán lí*,' Confucius raro loquebatur lucrum.

11. According to the normal or regular collocation in *Hebrew*, the attribute follows the substantive, and the object follows the verb; but the predicate precedes the subject; as, *בן חכם ישמח אב* a wise son gladdens the father, Prov. 10:1. *וַיַּפֵּל יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים תְּרֵדְמָה עַל הָאָדָם* and Jehovah God brought a deep sleep upon the man, Gen. 2:21.

The Hebrew, in deviating from the logical order, seem to have regarded the verbal idea as the leading one in the sentence.

12. The leading principles of *Greek* collocation are as follows:

(1.) The predicate follows the subject, the attribute the substantive; but the object goes before the verb. Thus *ἀγαθὸν κακὸς καλὸς ποιεῖ*, Matt. 7:17.

This deviation from the logical order gives compactness to the sentence.

(2.) Attributes of different kinds are arranged before and after the substantive. Thus *ὁ ἐμὸς εὐαίρετος σοφός*, meus amicus sapiens.

(3.) Objects of different kinds are arranged on the following plan: *οἱ Ἕλληνες ταύτην τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐν Μαγαδῶνι τοὺς Πέρσας*

*καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνας*, Hellenes illo die in Marathone Persas bene vicerunt; *καὶ παῖδι τὸ βιβλίον δίδωμι*, puero librum do.

The Greek in collocation pays great attention to rhythm.

13. The leading principles of *Latin* collocation correspond nearly with the Greek, and are as follows:

(1.) The predicate follows the subject, the attribute follows the substantive; but the object precedes the verb. Thus 'arbor bona fructus bonos facit,' Mat. 7: 17 Vulg.

This deviation from the logical order has the same object as in Greek.

(2.) The different attributes are arranged thus: 'columna solida aurea erecta est;' 'naves longas triginta refecit;' 'hora mortis destinata;' 'homo, grandaevus, ex Italia, Caei pater, nuper mortuus est Alexandriae.'

(3.) The different objects are arranged thus: the accusative before the verb, the dative before the accusative, the notation of time, place, cause, and means, before the dative; as, 'Deus olim in monte legem populo parendam benigniter dedit.'

The peculiarity of Latin collocation consists in its concinnity, as developed by the figures chiasmus and anaphora.

*Example of the chiasmus*, 'Quam multa enim, quae nostri causâ nunquam faceremus, facimus causâ amicorum.'

*Example of the anaphora*, 'Ut non nequidquam tantae virtutis homines judicari deberet ausos esse transire latissimum flumen, ascendere altissimas rupes, subire iniquissimum locum, quae facilia ex difficillimis animi magnitudo redegerat.'

*Example of chiasmus and anaphora combined*, Simon Ockley, vir orientalibus literis eruditus sed parum a re familiari copiosus, ut Saracenorum historiam scriberet, contraxerat aes alienum, quod quum dissolvere non posset, datus est in custodiam.'

14. The leading principles of *German* collocation are as follows:

(1.) The predicate follows the subject, and the object follows the verb or adjective; but the attribute precedes the substantive.

(2.) Attributes of different kinds are arranged thus: 'drey gute, ehrliche Menschen;' 'diese drey guten Leute;' 'jene vier ersten tapfern Männer,' those four first brave men.

(3.) The different kinds of objects are arranged according to their logical worth; viz. form-words are subordinated to notional words; objects of the individual to objects of the kind;

adverbial objects of time, place, and causality, to complementary objects; dative or case of the person to the case of the thing; the accusative to the factitive; all objects to the complementary local relation. \*

German collocation has two peculiarities:

(1.) It distinguishes the subordinate proposition from the leading proposition by inverting the order of the parts of the predicate; as, '*er ist gestorben*;' '*Ich weiss, dass er gestorben ist*.'

(2.) It gives a compactness to the whole sentence, by placing the predicate in the leading proposition, and the verb itself in the subordinate proposition, at the close of the sentence; as, '*der Vater hat dem Sohne dies Buch geschenkt*.'

15. The leading principles of *English* collocation are as follows:

(1.) The predicate stands after the subject, the object after the verb, but the attribute stands before the noun; as, '*evil communications corrupt good manners*.'

(2.) Different attributes are arranged thus: '*These my two learned friends*.'

(3.) Different objects may be arranged thus: '*He gave an apple to him yesterday*.'

16. Collocation in an English simple sentence may be considered more minutely under the following heads: 1. subject and predicate; 2. substantive and attribute; 3. verb or adjective and object; 4. arrangement of various attributes; 5. arrangement of various objects; 6. arrangement of auxiliary and verb; 7. arrangement of preposition and object; 8. adverb.

(1.) *Subject and Predicate*.—The predicate follows the subject; as, '*the horse runs*.' This is the proper logical order.

(2.) *Substantive and Attribute*.—The attribute precedes the substantive; as, '*good men*.' This is contrary to the logical order. So whenever the attribute is a single word, and readily receives the stress of voice. But whenever the attribute is extended so as not to receive the stress of voice, the logical order is restored; as, '*a mind conscious of right*;' '*a wall three feet thick*;' '*a woman, modest, sensible, and virtuous*;' '*a being infinitely wise*.' So in poetry; '*to the isles Atlantic*;' and in many technical terms; as, '*heir presumptive*;' '*notary public*.'

(3.) *Verb or Adjective and Object*.—The object follows the verb or adjective; as, '*Alexander conquered Darius*.' This is also the logical order.

(4.) *Attributes of different kinds.*—These follow, in English and in the Teutonic dialects generally, a truly philosophic rule or principle; as, ‘these my two learned friends.’ See Joel Chapin’s *Anal. and Philos. Gram.* (1851.) p. 173. But the attributes seldom all precede; as, ‘an old man, from Italy, Caius’ father, deceased lately.’

(5.) *Objects of different kinds.*—The objects here seldom all follow the verb; as, ‘yesterday, in the palace, the king voluntarily relinquished the throne to his son.’

(6.) *The Auxiliary and Verb.*—The verb follows the auxiliary, the auxiliary having been originally a full verb, and followed by an infinitive; as, ‘he *will go*.’

(7.) *The Preposition and Complement.*—The preposition precedes, as its name imports; as, ‘to Boston.’ In this way too, the preposition takes its natural place between the verb or adjective and the object.

(8.) *Adverb.*—The adverbial object, when very short, precedes the verb or adjective; as, ‘he *wisely* refused;’ a *very* good man.’

Besides the normal or regular collocation, there is in most languages a rhetorical and an euphonic collocation.

We have confined ourselves in this article to simple sentences, and to the normal collocation. This is important as lying at the foundation of all collocation.

Nov. 1855.

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#### ART. XLII.—COMPOUND PROPOSITIONS.

Man was not long satisfied with the utterance of detached simple propositions. He soon felt the need of expressing their mutual relation and connection. Hence in continuous discourse we often find two or more propositions bound together. In this way arises the compound proposition.

1. *A compound sentence or proposition* is the combination of two or more sentences or propositions into one; and of course the union of two or more sentiments or thoughts into one compound sentiment or thought. The single propositions, in reference to the compound proposition, are called *members* or *clauses*.

2. As in the compound word, and in the syntactical combination of ideas, the unity of idea is indicated by the continuity

of utterance and the intonation; so in the compound proposition the unity of thought is indicated by the same means.

The continuity of utterance in the compound proposition requires that the pauses within the proposition be shorter than those which separate it from the preceding and following context.

The intonation of a compound sentence must be such as to give to one member of the same a logical prominence or precedence over the other. This affects merely the logical worth of the two members.

Although the union of two propositions into one is indicated mainly by the intonation, the special relation of the members to each other is pointed out by their import, position, and the use of conjunctions.

3. Conjunctions serve to express the relation of propositions to each other; but they perform this office less perfectly than has been generally supposed.

4. The perfect compound proposition is always bimembral; but the copulative or imperfect compound may consist of any number of terms.

However numerous may be the parts of which a perfect compound proposition consists, it may always be formed by repeated combinations of two parts. There is no occasion for compounding three unlike members directly.

5. When two propositions, each expressing distinct thoughts or sentiments, but not of the speaker, and not standing in a logical relation to each other, are so united into a single thought or sentiment, that one proposition, merely as an idea or notion, forms the complement of the other proposition, the former proposition is said to be *subordinate* to the latter, and this kind of union is called *subordination*.

The logical relations of thoughts are causality and antithesis.

6. When two or more propositions, each expressing distinct thoughts or sentiments of the speaker, and standing in a logical relation to each other, are so united into a compound thought or sentiment, that each continues to be a thought or sentiment of the speaker, or to exist in a manner independent of the other, such propositions are said to be *co-ordinate* to each other, and this kind of union is called *co-ordination*.

7. The same proposition may be a leading proposition in reference to one proposition, and a subordinate proposition in

reference to another; as, 'I respect the friend, *who rebukes me*, when I do wrong.' Here 'who rebukes me,' is subordinate to 'I respect the friend,' and 'when I do wrong' is subordinate to 'who rebukes me.'

8. The same thought or sentiment, standing in a given logical relation to another thought or sentiment, may oftentimes be expressed either co-ordinately or subordinately, at the will of the speaker; as, *Marcus laudatur, nam hostes vicit*, 'Marcus is praised, for he conquered the enemies;' and *Marcus laudatur, quia hostes vicit*, 'Marcus is praised, because he conquered the enemies.' In the former case the additional clause acquires importance, in the latter the causality is made emphatic.

The distinction between Eng. *for* and *because* is essentially the same as that between Gr.  $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$  and  $\delta\tau\iota$ , or that between Lat. *nam* and *quia*, or that between Germ. *denn* and *weil*. This distinction is sometimes overlooked; see Greene's Anal. p. 152.

9. The external form of the composition is sometimes at variance with its internal nature. Thus a co-ordinate thought may appear as a subordinate idea, and a subordinate idea may be presented as a co-ordinate thought; as, 'he had just arrived, when he set off again,' for 'he set off again, when he had just arrived.' So Lat. 'legebam tuas literas, cum mihi epistola affertur a Leptâ.' But this construction must be regarded as abnormal.

Jan. 1856.

## ART. XLII.—SUBORDINATIVE COMPOUND PROPOSITIONS.

1. *The subordinative or subordinating proposition* has been explained in the preceding Article.

2. The subordinate proposition stands in a *grammatical* relation to the leading proposition, i. e. it is a member or factor of some syntactical combination; while co-ordinate propositions stand in a logical relation to each other.

3. The subordinative proposition is not to be regarded as a composition of already existing parts to a whole, but as a development from the simple proposition. Thus '*one who lies* will steal,' is developed from '*a liar* will steal;' '*a soldier, who is cowardly*, deserves contempt,' is developed from '*a cowardly soldier* deserves contempt;' '*an article which is good* easily

*finds one who will purchase it,* is developed from *'a good article easily finds a purchaser;'* *'whenever you will, you can prove that your will is free,'* is developed from *'at any moment you can prove the freedom of your will.'*

That is, a notional word, whether it denote a subject, attribute, or object, may be expanded into a proposition, and an idea expressed in the form of a thought.

In this way the notional word returns to the form out of which it originated.

4. Subordinate propositions may be termed *subject-propositions*, *attribute-propositions*, or *object-propositions*, according as they represent a subject, attribute, or object. But in practice it will be found more convenient to distribute them thus:

(1.) *Substantive propositions*, including subject-propositions and complementary object-propositions.

(2.) *Adjective propositions*, or attribute-propositions.

(3.) *Adverbial propositions*, or supplementary object-propositions.

5. Subordinate propositions are naturally developed from participials, (or from verbal substantives and adjectives having somewhat of the nature of participials,) and correspond to the three kinds of participials; viz. substantive clauses or propositions to the supines, adjective clauses to the participle, and adverbial clauses to the gerund. To these also correspond three species of subordinate conjunctions or conjunctives.

6. This derivation of subordinative propositions from simple propositions seems to be confirmed by the fact, that the more ancient languages had participials, where the more modern have subordinate clauses.

7. Subordinate propositions, as compared with the participials, out of which they are developed, are more emphatic, and express definitely the time, mode, and particular relation to the main proposition, which the participials do not.

8. The subordinate proposition sometimes has a different origin from that specified above. Thus it may arise (1.) from a quoted thought or sentiment; as, *'my teacher told me, that these were planets;'* (2.) from a quoted question; as, *'he asked me, where I was born;'* and (3.) even from a thought or judgment of the speaker; as, *'I have procured a new work, which pleases me much.'* But in either case it is no longer a thought of the speaker, but merely an idea modifying the main proposition. These are spurious or abnormal subordinate propositions.

9. The subordinate proposition is usually introduced by a *relative* pronoun or particle, to which corresponds a demonstrative pronoun or particle, expressed or understood, in the leading proposition. The nature of the demonstrative pronoun or particle determines the character of the subordinate proposition.

10. An unemphatic or unimportant word cannot be developed into a proposition.

11. Subordinate propositions are more necessary in written than in spoken language.

12. The subordinate proposition may occupy three different positions:

(1.) Before the leading proposition; as, '*if you were here*, you would think otherwise.'

(2.) After the leading proposition; as, 'you would think otherwise, *if you were here*.'

(3.) Between the parts of the leading proposition; as, 'you, *if you were here*, would think otherwise.'

13. The character of the subordinate proposition, (whether substantive, adjective, or adverbial,) depends not on the form of the relative, but on the form of the antecedent expressed or understood; as,

'I do not know *where he is*.' Subst. prop.

'The place *where he fell* is marked by a monument. Adj. prop.

'He died *where he fell*.' Adv. prop.

'I do not know *when he died*.' Subst. prop.

'I remember the day *when he died*.' Adj. prop.

'I was absent *when he died*.' Adv. prop.

Jan. 1856.

#### ART. XLIII.—SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSITIONS.

1. *Substantive propositions* are a species of subordinate propositions. They are so called, because, in reference to the leading proposition, they occupy the place, and follow the construction of a substantive.

2. We distinguish four varieties of this proposition, viz. (1.) the proper or abstract substantive proposition; (2.) the concrete substantive proposition; (3.) the quoted thought or sentiment; and (4.) the quoted interrogation.



3. The *proper* substantive proposition arises from a substantive participial, or a verbal substantive, developed to a proposition, and connected with the main proposition by the particle *that*. Thus from 'to make many books' is developed the proposition 'that we should make many books;' from 'the congelation of water by cold' is developed 'that water should congeal by cold;' from 'the existence of God' is developed 'that God exists.' It expresses the *abstract* idea of an activity.

4. This substantive proposition is employed,

(1.) To denote the subject; as, '*that God exists*, is demonstrable;' 'it is a law of nature, *that water should congeal by cold*.'

(2.) To denote the immediate complement or passive object; as, 'we believe *that God exists*.' 'He rejoices *that we are free*.'

(3.) To denote the second complement; as, 'the Bible teaches us *that God is love*.'

(4.) To denote the attributive genitive; as, 'the belief *that God exists* almost universally prevails.'

The subject and the passive object differ only in their collocation.

5. The second variety of this proposition, expressing the *concrete* idea of an existence, is derived immediately from an adjective proposition used substantively, and is connected with the leading proposition by the compound relatives, *whoso*, *what*, *whatsoever* or *whatever*, *that*, etc. as, '*whoso loveth wisdom* rejoiceth his father,' Prov. 29: 3. 'I knew not *what it was*,' 2 Sam. 18: 29. 'he took notice of *what happened*;' '*whatsoever is right*, I will give you;' Matt. 20: 4. 'handsome is *that handsome does*;' '*that thou doest*, do quickly,' John 13: 27.

6. This substantive proposition is employed,

(1.) To denote the subject; as, '*whoso hearkeneth unto me* shall dwell safely,' Prov. 1: 33. '*what is right for one* is right for another.'

(2.) To denote the immediate complement; as, '*what men sow*, they must expect to reap;' '*whatsoever I have*, I will give you.'

7. The *quoted thought* or *sentiment* is treated as a developed thought or sentiment, and introduced also by the particle *that*; as, 'he told me *that the earth was round*.'

The particle *that*, in English, is often omitted; as, 'he says *it was so*.'

8. The quotation has the following variety of forms :

(1.) Solomon said that the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom.

(2.) Solomon said : "The fear of God is the beginning of wisdom."

(3.) "The fear of God is the beginning of wisdom," said Solomon.

(4.) "The fear of God," said Solomon, "is the beginning of wisdom."

9. *The quoted question*, the fourth kind of substantive propositions, is derived from an interrogative proposition, but it is treated like a subordinate proposition. It is introduced by *whether*, *if*, or some interrogative particle ; as, 'it is doubtful *whether it be so* ;' 'I know not *if it is true* ;' 'I know not *who he is*, or *where he is*.' But interrogative forms will be considered by themselves hereafter.

10. On the particle *that*, see *infra*.

11. The particles employed to introduce the substantive propositions are (1.) for the abstract idea of an activity, the particle *that* ; (2.) for the concrete idea of an existence, the compound relatives, *whoso*, *what*, *whatever*, *that* ; (3.) for a quoted thought or sentiment the particle *that* ; and (4.) for a quoted question, *whether*, *if*, or interrogative particles, *who*, *which*, *what*, *where*, *whence*, *whether*, *when*, *how*, *why* ; also interrogative compounds, *wherefore*, *wherein*, etc.

Jan. 1856.

#### ART. XLIV.—ADJECTIVE PROPOSITIONS.

1. *Adjective propositions* are a species of subordinata propositions. They are so called, because, in reference to the leading proposition, they occupy the place, and follow the construction of an adjective.

2. They arise also from adjective participials, or verbal adjectives, developed to a proposition. Thus from 'Balbus, *having a sword*, drew it,' is developed 'Balbus, *who had a sword*, drew it ;' from 'the *prudent* man looks to the future,' is developed 'the man *who is prudent*, looks to the future.'

3. The adjective proposition, in its full form, is introduced by a relative pronoun adjective, referring to a demonstrative adjective pronoun, expressed or understood, in the leading proposition.

The relative adjective pronoun agrees in gender, number, and case, with the substantive to be supplied in the subordinate proposition; as, 'the man, *who* (which man) told me, is dead;' 'the woman, *whom* (which woman) you saw, is alive;' 'the persons, *to whom* (which persons) you gave the money, are absent.'

4. This gives us a beautiful system of correlatives; as, *this* or *that* man *who* or *that*; *this* or *that* woman *who* or *that*; *this* or *that* thing *which* or *that*; *the* place *where* or *in which*; *the* time *when* or *in which*; *the* cause *why* or *wherefore*; *the* manner *how* or *in which*; *such as*.

5. The demonstrative, however, is always omitted, unless it happens to be emphatic.

In English, the relative pronoun is also often omitted; as, 'the house (which) I left was a happy one;' 'we must make the best terms (which) we can.'

6. The adjective proposition sometimes suffers abridgment; as, 'will England, *so happy in the enjoyment of the new light*, throw herself into the arms of the papacy?'

7. The adjective proposition is employed, as an attribute;

(1.) To modify the subject; as, 'the merchants *who dwell there* are wealthy.'

(2.) To modify the complementary object; as, 'they consumed all the provisions *which we had collected*.'

(3.) To modify the supplementary object; as, 'we found him in the house *that he had formerly inhabited*.'

8. The words employed to introduce the adjective proposition are relative pronouns, as *who*, *which*, *that*; and relative particles, as *where*, *whither*, *whence*, *when*, *how*, *as*; and some compounds with prepositions, as *wherefore*, *wherein*, etc. But all these words we comprehend under the general term of *conjunctions*. See *infra*.

Jan. 1856.

#### ART. XLV.—ADVERBIAL PROPOSITIONS.

*Adverbial proposition* is a favorite technical term of the new or Beckerian philology.

Adverbial propositions are a species of subordinate propositions. They are so called because like adverbs they modify the verb of the leading proposition.

They arise also from adverbs, or from adverbial phrases, developed to a proposition. Thus from the adverb 'suddenly' is developed the proposition, 'before one is aware;' from the phrase, 'before cock-crowing,' is developed the proposition, 'before the cock crow;' from the phrase 'during life' is developed the proposition 'while I have my being.'

These propositions express the modification of *place*, *time*, *manner*, *cause*, and *intensity*. They do not express the complement or immediate object of the verb. They generally precede the leading proposition.

The particles introducing adverbial propositions are properly relative adverbs, which have a demonstrative or antecedent, expressed or understood, in the leading proposition. This relative and antecedent, by their correlation, bind the propositions together.

This correlation of the demonstrative and relative is a peculiar process in language, and exerts an extensive and powerful influence over its various forms.

These adverbial propositions may be classified as follows, and exemplified from the Common English Version.

I. Adverbial propositions of *place*, like adverbs of *place* in the simple proposition, express the *where*, the *whence*, and the *whither*.

*Where* thou lodgest, (*there*) I will lodge. Ruth 1: 16.

Before I go (*thither*) *whence* I shall not return. Job 10: 21.

*Whither* thou goest, (*thither*) I will go. Ruth 1: 16.

The demonstrative here, as it is easily understood from the relative, and is not specially emphatic, need not be written. But in the following sentence it is very properly retained.

*Where* your treasure is, *there* will your heart be also. Matt. 6: 21.

II. Adverbial propositions of *time*, analogous to adverbs of time in the simple proposition, modify the predicate of the leading proposition by expressing the event *during* which, (*as*, *when*, *while*,) *before* or *till* which, and *after* or *since* which the action of such predicate is exerted.

*As* they went to tell his disciples, (*so*) Jesus met them. Matt. 28: 9.

Here adverbs of manner are used as adverbs of time, and the demonstrative is omitted as before.

*Whensoever* ye will, (*then*) ye may do them good. Mark 14: 7.

Here an adverb of time is employed, and the demonstrative is omitted; but in the following sentence the demonstrative is properly retained.

When Jesus was glorified, *then* remembered they that these things were written of him. John 12: 16.

While I live, will I praise Jehovah, i. e. *the* while *that* I live, will I praise Jehovah. Ps. 146: 2.

Here the noun *while* (i. e. time) has passed in our conceptions to become a sort of relative.

Before (*the* time *that*) the cock crow, thou shalt deny me thrice. Matt. 26: 75.

Till (*the* time *that*) I come, give attendance to reading. 1 Tim. 4: 13.

After (*the* time *that*) I am waxed old, shall I have pleasure. Gen. 18: 12.

Since (*the* time *that*) thou art come down, no feller is come up against us. Is. 14: 8.

Observe the wonderful economy of the language in the four last examples in omitting superfluous words.

III. Adverbial propositions of the *manner* are introduced by the particles *as*, *that*, *than*, etc.

(*So*) forgive us our debts, *as* we forgive our debtors. Matt. 6: 12.

He that smiteth a man *so that* he die. Ex. 21: 12.

They are more *than* can be numbered. Ps. 40: 5.

IV. Adverbial propositions of the *cause* are introduced by *as*, *because*, *since*, *if*, *unless*, *except*, *although*, *that*, *lest*, etc.

*As* we have opportunity, (*so*) let us do good unto all men. Gal. 6: 10.

Here adverbs of manner are used to express causality, and the demonstrative is omitted.

Because he could swear by no greater, he sware by himself; i. e. for *the* cause *that* he could, etc. Heb. 6: 13.

Since (*the* fact *that*) by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. 1 Cor. 15: 21.

Here an adverb of time is employed to express causality.

If thou believest with all thy heart, thou mayest; i. e. give *the* fact *that* thou believest, etc. Acts 8: 37.

The soul shall not eat of the holy things, unless (*that*) he wash his flesh with water. Lev. 22: 6.

How shall they preach, except (*that*) they be sent. Rom. 10: 15.

*Though* he slay me, *yet* will I trust in him. Job. 13: 15.

Judge not (to the end) *that* ye be not judged. Matt. 7: 1.

Take heed lest (*that*) any may deceive you. Mark 13: 5.

V. Adverbial propositions of *intensity* are introduced by *that* or *the*.

One is *so* near to another, *that* no air can come between them. Job 41: 16.

*The* more they afflicted them, *the* more they multiplied. Ex. 1: 12.

An adverbial proposition is sometimes abridged by omitting the verb; as, 'men, when old, are timid.' Such abridgments have the tone, the pauses, and the location of subordinate propositions.

May, 1848.

The adverbial proposition may be placed,

(1.) Before the leading proposition; as, '*when I arrived*, I heard the news.'

(2.) After the leading proposition; as, 'I heard the news, *when I arrived*.'

(3.) Between the parts of the leading proposition; as, 'yesterday, *when I arrived*, I heard the news.'

Jan. 1856.

## ART. XLVI.—THE SPECIES OF ADVERBIAL PROPOSITIONS.

ADVERBIAL clauses, owing to their variety and complication, need to be more minutely classified.

There are five classes of adverbial propositions, answering to the five inquiries, *where?* *when?* *how?* *wherefore?* and *how much?*

### I. Adverbial Propositions of Place.

Of these there are three species.

1. Those expressing the place *where*; as, 'I reap, *where I sowed not*,' Mat. 25: 26.

2. Those expressing the place *whither*; as, '*whither I go*, ye cannot come,' John 8: 21.

3. Those expressing the place *whence*; as, 'I come, *whence he comes*.'

But each of these species is capable of many varieties; as,

'I lived (there) *where* my friend was.'

'I lived (there) *whither* my friend had gone.'

'I lived (there) *whence* my friend had departed.'

These all express the place *where* of the action predicated in the main proposition.

These propositions respect *place* or *space*, the most simple and the most obvious of the categories or predicaments of the senses.

*Note.*—The ideas of space and time occasion much difficulty to the metaphysician who looks at them abstractly. But the mathematician measures things existing in space, and counts things occurring in time, with the utmost definiteness and certainty. So also the language-maker speaks of things in time and space without any difficulty or embarrassment.

## II. *Adverbial Propositions of Time.*

Of these there are three species.

1. Those expressing the *point of time* of the predicated action in the leading proposition,

(1.) As coincident with the action in the subordinate clause; as, '*when the sun arose*, then the stranger departed;' 'I was absent, *when his brother died*.'

(2.) As *preceding* the action in the subordinate clause; as, '*before the sun rose*, the stranger departed;' 'one sees the lightning, *before he hears the thunder*.'

(3.) As *following* the action in the subordinate clause; as, '*after the sun rose*, the stranger departed;' 'the heirs divided his property, *after he was dead*.'

2. Those expressing the *continuance of time* of the predicated action in the leading proposition; as, 'I stood by, *whilst it was being done*;' 'since he has had a great income, he has had also great expenses;' 'watch ye, *until I come again*.'

The particle *since* limits the time at its commencement; the particle *until*, at its end.

3. Those expressing a *repetition of the coincidence*; as, 'the king, *whenever he saw a subject in want*, always relieved him.'

These propositions respect *time*, a category of the senses, hardly less simple and obvious than the category of space.

### III. *Adverbial Propositions of Manner.*

An adverbial proposition of manner may express the manner of the predicated action in the leading proposition,

1. By stating its effect; as, 'he speaks *so that he is not understood*,' that is, he speaks *unintelligibly*.

2. By comparing it with another action; as, 'he speaks, *as he thinks*;' 'as he thinks, so he speaks.'

These propositions respect *quality*, one of the categories of the understanding.

The place, the time, and the quality, all express grammatical relations of ideas or notions, i. e. they serve to specify or individualize the generic action predicated in the leading proposition. They have also peculiar forms of the pronoun adapted to their use; as, *where, when, how; there, then, thus*.

On account of this general character, adverbial propositions of place, time, and manner, are placed after each other.

### IV. *Adverbial Propositions of the Cause.*

Under *the cause* we include the numerous and complicated relations of *the ground and consequence*.

These relations are not, like place, time, and manner, grammatical relations of ideas, but they are logical relations of thoughts, and are properly expressed by co-ordinate propositions. Neither have they any peculiar form of the pronoun adapted to their use. *Why* is merely an abridgement of Anglo-Sax. *forhwý*.

It is only in an abnormal way that any of these logical relations of thought take the form of a grammatical relation of ideas.

We have a cross division of adverbial propositions of the cause. The ground may be either *actual, possible, adversative, or final*. It may also be either *real, moral, or logical*.

1. *The actual-real ground, or the proper cause*.—One matter of fact is the ground of another matter of fact.

This ground or cause may be expressed in a simple proposition; as, 'Socrates died *from poison*;' but its appropriate form is a co-ordinate compound proposition; as, 'Socrates took *poison*, and died in consequence.'

It is only when the cause itself is cast into the shade, and the causality is made prominent, that this relation is expressed in the form of a subordinate proposition, as a grammatical relation of ideas. Thus



'Socrates died, *because he took poison.*'

'The pear fell off, *because it was ripe.*'

The actual-real ground is the basis of all the other relations of the ground and consequence.

2. *The actual-moral ground, or the motive.*—A motive is the ground of a free or voluntary act.

This may be expressed in a simple proposition; as, 'the good child obeys *from affection*;' but its appropriate form is a co-ordinate compound proposition; as, '*the good child loves his parents*, and he therefore obeys them.'

It is only when the motive itself is cast into the shade, and the causality is made prominent, that this relation is expressed in the form of a subordinate proposition, as a grammatical relation of ideas. Thus

'*Since I have trusted him thus far*, I will continue to trust him.'

3. *The actual-logical ground, or the reason.*—One judgment of the intellect is the ground of another judgment of the intellect, or one proposition is the ground of our knowledge of another.

This may be expressed in a simple proposition; as, '*from his appearance*, he is an honest man;' but its appropriate form is a co-ordinate compound proposition; as, '*the night has been very cold*, the flowers must therefore be frozen;' '*the flowers are frozen*, the night therefore must have been very cold.' 'The snow has melted on the mountains, *for the valley is overflowed.*'

This relation is thought incapable of being expressed as a subordinate proposition, because the stress or emphasis always lies on the cause as an assertion of the speaker. We speak of it here under subordinate propositions, merely to complete the view of the different kinds of causes.

4. *The possible ground, or the condition.*—The actuality of the effect is conditioned by the actuality of the possible ground.

This ground may be expressed in a simple proposition; as, 'he will lay up money *with suitable economy.*' But it is not readily expressed by a co-ordinate compound proposition; as the stress or emphasis cannot fall on an uncertain condition.

The adverbial proposition of the possible ground constitutes the conditional clause or condition, and the leading proposition to which it is attached constitutes the conditioned clause or

consequent. As the condition precedes the thing conditioned, and the ground the consequence, in the order of thought, though not always in the order of expression, the condition is called the *protasis* or antecedent, and the thing conditioned the *apodosis* or conclusion.

The different logical forms of this proposition in English are as follows.

(1.) Those which express a simple supposition, without any expression of further uncertainty or doubt as to the existence or non-existence of the condition; as,

*'If he has any thing, he gives it.'*

*'If it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it,' Acts 5 : 39.*

(2.) Those which express the condition as future or contingent, but with the prospect of decision; as,

*'If I ever have any thing, I will give it to you.'*

*'If I should have any thing, I will give it to you.'*

(3.) Those which express uncertainty of the condition, without any prospect of decision.

*'If he should have any thing, he would give it.'*

(4.) Those which express a consequence or a condition not realized; as,

*'If I had it, I would give it to you.'*

*'If ye believed Moses, ye would believe me,' John 5 : 46.*

The different external forms of the conditioned compound proposition in English are as follows.

(1.) Where the protasis or condition is introduced by the conjunctions *if, provided, in case that, etc.* as,

*'If I have money, I will give it to you.'*

*'Provided you are sincere, I will forgive you.'*

*'In case that he is guilty, he must be punished.'*

(2.) Where the protasis is introduced by indefinite pronouns, compounded with *so* or *ever*; as,

*'Whoso offereth praise, glorifieth me,' Ps. 50 : 23.*

(3.) Where the verb in the protasis or condition is placed before the subject. This is without doubt an ancient subjunctive mood.

*'Hadst thou been here, my brother had not died.'*

*'Had I been in his place, I would have acted otherwise.'*

(4.) Where the protasis is expressed by an interrogation; as,

*'Is a man pinched with want? Charity will relieve him.'*

*'Is thine enemy hungry? Feed him.'*

(5.) Where the protasis is expressed by an imperative; as,

'*Prove that to me, and I shall be satisfied.*'

'*Obey and live.*'

'*Live uprightly, then thou wilt be happy in another world.*'

'*Resist the devil, and he will flee from you,*' James 4 : 7.

The use of the imperative for the conditional exhibits, in a happy manner, the close connection of the condition and result; as, '*this do, and live.*' A command to do this is, as it were, a command also to live.

For more concerning conditional propositions, see Art. XLVII.

5. *The adversative ground, or the concession.*—The ground for the non-actuality of the predicated activity.

The adversative ground is an opposing ground or cause, which is represented as inadequate to prevent the contrary effect.

The adversative ground is expressed in simple sentences by means of the particles, *in spite of, notwithstanding, with, against*, etc. as, '*he laid up money, in spite of his small salary;*' '*we have, notwithstanding the long rain, a deficiency of water;*' '*he departed against the will of his father;*' '*he is contented with his poverty.*'

The adverbial phrase may be developed to a proposition; as, '*He laid up money, although his salary was small.*'

'*Notwithstanding there has been a long rain, we have a deficiency of water.*'

'*God is every where present, although we see him not.*'

'*Although insects do much injury, yet they are not without use.*'

But the co-ordinate compound is the appropriate form for the adversative ground; as, '*it has rained a long time, and we have yet a want of water.*' It often must have this form.

There are four varieties in the external form of this adverbial proposition.

(1.) That introduced by *although, though, even if, notwithstanding*, etc. as above.

(2.) That introduced by *however, whoever, whatever*, etc. as, '*however fair his promises may be, yet he is not to be trusted.*'

(3.) That introduced by a question; as, '*Are you seeking for glory? yet you cannot obtain it.*'

(4.) That introduced by an imperative; as, '*strive all you can, yet you will not succeed;*' '*bless God, and die,*' i. e. *although thou bless God, yet thou shalt die*, Job 2 : 9.

### 6. *The ultimate ground, or the purpose.*

The distinction between efficient and final causes is well understood. In efficient causes we consider merely the relation between a given cause and an effect; in final causes we regard the effect as an object aimed at, to which the cause contributes as a means.

In simple propositions the purpose is expressed by the particles, *for, for the sake of, to, from*, etc. as, 'I read *for entertainment*;' 'the ambitious undergo much *for the sake of glory*;' 'he works hard *to live*;' 'the boy does right merely *from fear of punishment*.'

The adverbial proposition of the final cause is introduced by the particles *that, in order that*, etc. as,

'Honor thy father and thy mother, *that it may be well with thee*.'

'I tell it to you, *that you may know it*.'

'The farmer manures his ground, *in order that it may produce more*.'

'*In order that he might escape*, he changed his dress.'

The final cause or purpose is related to the moral cause, yet it seems expedient to separate it from the other causes, and to place it by itself at the close.

*Note.*—Cause is one of the simplest and most familiar conceptions of the human mind. It has its origin in internal experience, that is, in the consciousness of volition and action; and is afterwards applied to external things.

The numerous and complicated forms which the cause assumes, may be illustrated thus.

A clerk is dependent on his salary for his support. We may say of him,

'He lays up money, *because he is prudent in his expenditures*.' Proper cause, or actual-real ground.

'He is prudent in his expenditures, *because he lays up money*.' Réason, or actual-logical ground.

'He should lay up money, *because he has a good salary*.' Motive, or actual-moral ground.

'He will lay up money, *if he is prudent in his expenditures*.' Condition, or possible ground.

'He lays up money, *although he has not a good salary*.' Concession, or adversative ground.

'He is prudent in his expenditures, *in order that he may lay up money.*' Purpose, or ultimate ground.

#### V. *Adverbial Propositions of Intensity.*

1. *Intensity* is greatness of force or strength, as differing from *extension* or greatness of bulk.

2. Adverbial propositions of *intensity* are so called because they express the intensity of the predicated activity in the leading proposition.

3. It is only when the predicate is in the form of an adjective, or when the verb is modified by an adverb, that its intensity can be expressed by a subordinate proposition. The intensity then refers immediately to such adjective or adverb.

4. Adverbial propositions of intensity express the intensity of the predicated activity,

(1.) By comparing it with another activity or with the same activity of another subject,

(a) In the way of equality ; as,

'This is as good, *as that is bad.*'

'He is as rich, *as his brother.*'

'He writes as fast, *as the orator speaks.*'

'He writes as fast, *as you.*'

The particles, here employed, whether relative or demonstrative, are those of manner.

(b) In the way of inequality ; as,

'The song of the nightingale is more various *than the song of the thrush.*'

'He is richer *than his brother.*'

'He writes more beautifully *than his master.*'

'This institution is more amply endowed *than that.*'

The particle *than*, which is used here, is merely another form of *then*, the particle of time ; as, 'James is older *than* John,' that is, 'James is more old, *then* John.'

(c) In the way of proportion ; as,

'*The more they afflicted them, the more they multiplied.*'

'*The more you study, the more you will learn.*'

The particle *the* used here is not the common article, but the Anglo-Sax. *thy*, the ablative case of the demonstrative pronoun *se, seo, that*. It is used in the above examples both as a demonstrative and as a relative.

(2.) By expressing the effect of the activity; as,  
 'He speaks so loud, *that one may hear him in the street.*'

'One is so near to another, *that no air can come between them.*'

*Note.*—The English language, in expressing *inequality*, here makes use of a participial construction; as, 'he is too old to learn.'

5. This species of adverbial propositions has no particles peculiar to itself, but employs particles which have other uses. Hence these propositions have been differently treated by different grammarians.

Weissenborn in his Latin Grammar, and Kühner in his Greek and Latin Grammars, join them with propositions of comparison.

Morell, Bauer, and Wurst, join them with propositions of manner.

But, according to Becker, they form a *distinct* class by themselves, as intensity is a distinct category, or predicament, from place, time, manner, and cause.

6. These propositions are placed last as they modify the predicated activity less directly than the other adverbial propositions.

Feb. 1856.

## ART. XLVII.—CONDITIONAL PROPOSITIONS.

CONDITIONAL propositions need still further explanation.

The are called propositions of the *possible* ground, as opposed to the real, moral, and logical grounds, which are all *actual*.

The logical maxim which comes in here is this: "*posita conditione ponitur conditionatum, et sublato conditionato tollitur conditio.*"

The doctrine of the possible ground, or the form of the conditional proposition, is one of the most perplexing subjects in grammar.

The important problem is to make a logical classification and a definite explanation of the different forms of this proposition. This classification should respect the mode of assertion in the mind of the speaker.

Different languages differ greatly as to the development of conditional clauses. Of the languages which we shall notice, the Greek is the most developed, and the Hebrew the least.

1. The *Hebrew* language has two forms of the conditional proposition, distinguished by the use of the particles **אִם** and **אֲלֵ**.

(1.) The simple condition introduced by **אִם**; as,

'If (Heb. **אִם**) I have found favor in the sight of the king, let Haman come to the banquet,' Est. 5 : 8.

'If (Heb. **אִם**) thou wilt go with me, then I will go,' Judges 4 : 8.

'If (Heb. **אִם**) thy presence go not with me, carry us not up hence,' Ex. 33 : 15.

(2.) The condition, contrary to the known fact, introduced by **אֲלֵ**; as,

'If (Heb. **אֲלֵ**) they were wise, (but they are not wise,) they would understand this,' Deut. 32 : 29.

'If (Heb. **אֲלֵ**) I should cause noisome beasts to pass through the land, (which I shall not do,) these three men only should be saved,' Ezek. 14 : 15, 16.

'If (Heb. **אֲלֵ**) the Lord were pleased to kill us, (which he is not disposed to do,) he would not have received a burnt-offering at our hands,' Judg. 13 : 23.

2. The *Greek* language excels in forms for the conditional proposition. It has four principal forms, as given by all the grammarians from Hermann down.

(1.) Where the protasis has *εἰ* with the appropriate tense of the indicative, and the apodosis has also the appropriate tense of the indicative, or an imperative; as,

*Εἰ τι ἔχεις, δός,* 'if you have anything, give it.'

(2.) Where the protasis has *εἰάν* with the subjunctive, and the apodosis has the indicative future; as,

*Ἐάν τι ἔχωμεν, δώσομεν,* 'if we have anything, we will give it.' So John 7 : 17.

(3.) Where the protasis has *εἰ* with the optative, and the apodosis has the optative with *ἄν*; as,

*Εἰ τις ταῦτα πράττοι, μέγα μ' ἂν ὠφελήσει,* 'if any one should do this, he would do me a great service.'

(4.) Where the protasis has *εἰ* with an imperfect or past tense of the indicative, and the apodosis an imperfect or past tense of the indicative with *ἄν*; as,

*Εἰ τι εἶχεν, εἰδίδου ἄν,* 'if he had anything, he would give it.' So John 5 : 46. Heb. 4 : 8.

The existence of these distinctions in the Greek language is undoubted, and many attempts have been made to render them clear to the English mind.

According to Buttmann, the condition in No. 4. is impossible, in the other numbers possible; in No. 1. possible without any expression of uncertainty; in No. 2. with the expression of uncertainty, but with a prospect of decision; and in No. 3. with the expression of uncertainty and no prospect of decision.

According to Prof. A. Crosby, the condition is assumed in No. 1. as a fact; in No. 2. as that which may become a fact; in No. 3. as a mere supposition without regard to fact; and in No. 4. as contrary to fact.

Others have stated it thus: the protasis is conceived of in No. 1. as real; in No. 2. as partially contingent; in No. 3. as absolutely contingent; and in No. 4. as impossible.

Perhaps better thus:

In No. 1. the protasis is assumed as actual, and of course the apodosis is actual, and expressed in the indicative.

In No. 2. the protasis is regarded as a contingency to be decided by time; hence the apodosis is actual, and expressed in the indicative future.

In No. 3. the protasis is regarded as an absolute contingency, and the apodosis is left of course as an absolute contingency. Both are in the optative mode.

In No. 4. the protasis is represented in the imperfect tense as inchoative and imperfect, and by implication as never completed; of course the apodosis is the same, and represented in the same manner.

Feb. 1856.

3. Dr. Chs. Siedhof, in a review of Zumpt's Latin Grammar, (Bibl. Sacra, Vol. IV. p. 429.) has, we think, greatly simplified the statement concerning conditional sentences in *Latin*, a subject which has been left in our common school grammars somewhat obscure.

He makes three kinds of conditions, and consequently three kinds of conditional sentences.

1. The first is where there is an absolute uncertainty as to what is said in the condition; as,

'*Si habeo pecuniam, tibi dabo,*' If I have money, I will give it to you. Here supply the antithesis, '*sed nescio,*' but I do not



know whether I have it or not; the probability on either side is equal.

2. The second is where there is a mere possibility, but not a probability as to what is said; as,

'*Si habeam pecuniam, tibi dem,*' If I should have money, I may give it to you. Here supply the antithesis, '*sed dubito,*' but I doubt whether I shall have it; it is more probable that I shall not.

3. The third involves a complete denial of what is represented in the condition, and of course in the clause conditioned; as,

'*Si haberem pecuniam, tibi darem,*' If I had money, I would give it to you. Here supply the antithesis, '*sed non habeo, ergo non do,*' but I have not, therefore I do not give.

'*Si habuissem pecuniam, tibi dedissem,*' If I had had money, I would have given it to you. Here supply the antithesis, '*sed non habui, ergo non dedi,*' but I had not, therefore I gave not.

These are the different cases of the condition or possible ground. The latter case is that of the proper conditional mode, or the mode of the assumed antithesis, which exhibits a curious phenomenon in language.

A person, having no money, and therefore unable to give any, instead of simply saying, 'I have no money, and therefore do not give it to you,' makes use of an assumed antithesis, and says, 'If I had money, I would give it to you;' neither of which is true.

Other examples are

'*Si hoc diceres, errares.*'

'*Si hoc dixisses, errasses.*'

'*Si tacuisses, philosophus mansisses.*'

'*Si venisses ad exercitum, a tribunis militaribus visus esses.*'

'*Alexandro si vita longior data esset, Oceanum manus Macedonum transvolasset.*'

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4. The German language has three forms of the conditional proposition, as given by Becker and Heyse.

(1.) Where the protasis is emphatic, and precedes the apodosis; as, '*wenn er schuldig ist, so muss er gestraft werden,*' if he is guilty, then he must be punished.

(2.) Where the protasis is emphatic, and precedes the apodosis; and also the protasis and apodosis are in the imperfect;

as, '*wenn ich wollte, ich konnt'* ihm recht viel Böses dafür thun,' *if I would, I could do him much injury therefor.*

(3.) Where the protasis is unemphatic, and follows the apodosis; as, '*Ich fecte nicht gegen Dich, wenn ich's vermeiden kann,*' *I do not fight against thee, if I can avoid it.*

The German conditional proposition is introduced by *wenn, falls, wo, wofern, etc.*

The German is peculiar in using *wenn* (liter. 'when') an adverbial particle of time to introduce the protasis. Comp. Gr. *et*, Lat. *si*, Eng. *if*, which are not particles of time. Hence the Greek distinguishes between *et* and *ore*; the Latin between *si* and *cum*; and the English between *if* and *when*; but the German uses *wenn* in both senses.

The German can also express the protasis, by an interrogation, by an imperative, or by a verb in the conjunctive mode; as, '*Begeh ich eine Thorheit, so ist es Eure, Lester, nicht die meine.*'

'*Trage Englands Fahne, und Du bist frei.*'

'*Hätte ich den kriegesischen Talbot in der Schlacht nicht fallen sehn, so sagt' ich, Du wärest Talbot.*'

5. The *English* language appears to distinguish four forms or variations of the condition or possible ground.

(1.) Where the protasis and apodosis are both in the indicative; as, '*if it rains, I cannot go out.*' Here all the contingency lies in the ignorance of the speaker. It either rains or does not rain; but he does not know which.

(2.) Where the protasis is in the subjunctive, and the apodosis in the indicative; as, '*if it rain to-morrow, I shall not go.*' Here is a contingency arising from the event being a future one and of course uncertain. So Ex. 21 : 20. Lev. 22 : 6.

(3.) Where the particle 'ever,' at any time, is introduced; as, '*if he ever comes, we shall know it.*' Here the condition is contingent, but to be decided by time or experience.

(4.) Where the imperfect tense (expressing imperfect or inchoative action) is employed both in the protasis and the apodosis; as, '*if ye were blind, ye would have no sin.*' Here the implication is that they were not blind, and that they had sin.

Feb. 1856.

## ART. XLVIII.—CO-ORDINATING COMPOUND PROPOSITIONS, OR CO-ORDINATION.

1. THE doctrine of subordination, or of subordinative compound propositions, has been already considered.

2. *Co-ordination* is not, like subordination, the development of a compound proposition out of a simple one; but it is a combining of two distinct propositions into one.

3. In co-ordination each proposition remains distinct from the others, and expresses a complete thought.

4. The relations which sentences or thoughts have to each other are called *logical* relations, and pertain to a higher function of the human mind.

5. The co-ordinating compound proposition is the appropriate form for the expression of these logical relations.

6. The logical relations here concerned are those of causality and antithesis.

7. The copulative combination expresses no proper relation between the propositions combined, but only a common relation, (adversative or causal,) to a third proposition. It admits of more than two members. The union of thought is incomplete.

8. There are, philosophically speaking, according to Dr. Becker, only three relations in which the members or parts of a co-ordinating compound proposition can stand to each other; first, that in which two assertions are simply *coupled together*; secondly, that in which one assertion is *opposed to* another; and thirdly, that by which we *account* for one assertion by means of another.

(1.) The first of these relations is called *copulative*.

'The man walked, *and* the boy ran.'

(2.) The second is called *adversative*.

'Wheat does not grow wild, *but* it must be sown.'

(3.) The third is *causal*.

'We could obtain no horses, *therefore* we were obliged to go on foot.'

The increasing of the number of these relations is contrary to the doctrine of Dr. Becker.

9. But in co-ordinate propositions we have to consider not only the logical relation of the propositions to each other, but

also the logical form of the compound proposition, which consists in the equal or unequal logical worth of the propositions, and in the stress or emphasis laid on the logical relation between them.

10. The members of a compound co-ordinate proposition must be separated by pauses.

11. We may now illustrate the different degrees of union or disunion between co-ordinate sentences.

(1.) 'Snow is white.' 'God is eternal.' These propositions cannot be united. They belong to separate paragraphs, and must be pronounced with a long pause between them.

(2.) 'Time is fleeting.' 'Life is short.' As the propositions are kindred, they may be written in the same paragraph.

(3.) 'Time is fleeting, *and* life is short; we must be prepared to die.' Here the propositions are united by a single conjunction.

(4.) '*Both* life is short, *and* much is to be done.' Here two conjunctions are employed, which makes the union still closer.  
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#### ART. XLIX.—THE COPULATIVE COMPOUND PROPOSITION, OR THE COPULATIVE COMBINATION.

THE varieties of the copulative combination are as follows.

I. The copulative combination of two or more sentences or propositions, all of equal logical worth, and unemphatic.

*Note.*—The logical worth of a proposition is increased according to its prominence as a thought of the speaker.

'The sun shines *and* the air is mild.'

'Heaven *and* earth shall pass away.'

He chooses *and* rejects without discrimination.

Here observe, 1. that the clauses have equal stress of intonation, because they are of the same tenor, or stand in the same relation to the mind of the speaker.

2. That they are separated merely by slight pauses, because they are unemphatic.

3. That they are abridged or condensed, when their form permits, for the same reason.

4. That when the terms become numerous they are capable of a rhythmical grouping, dependent on the minuter shades of meaning; comp. Hab. 8 : 17. Rom. 8 : 38, 39.

This is the simplest form of the copulative compound sentence. Here the one sentence or clause is enlarged by the other; or two sentences or clauses are combined into one sentence of greater or more comprehensive import.

If two clauses of this kind have a common subject, or predicate, or other member, they may be abridged by expressing the part which is common only once; as, 'Heaven and earth shall pass away.'

II. The copulative combination of two or more sentences or propositions, all of equal worth, and emphatic.

'Art is long, life is short, the judgment is difficult, the occasion is fleeting.'

'The duty of the historian is two-fold; *first*, to himself, *then*, to his reader.'

'Their numbers were reduced; *partly* by war, *partly* by pestilence.'

Here observe 1. that the clauses have equal stress of intonation, for the same reason as in No. I.

2. That they sometimes omit the conjunction, which enables the stress to fall more easily on the propositions themselves.

3. That the clauses are separated by longer pauses, on account of their importance.

4. That they sometimes take the ordinative and partitive particles, which has a similar effect to that of omitting the conjunction.

This differs from the preceding in omitting the copulative conjunction, and in admitting a longer pause between the clauses. It is well adapted to give a prominence to the clauses, but not to exhibit their common relation to a third thought or proposition.

III. The copulative combination of two clauses of unequal worth, an emphasis or prominence being given to the second clause, thus forming a climax.

'He has not only heard the lecture, *but also* understood it.'

'He has heard, *yea*, understood the lecture.'

'*Even* the wisest may err.'

Here observe 1. that the climax of thought is indicated by the intonation.

2. That the clauses are sometimes capable of contraction, as in the second example.

3. That one member may be even entirely suppressed, as in the last example.

This form is used when one thought is enlarged by another thought of greater comprehension.

IV. The copulative combination of two thoughts, where the emphasis or stress is laid not on the thoughts as thoughts, but on their union or connection with each other, consisting in their common relation to a third sentiment or thought expressed or implied. For this we have in English different expressions.

'He is *both* learned *and* wise.'

'He is wise *as well as* learned.'

'He is *neither* wise *nor* learned.'

Here observe 1. that the force of these expressions consists in the exclusion of all antithesis.

2. That the intonation of the clauses is equal, and the pauses slight.

3. That the clauses are capable of abridgment.

4. And that in the first form the number of members may be increased; as, 'These things which ye have *both* learned, *and* received, *and* heard, *and* seen in me, do.' Phil. 4 : 9. So Rom. 14 : 9.

There are two other classes of a mixed character.

V. The adversative or causal combination in the form of a copulative.

'He is poor *and* happy.'

'He was a spendthrift, *and* now is a beggar.'

'The crime was discovered, *and* he must flee.'

Comp. Mat. 10 : 29. 12 : 5, 39. Mark 1 : 27.

Here observe 1. that the combination is necessarily bimembral.

2. That the logical worth of the members is unequal.

3. That the intonation is like that of the adversative or causal compound.

VI. The copulative combination with adversative or causal particle added.

'He is poor, *and yet* happy.'

'He was a spendthrift, *and therefore* is now a beggar.'

'The crime was discovered, *and therefore* he must flee.'

Here observe 1. that the copulative combination predominates over the other, which is thrown into the background.

2. That the compound is intonated in the same way, and has the same pauses, as the copulative compound.

*Note.*—In the copulative compound the relation of the members to each other is not internal or immediate, but the relation is merely external, consisting in a common relation to another thought expressed or implied. Hence this combination is considered as imperfect compared with the antithetic or causal, and incapable of the unity which arises from the rhythmical intonation.

Feb. 1856.

ART. L.—THE ADVERSATIVE COMPOUND PROPOSITION, OR  
THE ADVERSATIVE COMBINATION.

IN the adversative combination, the union is much more complete than in the copulative; the union of the connected thoughts lies immediately in their relation to each other, and not in their relation to something else; only two thoughts can be thus connected; and one of the thoughts is made more prominent or emphatic than the other, by being placed last and by having a greater intonation.

The classes of the adversative proposition are as follows.

I. *The Antithetic Compound Proposition.*

‘He is not an Englishman, *but* a Frenchman.’

‘He did not sail to India, *but* he held on his course to China.’

In this form of proposition the second member negatives the first.

The conjunctions here used are *but, on the other hand, etc.*

II. *The Restrictive Compound Proposition.*

‘The house is convenient, *but* the garden is waste.’

‘We ought to rejoice, *but* we must rejoice with trembling.’

Here the second clause restricts or limits the meaning of the first, or shuts off a natural inference.

The conjunctions here used are *but, yet, only, nevertheless, etc.*

III. *The Disjunctive Compound Proposition.*

‘*Either* the world had a creator, *or* it existed by chance.’

The conjunctions here used are *either, or; whether, or; else.*

Feb. 1856.

## ART. LI.—CAUSAL COMPOUND PROPOSITIONS; OR THE CAUSAL COMBINATION.

*Illative and Causative Propositions.*

THE illative compound proposition, and the causative compound proposition, agree in the logical relation of their members to each other, but differ in the logical worth of the same. Or, to be more explicit, the illative and causative propositions agree substantially in this, that their members have the same logical relation to each other, to wit, the relation of ground and consequence; but the comparative logical worth or import of the members, as expressing the ground or the consequence, is inverted.

In the illative proposition, the second member, which of course has the intonation and possesses the greater logical worth, is introduced by an illative conjunction, as Lat. *igitur*, *itaque*, Eng. *therefore*, *hence*, and expresses a consequence or conclusion from the first member.

In the causative proposition, the second member, which of course has the intonation and possesses the greater logical worth, is introduced by a causative conjunction, as Lat. *nam*, *enim*, Eng. *for*, and expresses the ground or reason of the first member.

In the compound proposition, 'you labor not, *therefore* you have not,' the second member, which has the intonation and greater logical worth, is introduced by *therefore*, and expresses the consequence or conclusion. This is an *illative* or *conclusive* proposition. If we invert the same, 'you have not, *for* you labor not,' then the second member, which has the intonation and greater logical worth, is introduced by *for*, and expresses the ground, cause, or reason of the preceding member. This is a *causative* proposition. The difference between the two lies in the comparative logical worth of the members or clauses.

Illative and causative conjunctions, which now express logical relations of thoughts or propositions, originally expressed, like other co-ordinate conjunctions, merely grammatical relations of the predicate. The illative conjunction *therefore* denotes *for that* or *in front of that*; as, 'you labor not, *therefore* (i. e. in front of that) you have not.' The causative conjunction *for* is



primarily a preposition, denoting *before*, or *in front of*; 'you have not, *for* (i. e. in front of) you labor not.' In both cases, the consequence or conclusion is conceived of and represented as being prominent or standing out *in front of* the ground or cause. So in the illative conjunction *hence*.

As these conjunctions express the relation of the ground and consequence only in a general way, of course they do not of themselves distinguish the particular species, as the *real* ground, the *moral* ground, and the *logical* ground.

1. Illative and causative propositions expressing the *real* ground:

'You labor not, *therefore* you have not.'

'You have not, *for* you labor not.'

'God took Enoch, *therefore* he was not.'

'Enoch was not, *for* God took him.'

2. Illative and causative propositions expressing the *moral* ground:

'He is quarrelsome, *therefore* people avoid him.'

'People avoid him, *for* he is quarrelsome.'

'Time speeds, *therefore* seize the day.'

'Seize the day, *for* time speeds.'

3. Illative and causative propositions expressing the *logical* ground:

'He blushes, *therefore* he is guilty.'

'He is guilty, *for* he blushes.'

'The ground is now wet, *therefore* it rained yesterday.'

'It rained yesterday, *for* the ground is now wet.'

*Note.*—Mathematical propositions admit of a very peculiar inversion. Thus we may say, 'the triangles have equal sides, *therefore* they coincide with each other;' or, 'the triangles coincide with each other, *therefore* they have equal sides.' So in some relations of the merely logical ground, we may either say, 'the brook is very high, *for* a great deal of rain fell last night;' or, 'a great deal of rain fell last night, *for* the brook is very high.'

Nov. 1848.

## ART. LII.—THE PERIOD.

1. THE connection between our thoughts, whether external and accidental, or internal and necessary, often requires the combination of many propositions to a linguistical whole. Such a whole is a *decompound sentence*, and when the union is complete, it may be called a *period*.

2. The use of the period is a higher development of the power of thinking. The categories of antithesis and causality, which are involved in it, belong to a higher function of the human mind. The consideration of this subject introduces us into a new province of grammar. But the doctrine of the period, in its distinctive character, is not yet a part of English literature.

3. The true nature of the period has been misapprehended, for the most part, by writers on rhetoric and grammar. They have looked more to its external form than to its internal nature.

4. Various views have been entertained of the period.

(1.) By a *period* is usually understood 'a complete sentence from one full stop to another.' This is the only definition given by Dr. N. Webster in his Dictionary. But this is a very inadequate account of the subject. Surely 'Jesus wept,' John 11 : 35. is not a period.

(2.) Some, as Dr. Alex. Adam, have regarded every compound proposition as a period; but surely a copulative combination, however extended, does not constitute a period.

(3.) According to Wurst, a period is a compound sentence consisting of a protasis with the rising and an apodosis with the falling inflexion. This is an approximation to the truth, for the union of protasis and apodosis produces the compactness which is required in the period. The simple protasis and apodosis, however, do not constitute a period.

(4.) According to Campbell and Walker, a period differs from a loose sentence in not making complete sense till we come to the close. This again is an approximation to the truth. But these writers admit the uncertainty of their own rule.

(5.) According to Heyse, a period is a compound sentence consisting of a protasis and apodosis, which are themselves variously complicated and compounded.

(4.) If we regard the definition of Heyse, as the appropriate form for co-ordinate propositions *related to each other in the predicament of antithesis and causality*, we shall have the definition of Dr. Becker, which meets our approbation.

5. We are now prepared to state wherein the nature of a period consists.

(1.) The period must be *bimembral*, as only two members can form a *proper* unity. The parts, however, may be compounded.

(2.) The members of the period constitute a protasis and apodosis, that is, they are mutually dependent and reciprocally related to each other. This arises from the antithetic and causal relation of the members to each other.

(3.) The unity of the leading members, which consists in their logical relation to each other, is indicated by the intonation.

(4.) The leading members must be separated by longer pauses.

(5.) The subordinate parts must be so arranged, as not to disturb the unity of the whole, by a want of symmetry, or by an ambiguous collocation.

6. Dr. Becker supposes some forms of the period to be normal, and others abnormal. Adverbial propositions of time and manner form only abnormal periods.

7. The normal and abnormal periods, taken together, include

(1.) Co-ordinative compound propositions, whose members or single propositions are united by means of adversative conjunctions, as *but, yet, otherwise, on the contrary*, etc. or by means of causal conjunctions, as *for, therefore, consequently*, etc.

(2.) Subordinative compound propositions, whose subordinate clause is introduced by *when, after, since, before, as, if, although*, etc.

8. Although all compounds are strictly binomial or bimembral; yet, in a qualified sense, a simple period is called *bimembral*, as consisting of one protasis and one apodosis only, and other periods are called *trimembral, quadrimembral*, etc. according to the number of protases and apodoses. In Hab. 3: 17, 18, we have six protases and two apodoses. Even according to this nomenclature, however numerous the subordinate propositions may be, if there be only one protasis and one apodosis, the period is still bimembral.

In the compound period the protases are co-ordinate to each other, and equal. So the apodoses.

There is no limit to compound propositions, either as it respects their variety or their extent.

9. In a simple period, if the clauses are subordinate, a comma is used; if the clauses are co-ordinate, a semicolon.

In compound periods, a colon is employed between the protasis and apodosis, and semicolons between different protases or apodoses.

10. The period belongs exclusively to the more elevated or solemn discourse. Its artificial structure presupposes in the speaker composure and self-possession, and in the hearer close attention. It is not adapted to the didactic or narrative style, nor to the business or letter style; and in the pulpit or popular addresses, long periods would soon exhaust the patience of the hearers. The period when used should be mingled with shorter sentences.

March, 1856.

#### ART. LIII.—CONTRACTION OF PROPOSITIONS.

1. THE contraction or abridgment of propositions is an important process in language, and deserving of some consideration.

2. This contraction is possible only where two or more propositions have the same subject, predicate, or other essential member, in common.

3. This, however, is merely the external condition. The propositions are properly contracted only when their internal nature permits it, i. e. when there is no special stress or emphasis on the logical worth of the propositions, or on their logical relation to each other.

4. Hence contraction is very common in the *simple copulative*, *partitive*, and *ordinative* combination, because the propositions are often wanting in emphasis; but hardly permissible in the *causal* combination, in which the propositions are usually emphatic.

##### I. *Contraction of Co-ordinate Propositions.*

The *copulative* combination may be contracted, when two propositions have a common subject, predicate, attribute, complementary object, or adverbial object; as,

'*The flower blooms and fades.*'

'*Love is patient and kind.*'

'*Heaven and earth shall pass away.*'

'*Thou hast injured and he has defrauded me.*'

'*Thou hast spoken, and he has acted wisely.*'

But this is only when the parts omitted have no special stress.

In the *adversative* combination, the restrictive and disjunctive clauses readily admit of contraction, but not the antithetic; as,

'*He has not erred, but in part.*'

'*He is either present or absent.*'

The *causal* combination does not readily admit of contraction, except when the copulative conjunction *and* precedes *therefore*; as,

'*He was found guilty and therefore punished.*'

## II. *Contraction of Subordinate Propositions.*

*Substantive* propositions, if they have the same subject or object as the leading verb, may be contracted by being changed into infinitives or supines; as, '*they regretted not to have seen him,*' i. e. that they had not seen him.

*Adjective* propositions are contracted by omitting the relative, and changing the verb into a participle, or, if the predicate is separate, by omitting the relative and copula; as, '*the fox, exceeding all other animals in cunning,*' is made an emblem of cunning; i. e. which exceeds all other animals in cunning; '*David, son of Jesse, was anointed king of Israel,*' i. e. who was son of Jesse; '*I entered a ship bound for New York,*' i. e. which was bound for New York; '*being still a child, he was thought in great danger,*' i. e. who was still a child.

*Adverbial* propositions of *place* and *time* admit of contraction, only in a partial manner; as '*John lives where his father did,*' i. e. where his father lived; '*John arose before I did,*' i. e. before I arose.

*Adverbial* propositions of *manner* readily admit of contraction, as they often have a predicate in common with the leading proposition; as, '*thou speakest as a visionary man,*' scil. speaketh; '*it happens with books, as with new acquaintances,*' i. e. as it happens with new acquaintances.

*Adverbial* propositions of *the possible ground* and of *the adversative ground* admit of contraction; as, '*it is important, if true,*' i. e. if it is true; '*they are alike, although in a very*

*remote sense*,' i. e. although they are alike in a very remote sense.

Adverbial propositions of *the ultimate ground* admit of contraction, by taking the form of an infinitive or supine; as, 'they embarked in business *in order to make money*,' i. e. in order that they might make money.

Adverbial propositions of *intensity* admit of contraction; as, 'the remedy is worse *than the disease*;' i. e. than the disease is bad; 'I regard him more as a historian *than as a poet*;' i. e. than I regard him as a poet.

Such contractions may extend to trimembral propositions; as, 'Beauty flows in the waves of light, radiates in the human face divine, and sparkles in the pathway of every child.'

'To cleanse our own opinions from falsehood, our hearts from malignity, and our actions from vice, is our first concern.'

'Has God provided for the poor a coarser earth, a thinner air, a paler sky.'

So in quadrimembral propositions; as,

'Man was created to search for truth, to love the beautiful, to desire what is good, and to do the best.'

'The voice of merriment and of wailing, the steps of the busy and the idle, have ceased in the deserted courts.'

The contracted propositions may without injury be regarded as simple propositions, in which the subject, predicate, or other member, is compounded.

There are some conjunctions which seem more especially to require the contraction, viz. the partitive and ordinative conjunctions, also, *as well as*, *than*, etc.

On the contrary, in amplifying the expression, an emphasis or stress may be laid on a conception or thought;

(1.) By changing an adjective into a preposition and substantive; as, 'he is a man *of learning*,' for 'he is a *learned* man.'

(2.) By changing a clause into a subordinate sentence; as, 'he told his troops *that they must not fire upon the enemy*,' for 'he told his troops *not to fire upon the enemy*.'

(3.) By changing a subordinate proposition into a co-ordinate one; as, '*the troops approached*, and discharged their muskets,' for '*when the troops approached*, they discharged their muskets.'

March, 1856.

## ART. LIV.—CONJUNCTIONS AND CONJUNCTIVES.

1. THE importance of the right use of conjunctions in continuous discourse, although in themselves of secondary value, has long been felt and acknowledged. But I know not that any satisfactory classification of English conjunctions has yet been made. The new or Beckerian philology comes in here to our aid.

2. The *proper* conjunction connects propositions, and shows the relation between them, but itself involves no part of any proposition; as, 'he arrived *and* I departed;' 'he is rich, *yet* he is not liberal.'

A *conjunctive* word, besides expressing the connection, involves some element or factor of the proposition itself, being what is usually called a *relative* word; as, 'God, *who* made the world, is almighty;' 'the house *in which* he lives is pleasant;' 'the city *where* he lives is distant;' 'the time *when* he was born is unknown.'

These two classes of words are here brought together because they are developed only in compound propositions, and because they subserve the same general object.

3. Where particles connect words only, they must be regarded as prepositions; as, 'two *and* three are five;' 'all *but* one escaped;' 'Alexander *or* Paris fled from the field of battle.' They often, however, connect sentences in reality, where they appear to connect words only; as, 'he eats *and* drinks,' i. e. 'he eats *and* he drinks;' 'there is none good, *but* one,' i. e. 'there is none good, *but* one is good;' 'he is dead *or* alive,' i. e. 'he is dead, *or* he is alive.'

We must admit, however, that the abridged sentence is not exactly equivalent, in a rhetorical point of view, to the two simple sentences written out.

4. The sentence thus connected either has an independent existence, making no part of the other, or else constitutes an integrant part of the same.

In the former case the sentences are called *co-ordinate*, and the conjunctions employed *co-ordinative*. In the latter case the sentence added is called *subordinate*, and the conjunctions employed *subordinative*.

5. Co-ordinative conjunctions express logical relations of thoughts; subordinative conjunctions express grammatical relations of ideas.

### I. Co-ordinative Conjunctions.

I propose to consider first the co-ordinative conjunctions.

The logical relations between independent thoughts or propositions, according to the laws of the human mind, are two, viz. the relation of causality, and that of antithesis. Hence we have three kinds of co-ordinative conjunctions, and no more nor less.

1. *Copulative* conjunctions, serving to enlarge a thought or sentence, by adding another thought or sentence. They express no relation between the sentences connected, but only a common relation, (that of causality or antithesis,) to a third sentence; as, 'the foxes have holes, *and* the birds of the air have nests, but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head.' Mat. 9 : 20. 'The fining-pot is for silver, *and* the furnace for gold; but the Lord trieth the hearts.' Prov. 17 : 3. The varieties of the copulative conjunction are as follows:

(1.) *Simple copulative* conjunctions, which merely enlarge the thought in the most general way; as, *and*; or, with a slight emphasis on the second member; as, *besides*, *likewise*, *moreover*; or, with a stress on the combination; as, *as well as*, *both—and*; *neither—nor*.

'The sun shines, *and* the air is mild.'

'You have done very wrong; *besides*, you promised to do better.'

'Wise men die, *likewise* the fool and the brutish person perish.' Ps. 49 : 10.

'He was there *as well as* the others.'

'He is *both* poor *and* wretched.'

'He is *neither* wise *nor* learned.'

*Moreover* and *furthermore* appear to connect only paragraphs; as,

'*Moreover*, by them is thy servant warned.' Ps. 19 : 11.

(2.) *Intensive copulative* conjunctions, which denote a kind of climax; as, *also*, *but also*, *yes*, *nay*.

'The foolish do wrong, *also* the wise sometimes err.'

'He not only threatened him, *but also* struck him.'



‘A good man always profits by his endeavor; *yet*, when he is absent; *nay*, when dead, by his example and memory.’—Ben Jonson.

(3.) *Ordinative* conjunctions, which arrange the thoughts or sentences, as it were, in the order of time; as, *first, secondly, thirdly, again, then, finally, lastly*.

‘The duty of the historian is two-fold; *first*, towards himself, *then*, towards his reader.’

(4.) *Partitive* conjunctions, where the connected sentences are constituent part of a third sentence which embraces them; as, *partly*, etc.

‘The letter was *partly* badly written, *partly* obscurely composed.’

2. *Adversative* conjunctions, serving to limit the preceding thought. They all involve the idea of antithesis. The varieties of the adversative conjunction are as follows:

(1.) *Antithetic* or *exclusive* conjunctions; as, *not—but, on the other hand, on the contrary*.

‘He is *not* temperate, *but* he is intemperate.’

‘It is *not* day, *but* it is night.’

‘*On the other hand*, they thought differently.’

‘*On the contrary*, I believe that truth is the great inspirer.’

(2.) *Restrictive* conjunctions, serving to limit or restrict the preceding proposition; as, *but, yet, nevertheless, notwithstanding, however, albeit, still, only*.

‘The house is convenient, *but* the garden is waste.’

‘We ought to rejoice, *but* we must rejoice with trembling.’

‘*Nevertheless* he was innocent.’

‘They, *notwithstanding*, had much love to spare.’

‘We must, *however*, pay some deference to the opinion of others.’

Sometimes the restriction or limitation merely shuts out an inference; as,

‘The ostrich is a bird, *but* it cannot fly.’

‘He is rich, *yet* he is not liberal.’

(3.) *Disjunctive* conjunctions; as, *or; either—or; whether—or; else*.

‘It is my brother *or* my sister.’

‘*Either* the world had a creator, *or* it existed by chance.’

‘I do not know, *whether* it be good *or* bad.’

‘He deceived me, *else* I would have aided him.’

3. *Causal* conjunctions, expressing the relation of causality; including

(1.) *Causative* conjunctions, where the added member annexes the cause; as, *for*.

'Praise the Lord, *for* he is good.'

'I go away happy, *for* I have satisfied him.'

(2.) *Illative* conjunctions, where the added member expresses the effect or consequence; as, *then, therefore, wherefore, accordingly, consequently, and so, hence, of course*.

'Man is a creature, *therefore* he is mortal.'

'*Then* let us agree to do as we said.'

'*Wherefore* let us not be disheartened.'

'*Whereupon* we all agreed to go.'

'*Thereupon* the whole was concluded.'

## II. *Subordinative conjunctions.*

The subordinative conjunctions introduce a clause or proposition as a member or factor, (subject, attribute, object,) of another proposition. They are, as it were, the inflections of the subordinate proposition, by means of which is expressed its relation to the main proposition. The varieties of the subordinative conjunction are as follows:

1. Conjunctions merely introducing the subordinate proposition and expressing an *abstract* idea; as, *that, whether, if*.

'I know *that* he is dead.'

'I do not know *whether* he is dead.'

'I asked *if* he was dead.'

2. Conjunctions expressing the *concrete* idea of a person or thing; as, *who, what, which, that*. (Relative pronouns.)

'*What* is right for one is right for another.'

3. Subordinative conjunctions of *place*; as, *where, whither, whence, wherever, whithersoever, whencesoever*. (Relative adverbs of place.)

'*Where* thou lodgest, I will lodge.'

4. Subordinative conjunctions of *time*; as, *when, while or whilst, before, after, till or until, since*. (Relative adverbs of time and prepositions.)

'*Whenssoever* ye will, ye can do them good.'

5. Subordinative conjunctions of *manner*; as, *as, as if, so that*.

'He rewardeth thee *as* thou hast served us.' Ps. 137 : 8.

'He looks *as if* he were sick.'

'He conducted himself so *that* people were afraid of him.'

'As the hart panteth for the water-brooks, so panteth my soul after thee.' Ps. 42 : 1.

'As the mountains are round about Jerusalem, so the Lord is round about his people.' Ps. 125 : 2.

6. Subordinative conjunctions of *causality*;

(1.) Of the *actual* (real or moral) cause; *as, because, since, whereas.*

'The stars appear small, *because* they are at a distance from us.'

'We should do good, *because* God commands it.'

(2.) Of the *possible* cause or condition; *as, if, in case that, provided, unless, except.*

'I will not let thee go, *except* thou bless me.'

(3.) Of the *adversative* cause or concession; *as, though or although.*

'*Though* the Lord be high, yet hath he respect unto the lowly.' Ps. 138 : 6.

'*Though* I walk in the midst of trouble, thou wilt revive me.' Ps. 138 : 7.

(4.) Of the *final* cause or purpose; *as, that, lest.*

'He changed his dress, *that* he might escape.'

7. Subordinative conjunctions of *intensity*; *as, as, than, the, so that.*

'He is as rich *as* his brother.'

'He is wiser *than* his teachers.'

'*The* more, *the* better.'

'One is so near to another, *that* no air can come between them.'

Many particles are so used that they may be considered either as conjunctions, or as adverbs, the conjunction *and* being understood. Such are *besides, likewise, secondly, again, else, accordingly,* etc.

March, 1856.

#### ART. LV.—REMARKS ON CONJUNCTIONS.

1. CONJUNCTIONS connect propositions and show the relation between them. The relations of propositions or thoughts to each other belong to the intellectual or invisible world, and not to the visible or tangible. Hence conjunctions are not primitive words, but words originally employed for other purposes ;

and many of them are still thus employed. Conjunctions are derived,

- (1.) From demonstrative pronouns; as, *that*.
- (2.) From adjectives; as, *both, either, or, neither, nor, whether*.
- (3.) From adverbs; as, *then, now, yet, still, otherwise, as, however, nevertheless, else, likewise, also, accordingly, consequently, therefore*.
- (4.) From prepositions; as, *and, but, for, because, before, after, since, ere* (obs.).
- (5.) From verbs; as, *if, except*.
- (6.) From participles; as, *notwithstanding, provided, saving, seeing*.
- (7.) The conjunctives, or relative pronouns and adverbs, were in their origin *interrogatives*; as, *who? which? what? where? when?* etc.

"There is not such a thing," says Horne Tooke, "as a conjunction in any language, which may not, by a skilful herald, be traced home to its own family and origin."

2. Conjunctions, as to their form, are, like other particles,

- (1.) Partly from pronominal elements; as, *that, then, than; who, which, what, where, whence, whither, when, how*.
- (2.) Partly stem-words; as, *and, for, both, yet, still, now, etc* (obs.).
- (3.) Partly derivatives; as, *either, or, neither, nor, whether, else, accordingly, consequently, notwithstanding, provided, since, after*.
- (4.) Partly compounds; as, *otherwise, also, as, likewise, therefore, wherefore, but, however, nevertheless, because, before, except, moreover, albeit, furthermore, forasmuch as*. The three last are nearly obsolete.

3. Some conjunctions appear to be of an earlier, others of a later formation. Some appear to be intermediate.

- (1.) Of an earlier formation, *and, for, if*.
  - (2.) Of an intermediate formation, *but, also, as*.
  - (3.) Of a later formation, *moreover, finally, nevertheless, in order that, to the end that, howbeit, forasmuch as*.
  - (4.) In a forming state, *the moment that, the instant that*, etc.
4. Some conjunctions have two or more different uses. Thus *As*, a relative adverb of manner or intensity; as, 'He did *as* he was directed.'
- 'He writes *as* fast as the orator speaks.'

*As*, as a relative pronoun, in the nominative or objective case; *as*,

'Let such *as* understand answer.'

'He destroyed so many *as* he could.'

*But*, as an antithetic co-ordinative conjunction; *as*,

'Not God, *but* man is in fault.'

'The church is not old, *but* new.'

*But*, as a restrictive co-ordinative conjunction; *as*,

'They have mouths, *but* they speak not.' Ps. 115 : 5.

'The house is convenient, *but* the garden is waste.'

'There is none good *but* one, that is, God.' Mark 10 : 18.

*If*, as a conditional conjunction; *as*,

'*If* thou hadst been here, my brother had not died.'

*If*, as introducing a question; *as*,

'I asked them, *if* he was dead.'

*That*, introducing a subordinate clause in the nominative or accusative; *as*,

'*That* God exists, is evident.'

'I know *that* he is dead.'

*That*, expressing the final cause or purpose; *as*,

'I have come *that* ye might have life.'

These distinct uses should be noticed in our English dictionaries and carefully explained.

5. In many conjunctions there is a beautiful correlation; *as*, both—*and*; *either*—*or*; *neither*—*nor*; *whether*—*or*; *although* or *though*—*yet*; *where*—*there*; *when*—*then*; *as*—*as*; *as*—*so*; *if*—*then*; *not only*—*but also*.

6. Conjunctions are not primitive words. *As* they express the relations of sentences which are merely intellectual, and not objects of the senses, the words thus used will be found in their origin to have expressed ideas more tangible and obvious.

Compare 'the sun shines *and* the air is mild,' where the particle *and* is a conjunction, as it connects sentences or thoughts, with 'two *and* three are five,' where the particle *and* is a preposition, shewing the relationship between words only, and nearly equivalent to *with*.

The latter meaning, whereby it modifies words or ideas, and does not express the affections of whole propositions, is to be regarded, from the nature of the case, as the primary and original use of *and*.

No satisfactory etymology of *and* has yet been given.

Compare 'I saw *both* him and his sister,' where *both* is a conjunction, with 'both the boys were present,' where *both* is a numeral adjective, meaning 'the two.'

Compare '*also*, they say that he went to Rome,' where *also* is a conjunction joining this sentence to a preceding one, with *all so*, (all or altogether in that manner,) an adverb of manner.

*Also* may often be resolved in this way as an adverb of manner, comp. Mat. 6 : 21. 24 : 44.

Compare 'there is none good, *but* one,' where *but* is a conjunction, with 'all *but* one were destroyed,' where *but* is a preposition, nearly equivalent to *except*.

Compare 'he made several attempts to accomplish his object, *yet* he has not succeeded,' where *yet* is a conjunction, with 'he is *yet* living,' where *yet* is an adverb of time.

Compare '*still* he has not succeeded,' where *still* is a conjunction, with 'he is *still* alive,' where *still* is an adverb of time.

Compare '*else* would I give it,' where *else* is a conjunction, with 'nowhere *else*,' where *else* is merely an adverbial genitive.

Compare 'it rained, *nevertheless* we proceeded on our journey,' where *nevertheless* is a conjunction, with '*nevertheless* guilty,' where *nevertheless* is an adverb.

Compare 'no man stood with me; *notwithstanding* the Lord stood with me.' 2 Tim. 4 : 17. where *notwithstanding* is a conjunction, with 'he is rich, *notwithstanding* his loss,' where *notwithstanding* is a participle used absolutely.

Compare 'he died *as well as* his brother,' where *as well as* is a conjunction, with 'he is *as well as* his brother,' where *well* is an adjective.

Compare 'he thought to govern his minister, *on the contrary* his minister governed him,' where *on the contrary* is a conjunction, with 'on the *contrary* side,' where *contrary* is an adjective.

Compare '*either* he is talking or he is pursuing,' where *either* is a conjunction, with '*either* orange,' where *either* is an adjective.

Compare 'you may go *or* stay,' where *or* (an abridgment of *other*;) is a conjunction, with '*other* men,' where *other* is an adjective.

Compare 'he is *neither* good nor bad,' where *neither* is a conjunction, with '*neither* hand,' where *neither* is an adjective.

Compare 'trust in God, *for* he is good,' where *for* is a conjunction, with 'trust in God *for* safety,' where *for* is a preposition.

Compare '*then* it must be so,' where *then* is a conjunction, with 'he was *then* alive,' where *then* is an adverb of time.

Compare 'you labor not, *therefore* you have not,' where *therefore* is a conjunction, with 'he committed forgery, and died *therefor*,' where *therefor* is an adverb.

Compare '*consequently* it was lost,' where *consequently* is a conjunction, with '*consequently* injurious,' where *consequently* is an adverb.

Compare '*accordingly* he was punished,' where *accordingly* is a conjunction, with 'rewarded *accordingly*,' where *accordingly* is an adverb.

The adverbial and conjunctive use of a particle may often be seen in the same sentence; as,

'We must, *however*, pay some deference to the opinions of the wise, *however* much they are contrary to our own.'

'I have *now* shown the consistency of my principles; and, *now*, what is the fair and obvious conclusion?'

'On these facts, *then*, I *then* rested my argument, and afterwards made a few general observations on the subject.'

'I found, *too*, a theatre at Alexandria, and another at Cairo; but he who would enjoy the representations must not be *too* particular.'

'The young man was *indeed* culpable in that act, though, *indeed*, he conducted himself very well in other respects.'

7. Two or more conjunctions are often found in immediate connection, but the circumstances under which this connection takes place are very different.

(1.) Sometimes the meeting of the two conjunctions is accidental, the first conjunction having reference to the whole sentence that follows, and the second conjunction merely to the following clause. It is no proper union.

'I go to prepare a place for you. *And if* I go to prepare a place for you; I will come again, and receive you to myself.' John 14 : 2, 3.

'Let us not say, we keep the commandments of the one, when we break the commandments of the other. *For unless* we observe both, we obey neither.' Hooker.

Sometimes the conjunctions are in the inverted order.

'It is of the utmost importance to us, that we associate principally with the wise and virtuous. *When, therefore*, we choose

our companions, we ought to be extremely careful in regard to the choice we make.'

So *and that, but however, for else, for otherwise, or on the contrary, but yet, as also, if on the contrary.*

Sometimes a decompound sentence may be ushered in by no fewer than three successive conjunctions.

'To those who do not love God, the enjoyment of him is unattainable. *Now as that* we may love God, it is necessary to know him; so that we may know God, it is necessary to study his works.'

But this use of three conjunctions is not to be commended.

(2.) *And* is sometimes used before the conjunctions *also, likewise, yet, therefore, thirdly*, referring to the same clause; but it evidently diminishes the force which these particles otherwise would have. See *supra*, p. 140.

*And* cannot be used before *for* or *but*; nor the conjunction *also* before *likewise*.

(3.) *But* is sometimes used before the conjunctions *also, yet*, referring to the same clause, and seems to have the opposite effect to that of *and*. See *supra*, p. 139.

(4.) Sometimes the two conjunctions are so combined as to have a new import, different from either of the conjunctions separately; as, *as if, so that, inasmuch that*.

(5.) There was formerly a tendency to repeat synonymous conjunctions, for the sake of intensity; but such combinations have become either obsolete or obsolescent; as, *and further, and in like manner, but however, yet nevertheless, yet notwithstanding, moreover, furthermore, over and above, for because, therefore then*.

8. Some conjunctions of adverbial origin retain or admit that position, which they formerly had in the sentence as adverbs; as, *too, then, therefore, nevertheless, however*.

March, 1856.



## ART. LVI.—SOME SPECIAL CONJUNCTIONS CONSIDERED.

I propose to examine more particularly a few of the most important conjunctions.

I. *And*.

*And* is a small word, yet it is of some importance.

The particle *and* appears to be confined to the Teutonic family of languages. The corresponding forms in the cognate dialects are Old Germ. *anti*, *unde*, Old Fries. *ande*, Anglo-Sax. *and*, Germ. *und*, Dutch *en*, Icelandic *end*.

The different uses of *and* are the following :

1. As a preposition, shewing the relation between words merely, and nearly equivalent to *with*; as,

‘Two *and* three are five.’

This use of *and*, however, differs somewhat from the preposition *with*, being better adapted to exhibit the parity of relation in the two terms connected.

As the primary use of all the particles, from the nature of the case, is to modify words or ideas, and not to express the affections of whole propositions, the above is to be regarded as the primary and original use of *and*.

2. As a proper conjunction, connecting full sentences, and that in the simplest and most general manner; as,

‘The sun shines, *and* the air is mild.’

Here one sentence or clause is enlarged or extended by the addition of another sentence or clause, both clauses being co-ordinate or alike expressing actual judgments of the mind. The two clauses may be allied to each other in space, as in description, or in time, as in narrative; yet they have no internal or immediate relation to each other, but only a common relation to a third proposition or sentiment, either expressed or understood. Thus

‘A stone is heavy, *and* the sand weighty; but a fool’s wrath is heavier than them both.’ Prov. 27 : 3. Here the common sentiment to which the two clauses refer is expressed.

‘God shall bless us; *and* all the ends of the earth shall fear him.’ Ps. 67 : 7. Here the common sentiment is only implied.

3. This particle is employed apparently to connect words, where in fact sentences are connected; as,

'The flower blooms *and* fades.'

'Heaven *and* earth pass away.'

'He chooses *and* rejects without discrimination.'

Here two propositions or sentiments, having the same subject, predicate, or other member, are abridged or condensed, by expressing only once the part which is common to both propositions. They are now apprehended by the mind, in some sense, as one thought. Hence this form is not equivalent to the two thoughts written out in full, but it is only substituted for them, when the member written but once is unemphatic.

*Note.*—In the preceding uses, the number of terms is not necessarily confined to two, but may be increased to any extent. The particle *and*, however, is commonly inserted only before the last term. It is omitted, for the sake of euphony, before all the other terms. But when there is an emphasis or stress laid upon each additional term of the series, then *and* is retained with advantage.

4. The particle *and* is used emphatically to express an opposition, or consequence ; as,

'He is poor *and* happy.'

'He was a spendthrift, *and* is now a beggar.'

Here the relation of opposition, or of the consequence, is expressed by the copulative relation. The particle *and*, by expressing the closeness of the relation, is well adapted to give stress or emphasis to the relation implied in the words.

5. The particle *and*, when joined with particles expressing other relations, is adapted to throw those relations into the back-ground, and to give the predominance to the copulative relation ; as,

'He is poor, *and* yet happy.'

'He was a spendthrift, *and* therefore is now a beggar.'

*Note.*—In the two last uses, where the relation of the terms is internal, and not merely external, the number of terms is necessarily limited to two, as in proper compound sentences.

6. This particle is used with *both* before the first clause, when an emphasis or stress is laid not on the thoughts as thoughts, but on their connection with each other, consisting in their common relation to a third sentiment or thought, expressed or implied ; as,

'He is *both* learned *and* wise.'

Sometimes, as in the Bible, the number of terms is extended ; as, 'Those things which ye have *both* learned, *and* received, *and* heard, *and* seen in me, do.' Phil. 4 : 9.

June, 1844.

## II. *But*.

The English particle *but*, or rather its equivalent, the Anglo-Saxon *butan*, is compounded of *be*, (= *by*), and *utan*, (= *out*;) being formed like and nearly synonymous with *without*, or Anglo-Sax. *withutan*, compounded of *with*, and *utan*, (= *out*;) as if it denoted 'circa exterum,' *by* or *with what is out*. In order to illustrate and confirm this etymology, I would observe,

1. The Anglo-Saxon termination *an*, which is probably the termination of the dative case singular or plural, is often dropped in English; comp. Anglo-Sax. *beforan*, before; *behind-an*, behind; *benydan*, beneath; *begeondan*, beyond.

2. The vowel *e* is omitted in many other compounds of the preposition *be*; comp. Anglo-Sax. *beæftan*, also written *beæftan*, after; *binnan*, also written *beinnan*, within; *bufan*, also written *beufan*, above; *abutan*, about; also Eng. *abast*; *above*; *about*.

3. The force of the preposition *by* is often observable in these compounds; comp. *because*; *bechance*, adv. *beside* and *besides*; *betime* and *betimes*; *between* and *betwixt*.

4. The prepositions *be* and *with* are nearly synonymous in such compounds; comp. Anglo-Sax. *beæftan* and *withæftan*, after; *beforan* and *withforan*, before; *begeondan*, beyond, and *withgeondan*, about; *beinnan* and *withinnan*, within; *benydan* and *withnidan*, beneath; *beufan* and *withufan*, above; *behind-an* and *withhinda*, behind. It is remarkable that Horne Tooke, with such examples before him, should mistake the prepositional force of the prefix, and suppose it to be the imperative mood of the verb *to be*.

5. It is evident that the prefix *be*, as well as the prefix *with*, has in many cases nearly lost its significance.

The different uses of *but* may be classified and arranged as follows.

1. Followed by a complement, and that a noun, it shows the relation between words only, and is equivalent to the prepositions, *without*, *except*. As the primary use of all the particles, from the nature of the case, is to modify words or ideas, and

not to express the affections of whole propositions, this is to be regarded as the primary and original use of *but*.

Old Eng. 'but let,' without hindrance.

Mod. Eng. 'all but one.'

2. Followed by a complement, and that a clause of a sentence, with or without *that*, it introduces a subordinate proposition, like *without*, *except*, *unless*, and is regarded as a conjunction.

'There is none good *but* one, that is, God.' Mark 10 : 18.

'He found nothing thereon, *but* leaves only.' Mat. 21 : 19.

3. In these contracted propositions, whenever the emphasis lies not on the negation, but on the exception, then the negative particle is properly omitted, and the particle *but* has the force of *only*.

'There is *but* one good, that is, God ; therefore acknowledge his goodness.'

'I saw *but* one person there,' the question being about his being alone.

4. *But*, not followed by a complement, but having its complement implied in the preceding clause, introduces a co-ordinate clause, and is called the adversative particle.

'Not God, *but* man, is in fault.' Here the adversation lies in the subject. God is not in fault, but (scil. this, i. e. on the contrary,) man is in fault.

'She did not see *but* heard him.' Here the adversation lies in the predicate. She did not see him, but (scil. this, i. e. aside or different from this,) she heard him.

'Not unto us, *but* unto thy name, give glory.' Ps. 115 : 1. Here the adversation lies in the object.

5. Sometimes the adversation is indirect ; or the clause introduced by *but*, is opposed not to the preceding clause, but to something which might be supposed to flow from it. This is *but restrictive*.

They have mouths, *but* they speak not. Ps. 115 : 5.

The ostrich is a bird, *but* cannot fly.

I have planted, Apollos watered, *but* God gave the increase.

1 Cor. 3 : 6.

In the following case the adversative force of *but* is very slight, indicative but little more than that the latter proposition is joined to the former, as the minor of a syllogism :

'All animals have sense, *but* a dog is an animal.'

6. Sometimes of two thoughts or sentences connected by *but*, the one contains an affirmation, while the other contains a denial of the contrary. In this case the thoughts or sentences are identical in meaning, although opposed in form.

The church is not old, *but* new.

The earth is not at rest, *but* in motion.

See New Englander, vol. x. p. 472.

### III. *Therefore*.

The particle *therefore* is the appropriate English illative or conclusive conjunction. It has three special uses, which are exhibited neither in our grammars nor in our dictionaries.

These are

1. To denote the *real* ground or reason, i. e. the physical cause; as,

'You do not work, *therefore* you have nothing.'

'It rained yesterday, *therefore* the streets are wet.'

'He was my table-companion, *therefore* I know him.'

2. To denote the *moral* ground or reason, i. e. the motive; as,

'The streets are wet, *therefore* he does not go out.'

'He is quarrelsome, *therefore* people avoid him.'

3. To denote the *logical* ground or reason, i. e. the proof; as,

'A and B are each equal to C, *therefore* they are also equal to each other.'

'The triangles have equal sides, *therefore* they coincide with each other.'

'He blushes, *therefore* he is guilty.'

These distinctions are given in German grammars, with manifest advantage to the learner.

*Note*.—Our common version of the Bible sometimes uses *therefore* as a correlative to *because*; as,

Gen. 11 : 9, '*Therefore* is the name of it called Babel; *because* the Lord did there confound the language of all the earth.' So Ps. 63 : 7.

Our translators, from misapprehension of the Hebrew idiom, have sometimes used *therefore* for *because*; as,

Ps. 1 : 5, '*Therefore* (better *because*) the ungodly shall not stand in the judgment.' So Ps. 42 : 6. 45 : 2. Is. 15 : 4. Jer. 48 : 36.

Aug. 1848.

IV. *That*.

1. This word, in the languages whence it is derived, is a pronoun of the neuter gender only, the masculine and feminine genders having their distinct appropriate forms. Comp. Meso-Goth. *thata* or *that*; Old Sax. Anglo-Sax. and Iceland. *that*; Old Germ. *daz*, Germ. *das*, Dutch *dat*, Swed. and Dan. *det*. Indeed it is nothing else than the Lat. *tud* in *istud*, Gr. *τό* (for *τόν*), and Sansk. and Zend. *tat*, which are all of the neuter gender. So Eng. *this*, is derived from the Anglo-Sax. neuter *this*.

This tendency to use the neuter gender, as generic, or for all genders, is exhibited also in the phrases, *it was he*, *it was she*, expressions which would not be tolerated in Latin or Greek. Comp. Meso-Goth. *niu thata ist sa timrja*; Dutch *ik was het die schreef*; Germ. *das ist der Mann*; *es ist der Mann*; where the pronoun is neuter, although referring to persons. Something analogous is the Latin expression *varium et mutabile semper femina*; where the neuter is used for one of the personal genders; the idea that *negotium* is here understood, being a mere grammatical fiction. So in Greek *τὸ ἀποκάλυψ*, Matt. 18 : 11. Luke 19 : 10. *τὸ γεγεννημένον*, John 3 : 6. 1 John 5 : 4. which are neuters used, as it were, collectively for both the other genders.

The word *that*, in its original form and in the ancient languages, is equivalent not to the Greek *ἐκεῖνος*, *η*, *ο*; Latin *ille*, *illa*, *illud*, or Germ. *jener*, *jene*, *jenes*, but to the Lat. *is*, *es*, *id*, or Germ. *der*, *die*, *das*. Of course, in its primary signification, it is a mere definitive, or simple demonstrative, to denote something already mentioned, or something well known, or something to be defined by a subsequent relative; and not a local or emphatic demonstrative, like Latin *hic*, *ille*, or *iste*, although it subsequently assumed the functions of the Germ. *jener*, *jene*, *jenes*. This explains many phenomena in its use, which are inexplicable on the ground that it was originally the correlative of *this*; for example, 'Immanuel, *that* is, God with us.'

*Note*.—The Lat. *tud*, Goth. *that*, Old Germ. *daz*, exemplifies the famous dialectic law; according to which Lat. *t* is changed into Meso-Goth. *th*, and Lat. *d* into Meso-Goth. *t*; and again Meso-Goth. *th* into Old Germ. *d*, and Meso-Goth. *t* into Old Germ. *th*, or rather its substitute the sibilant *z*.

In this signification, it has a singular *that*, and a plural *those*; and it is used both as a substantive and as an adjective, a difference in form, but not in meaning. It may refer either to words, clauses, or sentences.

2. This word is used as a demonstrative, correlative to *this*, and having reference to place, time, or order of mention; a meaning peculiar to the Anglo-Saxon, English, and Dutch; = Gr. *ἐκεῖνος*, η, ο; Lat. *ille, illa, illud*; Germ. *jener, jene, jenes*.

In this signification it has a singular *that*, and a plural *those*, and it is used both as a substantive and as an adjective.

*This* and *that*, when occurring together, are sometimes used indefinitely; as, 'If the Lord will, we shall live, and do *this* or *that*.'

3. This word is used as a *relative*, in reference to both persons and things, like the corresponding forms in the Teutonic dialects; = Gr. *ὅς, ἡ, ὅ*; Lat. *qui, quae, quod*; Germ. *der, die, das*.

This is without doubt a secondary and derived use, as is seen by a reference to the Latin and Sanskrit.

In this sense it is equivalent to *who* and *which*. Euphony, perspicuity and precision must decide in the choice of the relative. Rhetoricians, however, have distinguished some cases in which it should not be used; as, for example, immediately after a preposition. They have also stated that it should be used rather than *who* or *which*, (1.) when referring to a compound antecedent, consisting partly of persons and partly of things; (2.) to avoid the repetition of *who* and *which*; (3.) after adjectives of the superlative degree; (4.) after the adjective *same*; (5.) after the adjectives *all* and *some*, referring to things; and (6.) after the interrogative *who*?

As a relative, *that* is used in both numbers, but only substantively.

4. The word *that* is used, as a sort of article, before a clause of a sentence. It is attached to and defines the clause, just as the common article is attached to and defines the noun. It forms the clause into a noun, and that in its cases, or relations, according as it is used alone, or with different conjunctions, or as they might more appropriately be called *prepositions*. This usage is very extensive, especially in the old writers.

5. As if *for that*, denoting the object or purpose; = Gr. *ὅτι*, Lat. *ut*, Germ. *auf dass*.

July, 1838.

V. *As*.

The English particle *as* is a mutilated form of *also*, compounded of *all* and *so*, literally signifying 'entirely so,' or 'entirely in this manner.'

The word *all* in this particle has lost much of its force, as in other particles, *albeit*, *almost*, *alens*, *already*, *altogether*, *although*, *always*.

The word *so* in this particle is originally the modal or instrumental case of an ancient demonstrative pronoun, signifying 'thus' or 'in this manner.'

But this pronoun, although a demonstrative, has like its derivatives also the force of a relative.

And the particle of manner is also by an easy transfer employed to denote degree or intensity, and by a transfer somewhat bolder is used for the pronoun itself in the nominative or objective case.

Guided by these principles the different meanings of *as* may be arranged as follows.

1. A demonstrative adverb, denoting manner; as,  
'He does *as* well as he can.'
2. A relative adverb, denoting manner or degree; as,  
'He did *as* he was directed.'  
'On his return from Egypt, *as* I learned from the same authority, he levied an army.'  
'Ye shall be *as* gods.'  
'He does as well *as* he can.'
3. A conjunction modifying the proposition itself, and not merely the subject or predicate; as,  
'He trembled, *as* he spoke.'  
'*As* ye have heard, now obey.'
4. A relative pronoun, equivalent to *who*, *which*, or *that*. It is found in this sense after *so many*, *as many*, *such*, and *the same*.  
'He destroyed so many *as* he could find.'  
'As many *as* received him.'  
'Let such *as* understand answer.'  
'Send him such books *as* will please him.'  
'The same *as* I saw.'

*Note.*—The fuller form *also* is retained in English in the sense of *likewise*, i. e. in like manner; and in German in the sense of *therefore*.

March, 1856.



## ART. LVII.—COLLOCATION OF COMPOUND PROPOSITIONS.

*Subordinate* propositions, as a general rule, take the same position in a sentence, as the member or factor which they represent would do.

*Subordinate* propositions, when they modify the whole sentence, are placed at the close; but, when they modify a particular member of the sentence, they are placed near that member.

*Substantive* clauses, expressing the *subject*, are placed at the commencement of the sentence; but when emphatic, at the end. Thus

'*Whoso hearkeneth unto me, shall dwell safely.*'

'It is a law of nature, *that water should congeal by cold.*'

*Substantive* clauses, expressing the *object*, are placed after the verb, unless such clause is emphatic. Thus

'We believe *that God exists.*'

'*What men sow, they must expect to reap.*'

*Adjective* clauses stand near the substantive which they modify. Thus:

'The good, *which men do* is not lost.'

'Alfred has sold the bat, *which William gave him, for a shilling.*'

'Alfred has sold the bat for a shilling *which William gave him.*'

*Adverbial* clauses of *place, time, and manner*, are placed at the close; but if emphatic or extended, at the beginning. Thus

'Umbrage should never be taken, *where offence is not intended.*'

'*Where thoughts kindle, words spontaneously flow.*'

'Let us live, *while we live.*'

'*While the bridegroom tarried, they all slumbered and slept.*'

'Use time, *as if you knew its value.*'

'*As we grow older, life becomes dim in the distance.*'

*Adverbial* clauses of the *actual, possible, and adverting ground*, when emphatic, precede the leading clause, as a protasis; otherwise not. Thus

'*Since such is the fact, you have no cause whatever for solicitude.*'

'People are rude and unpolite, *because they are ignorant.*'

'*If there were no cowardice, there would be little insolence.*'

'*It were no virtue to bear calamities, if we did not feel them.*'

'*Though he praises the lady, it is only for her beauty.*'

Adverbial clauses of the *ultimate ground* are placed at the close. Thus

'*Live well, that you may die well.*'

'Some people endeavor to divert their thoughts, *lest their minds should disturb them.*'

Co-ordinate propositions often invert their order, but in that case the connective particle must be changed. Thus, 'you labor not, *therefore* you have not,' and 'you have not, *for* you labor not.'

March, 1856.

#### ART. LVIII.—THE MOODS.

THE doctrine of the moods is a complicated subject.

The problem to be solved is this, to find out a proper definition of the mood, and from it to deduce the number of moods which are requisite in language, or more definitely, to determine how many moods have been developed in the Indo-European stock of languages with which we are more immediately concerned.

The infinitive and participle have no claim to be considered as moods. They are participials, see Art. XXVIII. *supra*.

Mood is the relation of the proposition in some way to the powers of mind of the speaker.

But here a distinction is made between the activity or predicate-idea, involved in the thought or proposition, and the thought or proposition itself.

Dr. Becker, for example, distinguishes between modality in the *wider* sense, as including the relation of the predicate-idea to the mind of the speaker, and modality in the *stricter* sense, as including only the relation of the thought or assertion to the powers or functions of the speaker's mind.

Under the former he includes the actuality, possibility, and necessity of the predicate-idea, i. e. of its union with the subject.

Under the latter he includes the moods, usually so denominated; as the indicative, the conjunctive, the conditional, the interrogative, and the imperative.

This distinction of Dr. Becker's has been neglected by his followers, as Morell, Wurst, and Bauer, but we think unhappily.

There are six forms of the activity predicated of the subject, which express the relation of the *activity* to the mind of the speaker; viz.

- (1.) That of *actuality*; as, 'the leaf withers.'
- (2.) That of *non-actuality*; as, 'the leaf does not wither.'
- (3.) That of *possibility*; as, 'the leaf can wither.'
- (4.) That of *impossibility*; as, 'the leaf cannot wither.'
- (5.) That of *necessity*; as, 'the leaf must wither.'
- (6.) That of its converse; as, 'the leaf must not wither.'

Every predicated activity is supposed to fall under one of these heads.

If we make three forms, *actuality*, *possibility*, and *necessity*, and two varieties under each, we shall come to the same result.

These three or six forms are regarded, I believe, by all judicious grammarians, as collateral or correlative.

These affections of the predicated activity, as they, through the predicate, affect also the proposition, might seem, at first view, to require two moods, a *negative* mood, and a *potential* mood to express possibility and necessity. But these moods are unnecessary.

Every proposition may indeed be stated either positively or negatively. But the negative proposition has no peculiar mood-form. It is expressed by a particle of negation attached to the predicate, or some other member of the proposition. All that needs to be said, therefore, comes in under the head of negative particles.

The *potential mood*, so called, is expressed in English by the auxiliary verbs, *may*, *might*, *can*, *could*, *should*, and *must*, which are construed like other verbs with an infinitive. All that needs to be said of the potential mood, therefore, may be introduced under the discussion of auxiliary verbs and their uses.

As to the other moods we observe,

The moods have reference to the mind of the speaker. They have reference to the functions or powers called into operation in the enunciation of the thought or proposition.

The *infinitive mood* so called is the crude-form of the verb. It is the verb divested of all modality. It is no mood at all.

The *indicative* is the ground-form of the verb, and the basis of the other moods. It is the appropriate form to express an objective or positive judgment of the mind. It embraces or excludes the potential mood according to our mode of conceiving of it.

Its proper place is in a leading proposition, but it has nearly supplanted the place of the subjunctive in the subordinate proposition.

The appropriate use of the *conjunctive* or *subjunctive* mood is to express a subjective or problematical judgment, and it is found in a subordinate proposition. See Articles XLII—XLVII.

The conjunctive has some analogy to the genitive of the noun.

The *conditional* mood, or mood of the assumed antithesis, is a peculiar form of the proposition. See *supra* p. 135.

The *interrogative* mood differs not from the indicative except in the collocation. It is strictly speaking an imperfect proposition proposed to another to complete or fill up. It is only a sub-mood, as it were, of the indicative. See the Article on the Interrogation.

The *imperative* mood proceeds not from the intellect, but from the desires of the mind acting appropriately; for it is a great mistake to consider language as the offspring of the intellect only. See Art. on the Imperative Mood.

March, 1856.



#### ART. LIX.—PARTICLES OF ASSENT AND NEGATION.

1. THE idea of negation, being a simple idea, is clear and distinct in itself; nor does the expression of it usually occasion any difficulty.

2. The simplest form of the negation seems to have been an interjectional element, (analogous to the interjectional element of affirmation,) originally used as a negative response to an inquiry or command. But in actual usage a compound form is now employed, as being more emphatic; as, Lat. *non*, (= *ne oenum* or *unum*;) Germ. *nein*, (= *ne ein*;) Eng. *nay*, (= *ne aye*, not aye;) or *no*, (= *ne aye*, not ever.)

3. There is in the Shemitish languages a peculiar early form of the negation, (analogous to a peculiar form of the affirmation;) as, *וְאִין אִין* 'there is no man,' liter. there is nothing of a man, Gen. 31 : 50. comp. *וְאִין אִין* 'there is a kinsman,' liter. there is something of a kinsman, Ruth 3 : 12.

4. From this original negative element *ne* is derived by composition a beautiful system of negative words for the special occasions of human language; as (1.) interj. *nay, no*; (2.) subst. of person, *nobody*; (3.) subst. of thing, *naught, nothing*; (4.) adj. of quantity, *none* or *no*; (5.) adj. of preference, *neither*; (6.) adv. of modality, *not*, contraction of *naught*; (7.) adv. of place, *nowhere*; (8.) adv. of time, *never*; (9.) adv. of manner, *nohow, nowise, nowadays*; (10.) conj. *neither, nor*.

To these correspond in Latin, (1.) *non*; (2.) *nemo*; (3.) *nil* or *nihil*; (4.) *nullus*; (5.) *neuter*; (6.) *non, ne*; (7.) *nusquam*; (8.) *nunquam*; (9.) *nequaquam, neutiquam*; (10.) *neque, nec*.

5. The negation of an attribute is sometimes expressed by the inseparable particle *un* or *in*; as, *unprofitable, infirm*.

6. The general rule for the collocation of the adverb *not*, and the conjunctions *neither* and *nor*, is that which natural instinct dictates, that the negation should be placed near the word to which it refers.

'*Not* all that is favored by good use, is proper to be retained.'

'He walks *not*.'

'He does *not* walk.'

'*Neither* the pencil *nor* poetry is adequate.'

'It *neither* improves the understanding, *nor* delights the imagination.'

'It will please *neither* the mind, *nor* the imagination.'

The collocation of the other negative words presents no difficulty.

7. In some languages, as the Latin, there is a negation of the negation; as, *non-nemo*, somebody; *non-nullus*, some one. But in English this does not occur, except when one of the negatives is expressed by an inseparable particle; as, 'he is *not* *unable*.' There is, however, a slight difference of meaning.

8. In most languages, there is a tendency to repeat the negative for the sake of emphasis. This is particularly the case in Greek; also in early Latin, and in Anglo-Saxon. In English it is now confined to the popular idiom, and is disapproved of in the written style.

9. The expression of the negative in abridged or contracted sentences may be best illustrated by an example; as,

'No creature, (*neither* human, *nor* angelical,) shall ever be able to separate us from the love of God.'

10. Many languages, as the Greek and Latin, distinguish between the negative in a co-ordinate or leading proposition, and the negative in a subordinate or subjective proposition. But the English language does not.

March, 1856.

### *English Particles of Assent.*

#### *Yea, aye or ay, I, and yes.*

The particle of affirmation or assent is an early want in language. In English it has assumed the forms, *yea*, *aye* or *ay*, *I*, and *yes*.

1. *Yea*, Old Eng. *ye*, *ye*, (Goth. *jai*, Anglo-Sax. *ia*, *gea*, *ges*, or *ga*, Germ. *ja*,) is of obscure origin. J. Grimm connects it, notwithstanding the opposition of meaning, with Gr. *oî*, not. It is probably a natural sound, prompted by instinct, and primarily an interjection. Its different uses are as follows.

(1.) After a question or command, to express assent. In this sense it is emphatic, and the substitute, as it were, for a whole sentence. Thus

‘Art thou a Roman? He said, *Yea*.’ Acts 22 : 27.

*Yea* in this sense is now superseded by *yes*, except in solemn style, and in public proceedings.

(2.) Before a proposition, without being a member of it, to prepare the way for an amplification or climax. Here also it is an emphatic interjection, standing for a whole sentence. Thus

‘*Yea*, hath God said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden?’ Gen. 3 : 1.

‘I therein do rejoice, *yea*, and will rejoice.’ Phil. 1 : 18.

In this sense *yea* is still used in solemn or antiquated style.

It is somewhat singular that both *yea* and *nay* are sometimes used with the same augmentative force in one and the same sentence. Thus

‘A good man always profits by his endeavor; *yea*, when he is absent; *nay*, when dead, by his example and memory.’—Ben Jonson.

(3.) As a noun denoting assent or faithfulness. In this sense it loses its emphatic tone. Thus

‘Let your *yea* be *yea*; and your *nay*, *ay*.’ James 5 : 12.

‘All the promises of God in him are *yea*, and in him *amen*.’ 2 Cor. 1 : 20.

This use of *yea* as a substantive is merely a Hebraism or Grecism.

2. *Aye* or *ay*, another form for *yea*, in the two first acceptations, and still in use.

3. *I*, merely a different orthography and perhaps pronunciation for *aye* or *ay*, much used by Shakspeare, but now entirely antiquated. Thus

"Hath Romeo slain himself. Say thou but *I*;  
And that bare vowel *I*, shall poison more  
Than the death-darting *eye* of a cockatrice."

*Romeo and Juliet.*

4. *Yes*, Old Eng. *yisse*, (Anglo-Sax. *gese*, *gise*, or *gyse*,) compounded of *yea*, or Anglo-Sax. *gea*, and Anglo-Sax. *se* for *si*, 'let it be;' employed in the two first acceptations.

(1.) After a question or command, to express assent. Thus  
'Doth not your master pay tribute? He saith, *Yes*. Matt. 17 : 24, 25.

(2.) Before a proposition, without being a member of it, to prepare the way for an amplification or climax. Thus

'You have done all this, *yes*, you have done more.

*Yes* is sometimes joined with other particles; as, *O yes*, where each particle has its peculiar force; *yes indeed*, an intensive form for *yes*, etc.

June, 1844.

### *English Negatives.*

The class of words, called *negatives*, play an important part in language, and are worthy of special attention.

The leading uses of the negation are (1.) as an interjection prompted by natural instinct, to express dissent after a question or command; (2.) in regular discourse, to deny the predicate; and (3.) to deny the attribute.

The negative element, or simple negation, in English, which was in its origin naturally adapted to perform these functions, is *ne* or *un*.

This negative element, however, is not found in English at the present time as a separate word; but it occurs as the initial sound or initial syllable in many compounds. These compounds have superseded, as we shall see below, the use of the simple negation.

The principal negatives, in the Teutonic part of our language, which are in this way compounded with the negative element or simple negation, are *nay*, *na*, *never*, *none* or *no*, *naught* or *nought*, *not*, *neither*, *nor*, and the compounds with *up*.

1. *Nay*, Old English *naye*, (compounded of the negative element *ne* and the adverb or rather interjection of assent *yea* or *aye*,) is primarily employed, after a question or command, as an adverb or rather interjection of denial; as,

'Wilt thou then that we go and gather them up? But he said, *Nay*.' Matt. 19 : 28, 29.

'They have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them. And he said, *Nay*, father Abraham.' Luke 16 : 29, 30.

It is also employed very happily in denying that what has been said is all that can be said, and in thus preparing the way for an amplification or climax; as,

'He requested an answer, *nay*, he urged it.'

*Note*.—*Nay* always has the full circumflex tone. Although merely an interjection, it is virtually equivalent to a whole sentence.

2. *No*, (compounded of the negative element *ne* and the particle *aye*, ever,) has two uses in English :

(1.) As an interjection of denial; as,

'Art thou that prophet? And he answered, *No*.' John 1 : 21.

'And they spake unto him, saying, *No*; but we will bind thee fast, and deliver thee into their hand.' Judg. 15 : 13.

Also employed, like *nay*, in denying that what has been said is all that can be said, and in thus preparing the way for a climax; as,

'There is none righteous, *no*, not one.' Rom. 3 : 10.

'To whom we gave place by subjection, *no*, not for an hour.' Gal. 2 : 5.

*Note*.—In this use, *no* has always the full circumflex tone, and is virtually equivalent to a whole sentence.

(2.) As an adverb of negation, in a suspensive clause, and equivalent to *not*; as,

'That I may prove them, whether they will walk in my law, or *no*.' Ex. 16 : 4.

*Note*.—In this use it ceases to have the circumflex tone.

Compare Goth. *ni aiv*, compounded of *ni* and *aiv*; Anglo-Sax. *na*, compounded of *ne* and *a*; and Germ. *nie*, compounded of *ne* and *je*; the Goth. *aiv*, Anglo-Sax. *a*, Germ. *je*, and Eng. *aye*, being all the same word, and signifying *ever*.



3. *Never*, Anglo-Sax. *nefre*, *nefre*, or *nefor*, (compounded of *ne*, and *ever*, Anglo-Sax. *æfre*, the dative case of *aye*, Anglo-Sax. *a* or *awa*,) an adverb having several uses :

(1.) *Not at any time, at no time*, its appropriate meaning.

(2.) *In no degree*; as,

'Whoever has a friend to guide, may carry his eyes in another man's head, and yet see *never* the worse,'—South.

(3.) *Simply not*; as,

'He answered him *never* a word.'

4. *None*, (compounded of *ne* and *one*; comp. Anglo-Sax. *nan*, compounded of *ne* and *an*, one; Germ. *kein*, compounded of *ne* and *ein*, one; and Lat. *non* or *noenum*, compounded of *ne* and *oenum*, one;) an adjective having two uses :

(1.) *Not one*; as,

'There is *none* that doeth good.' Ps. 14 : 3.

(2.) *Not any*; as,

'Six days ye shall gather it; but on the seventh day, which is the sabbath, in it there shall be *none*.' Ex. 16 : 26.

In Old English it was used in both these senses before nouns beginning with a vowel; as,

'This is *none* other but the house of God.' Gen. 28 : 17.

'Thou shalt have *none* assurance of thy life. Deut. 28 : 66.

5. *No*, merely an abridged form of the preceding, now always used when a noun immediately follows; as,

'Let there be *no* strife between me and thee.' Gen. 13 : 8.

It is also used before the comparative degree, as an adverb, *not in any degree*; as '*no more*,' '*no longer*.'

6. *Naught* or *nought*, Anglo-Sax. *nawiht*, *nawuht*, (compounded of *ne*, *aye* = Anglo-Sax. *a*, and *wight* or *whit* = Anglo-Sax. *wiht* or *wuht*,) used in several senses :

(1.) As a substantive, *not anything, nothing*, its appropriate meaning.

(2.) As an adverb, *in no degree*; as,

'To wealth or sovereign power he *nought* applied.'—Fairfax.

(3.) As an adjective *bad, worthless*. In this sense it retains the older orthography *naught*.

7. *Not*, merely an abridged form or contraction of the preceding, and now employed to express the simple negation of the predicate or attribute.

8. *Neither*, Old English *nouthor* or *nother*, Anglo-Sax. *nather*, *nathor*, *nawther*, *nauthor*, (compounded of *ne* and *either*, Anglo-Sax. *athor*,) *not either*.

- (1.) As an adjective ; as,  
 'The upright judge inclines to *neither* party.'
- (2.) As an adverb, or rather referring to clauses or sentences ; as,  
 'Fight *neither* with small nor great, save only with the king.'  
 1 Kings 22 : 31.
9. *Nor*, merely a contraction of the preceding, and used with less emphasis ; as,  
 'Fight neither with small *nor* great.' 1 Kings 22 : 31.  
 'Eye hath not seen, *nor* ear heard.' 1 Cor. 2 : 9.  
 'Simois *nor* Xanthus shall be wanting there.'—Dryden.  
 'I whom *nor* avarice *nor* pleasures move.'—Walsh.
10. In old English writers we find *nys* for *ne is*, 'is not ;' *nill* for *ne will*, 'will not ;' *nas* for *ne has*, 'has not.' Compare Anglo-Sax. *nis* or *nys*, 'is not ;' *nele*, 'will not ;' *næfth*, 'has not.' In modern English we have *ant* for *are not* ; *wont* for *will not* ; *hant* for *have not*.
11. There are also some secondary compounds which need no comment ; as *nobody*, *nothing*, *nowhere*, *noways*, *nowise* ; *nevertheless* ; *nonesuch* ; *notwithstanding*.
12. *Un*, as an inseparable prefix, in *unbind*, *unfair*, etc.

Thus far we have regarded only the Teutonic or Anglo-Saxon part of our language. As this negative element exists also in Latin, it exhibits itself as a component part of many words derived from that language. Thus

- (1.) *Ne* is found in *necessary*, *negation*, *neglect*, *negotiate*, *neuter*, *nonentity*, *null*.
- (2.) *In*, (=Anglo-Sax. *un*), is found in *inept*, *inert*, *infirm*, etc.  
 May, 1844.

#### *Further Notes on Yea and Nay.*

1. These terms are used as interjections after a command, as well as after an interrogation.
2. *Yea* and *nay* belong to the solemn style ; in the common style they are giving way to *yes* and *no*.
3. Some of these terms are used by way of preparation for an emphatic sentence ; as, 'I have advised, *yea*, urged him ;' 'he requested an answer, *nay*, he urged it ;' 'you have done all this, *yes*, you have done more ;' 'there is none righteous, *no*, not one.'
4. Some of these terms, by a natural but peculiar process, have become nouns ; as, *nay*, 'denial ;' *yea*, 'faithfulness,' 2 Cor. 1 : 20.

5. These terms have led to the formation of verbs of affirmation and denial; as, Lat. *aio*, 'I say;' *nego*, 'I deny;' Germ. *bejahen*, 'to affirm;' Old Eng. *may*, 'to deny,' in Chaucer.

6. If we have been successful in our investigations, we have fallen upon two of the original forms of language; viz. *yea*, as an instinctive sound of assent, and *n*, as the element of negation. March, 1856.

### ART. LX.—AUXILIARY VERBS.

BESIDES *subjective* verbs whose action abides in the subject, as *lie*, *stand*, and *objective* verbs, whose action passes over to an object, as *strike*, *cut*; there is a third class of verbs, called *auxiliary* or *helping* verbs, which do not express action at all, as *may*, *can*.

In other words, these verbs do not express the activity itself, but only the time, mode, voice, or simple predication, of the activity. That is, they express not general abstract ideas themselves, but only their relations. The auxiliary verb is also the bearer of person and number.

The auxiliary verbs in English are *may*, *can*, *shall*, *will*, *ought*, *must*, *dare* or *durst*, *have*, *do*, *let*, *am*.

As these verbs do not, like other verbs, denote activity in any sense, the inquiry arises in many intelligent minds, whence did they come, and what was their original significancy, it being correctly assumed that they once expressed general abstract ideas. This curiosity is a natural one, and we shall endeavor to answer it in a familiar way.

The original meaning and present use of these terms, however, should not be confounded with each other, but kept perfectly distinct.

1. *May* is the past tense of a Teutonic verb, signifying 'to have power' or 'be able,' (comp. the derivative nouns, *might*, *main*, which both denote 'power;') but is now employed in English, (1.) to express possibility or contingency; (2.) to express permission; (3.) in a subordinate proposition, to express the conjunctive mood; and (4.) in the interrogative or inverted order, to express the entreaty form of the imperative. It is an auxiliary of mood.

It takes a new past tense after the weak inflection; as, *I might*.

2. *Can* is the past time of *to ken*, 'to know,' (after the strong inflection, comp. *get*, past *gat*;) and now signifies 'to be able,' i. e. 'to know how' to do a thing. It is an auxiliary of mood.

It takes a new past tense after the weak inflection; as, Anglo-Sax. *ic cudhe*. In English, however, by a singular freak of language, the orthography of the past tense has been conformed to the analogy of *would*, *should*; as, *I could*.

3. *Shall* is the past tense of a Teutonic verb, signifying 'to owe,' scil. a debt, hence 'to be obligated,' scil. to a duty; but is now employed, when unemphatic, to denote mere futurity. When emphatic, it conveys the idea of a promise or threat. It is an auxiliary of time and mood.

It takes a new past tense with change of vowel and weak inflection; as, *I should*.

4. *Will* is still used as a principal verb, pres. *will*, past. *willed*, signifying 'to have a volition' or 'be willing;' but as an auxiliary verb, when unemphatic, it denotes mere futurity, and when emphatic, resolution or a promise. It is an auxiliary of time and mood.

It takes a past tense after the weak inflection; as, *I would*.

5. *Ought* is the past tense of *to owe*, primarily 'to possess' or 'own;' but is now used as an auxiliary both in the present and past tense, to denote moral obligation. It is a sort of auxiliary of mood.

6. *Must* is the past tense of a Teutonic verb, signifying 'to be necessitated,' and is now used as an auxiliary to denote physical necessity. It is an auxiliary of mood.

*Must* appears to be used both as a present and as a past tense.

7. *Dare* or *durst*, past *durst*, is now an auxiliary verb of mood. *Dare*, past *dared*, is still used as a principal verb.

8. *Have*, past *had*, with the weak inflection, is used both as a principal verb, signifying 'to hold' or 'possess;' and as an auxiliary of time, helping to form the perfect and pluperfect tenses; as, *I have loved*, *I had loved*.

9. *Do*, past *did*, with the weak inflection, is used both as a principal verb, signifying 'to make' or 'to act;' and as an auxiliary to express emphasis. It is also used in the interrogative form of speech; as a mere expletive in poetry; and to avoid the repetition of the principal verb. It is an auxiliary of mood.

10. *Let* is used both as a principal verb, *let*, past *let*, signifying 'to permit;' and as an auxiliary verb to help form the imperative mood in the third and first persons, as, *let him go*, *let me go*.

11. *Am* or *be*, past *was*, partic. *been*, is made up of three distinct verbs, (which in other dialects are declined in full,) each signifying 'to exist' or 'to have existence;' and is employed as an auxiliary in English to form, in connection with the past participle, the passive voice of active verbs, and the past tense in some neuter verbs. It does this by expressing mere predication. It is also used, in connection with the active particle, to form tenses of continuous action; as, *I am building*, *I was building*. Also as a mere copula; as, 'God is good.' It is the predicate-verb, or auxiliary verb of mere predication.

#### *Remarks on the Auxiliaries.*

1. These auxiliaries are called verbs, because they were so in their origin, and because they still retain the inflection of verbs.

2. These verbs, (excepting *do*, *have*, *am*,) do not inflect the third person singular. This is owing to the fact that they were originally past tenses.

3. These verbs, (excepting *have*, *ought*, *am*,) take the simple infinitive without *to*.

March, 1856.

#### *On the Auxiliary Verb Shall.*

*Shall*, which is now in English an auxiliary verb of mood and tense, was originally a common verb, as is evident from its use in the Meso-Gothic and Anglo-Saxon dialects which exhibit the ancient state of our language.

The different significations of this verb may be arranged as follows :

1. *To owe*, scil. a debt, in Meso-Gothic and Anglo-Saxon.

So in the present tense, Meso-Goth. *wan filu skalt*, (shalt thou;) Anglo-Sax. *hu mycel scealt thu*, (shalt thou;) 'how much owest thou?' Luke 18 : 5.

So in the past tense, Meso-Goth. *ains skulda* (should) *skatte fimfhunda*, 'the one owed five hundred pence.' Luke 7 : 41.

This meaning is expressed in Greek by *ὀφείλω*, and in Latin by *debeo*.

2. *To be bound or obligated*, scil. to the performance of a duty, in Meso-Gothic and Anglo-Saxon, and partially in English.

So in the present tense, Meso-Goth. *skal* (he shall) *gasviltan*; Anglo-Sax. *he sceal* (shall) *sweltan*; 'he ought to die.' John 19 : 7.

Old Eng. 'The faith I *shall* to God.'—Chaucer.

So in the past tense, Meso-Goth. *thatei skuldedum* (we should) *taujan*, 'that which was our duty to do.' Luke 17 : 10.

Modern Eng. 'I *should* go,' 'thou *shouldst* go,' 'he *should* go,' i. e. I ought to go, thou oughtest to go, he ought to go.

This meaning is expressed like the preceding by Gr. *οφειλω* and Lat. *debeo*, and also by Gr. *δει* and Lat. *oportet*.

3. *To be under a necessity, must*, in Meso-Gothic and Anglo-Saxon.

Meso-Goth. *vaila merjan ik skal* (shall;) 'I must preach;' Luke 4 : 43. Anglo-Sax. *scyl* (shall) *beon gefyllad*, 'must be accomplished.' Luke 22 : 37.

This meaning is expressed, like the preceding, by Gr. *δει* and Lat. *oportet*, and also by Gr. *ξεῖν* and Lat. future participle in *urus*.

4. By implication, *to be future or certain*, in Meso-Gothic, Anglo-Saxon, and English.

So in the present tense, Meso-Goth. *wa skuli* (shall) *thata barn wairthan*, Eng. 'what manner of child *shall* this be?' Luke 1 : 66. Anglo-Sax. *scealt tredan*, 'thou *shalt* tread.'

So in the past tense, Meso-Goth. *thanei skuldedun* (should) *niman*, Eng. 'which they *should* receive.' John 7 : 39.

In very old English, *shall* was the only future auxiliary.

This meaning is expressed in Greek by *μελλω*, and in Latin by the future participle in *urus*.

5. *To be certain or future*, with the implication that no subjective difficulty remains in the mind of the speaker, thus involving the idea of a promise or permission. This meaning is of modern origin, and is properly found only in the second and third persons, and that in the leading proposition; as, 'you *shall* receive your wages,' 'he *shall* receive his wages.'

This last use of *shall* in given cases to express an implied promise or permission, has led to the use of *will* in the corresponding cases, to express mere futurity. This, I apprehend, explains the variegated character of the English future tense, which now is formed thus : I shall love, thou wilt love, he will love; we shall love, ye will love, they will love.

July, 1845.

### On the Auxiliary Verb Will.

*Will*, (Gr. βούλωμαι, Lat. volo, Goth. wiljan, Old Germ. wellan, wollen, willen, Germ. wollen, Dutch willen, Swed. vilja, Dan. ville, Iceland. vilia, Anglo-Sax. willan, wyllan, willian, Scott. wull;)

1. As an independent verb, declined regularly, 'to have a volition,' 'to resolve,' 'to determine,' 'to decide in the mind;' as, *I will to go*. Now antiquated.

2. As an irregular verb, denoting a volition, intention, resolution, promise, and by implication, the futuration of the thing willed; as, *I will go*. So in the first person, as the speaker can exercise volition for himself, and is expected so to do. Also with an emphasis in the second and third persons, Deut. 25 : 7, 9. Luke 15 : 28. John 5 : 40.

3. Denoting simple futuration, whether with or without volition; as, *he* or *it will go*. So in the second and third persons, where the speaker cannot exercise volition for others, and intimates no opposing necessity.

### Different Modes of expressing Future Time in English.

The different modes of expressing futuration in English are the following :

1. By means of the present tense; as, *I go to-morrow*. This is the most ancient form. Comp. Gr. εἶμι, 'I shall go.' (See Sophocles' Gr. Gram. p. 284.) Meso-Goth. *gibid*, (giveth) for Gr. δέωσι, 'shall give,' Luke 1 : 22. (See Grimm, iv. 176.) Anglo-Sax. *beo*, *byst*, *bydh*, 'ero, eris, erit,' (see Grimm, iv. 178.) Germ. *ich komme morgen*, (see Grimm, iv. 177.)

2. By means of the auxiliary verb *shall*, which originally denoted 'to owe' or 'to be obliged.' This for a time was the only future auxiliary.

3. By means of the auxiliary verb *will*, which originally denoted 'to have a volition.' It is used only in the second and third persons. It has only partially taken the place of *shall*. This fact helps much to explain the apparent mystery in the use of *shall* and *will*.

4. The form *I am about to love*.

5. The form *I am going to love*.

The two last forms are immediate futures.

March, 1856.

## ART. LXI.—THE INTERROGATIVE MOOD.

1. THE interrogative mood consists of an imperfect proposition, addressed to another for him to complete or fill up. It proceeds partly from the intellect of the speaker, and partly from his will or rather his desire of knowledge.

2. The interrogative proposition involves or implies an intellective one. Thus 'is he sick?' involves the intellective proposition, 'he is perhaps sick,' as a possible judgment. A desire is expressed at the same time that this possible judgment may be formed into an actual one, as 'he is sick,' or 'he is not sick.'

3. The varieties of the interrogative mood are as follows :

(1.) The simple interrogation, for the purpose of obtaining information ; as, 'is your master at home?' 'how do you do?'

(2.) The rhetorical interrogation, which, when affirmative, seems to call for a negative answer ; and when negative, to call for an affirmative answer ; as, 'shall God pervert judgment?' 'shall not the judge of all the earth do right?'

(3.) The passionate exclamation ; as, 'how glorious is God?' 'how weak and feeble is man?'

4. The different forms of the interrogation are as follows :

(1.) That introduced by interrogative words, as *who*, *what*, *where*, *when*, etc. It is an imperfect proposition addressed to another to be filled up, as to some factor or member ; as,

'Who was the man that dared to do this thing?'

'What is the act? what danger? what intent?'

'Where am I and whence did I come?'

These sentences have a stress on the interrogative word ; an inversion of the subject and verb ; and the falling inflection at the close. All which distinguish the interrogative from the indicative mood.

(2.) The interrogative sentence without the interrogative words. It is a simple inquiry whether the predicate belongs to the subject, and may be answered by yes or no.

'Is he sick?'

'Is God unrighteous?'

These sentences have an inversion of the subject and predicate, and a rising inflection at the close of the sentence.

Sometimes the interrogation is left to be denoted by the intonation only ; as, 'σὺ εἶ ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Ἰουδαίων;' which might



mean 'thou art the king of the Jews.' Mat. 27: 11. So Lat. 'Cernis, ut insultent Rutuli, Turnusque feratur.' Virg. And in English we may say 'you took a ride this morning,' and yet ask a question.

(3.) The interrogation with the disjunctive form; as,  
'Is this a verse of Homer or of Virgil?'

The interrogation, although it is properly a full thought, is often treated as a subordinate proposition. It then forms a species of substantive proposition; as,

'Ask him *who he is*, and *what he wants*.'

See supra, p. 120.

March, 1856.



## ART. LXII.—THE IMPERATIVE MOOD.

RECENT philological works from Germany enable us to give a more exact account of the imperative mood than has hitherto been usual.

Mood is the relation of thought to the powers of mind. Moods, according to Harris, exhibit the diathesis of the soul.

1. The imperative mood, logically considered, is that form of the thought which represents the action implied in the verb, as something willed by the speaker. The peculiar distinction of the imperative mood, consists in its proceeding immediately from the will, and expressing a volition or act of the will, while the indicative mood proceeds from the intellect, and expresses a judgment or act of the intellect. In this its most extensive sense it is sometimes called the *Requisitive* mood, (including the *imperative* mood and the *precativ*e or *optative*.) see Harris, p. 143, 144, and sometimes the *Volitive* mood, see Crosby, p. 243, 244, 417, 418. This mood is related to the other moods somewhat as the vocative case to the other cases, and is often connected with the vocative case.

2. The nature of the volitive or imperative proposition may be illustrated by a comparison of it on the one hand with the intellective proposition implied in it, and on the other hand with the intellective proposition evolved from it.

The imperative proposition involves or implies an intellective. Thus, 'help me' involves the intellective proposition 'thou canst help me,' or 'thou helpest me perhaps,' which expresses a log-

ical possibility. In the imperative proposition this possibility is willed to be actual; that is, the proposition now expresses moral necessity.

On the contrary, an intellective proposition may be evolved from the imperative proposition. Thus, 'thou must help me,' or 'thou art obliged to help me,' is evolved from the imperative proposition 'help me.' In this intellective proposition, moral necessity is directly affirmed or predicated.

3. The imperative mood, being thus an immediate expression of the will, has a strong peculiarly marked intonation. It hardly needs any other exponent of modality.

4. The imperative mood from its nature usually aims at conciseness of expression. It is often denoted by a short or simple form of the verb accompanied with a mutilation of the personal termination, or with an entire omission of pronouns. Thus, Heb. *הַרְגֵהוּ*, 'kill thou,' comp. *הַרְגֵהוּ* 'thou wilt kill;' Gr. *τύττε*, 'beat thou,' comp. *τύττε*, 'thou beatest;' Lat. *fer*, 'bring thou,' comp. *fers*, 'thou bringest;' Germ. *gib*; Eng. *give*.

5. Imperative propositions are liable to bold ellipses more than most others; as, 'hats off;' 'heads out;' 'to arms;' 'forward;' 'to the right.'

6. The varieties of the imperative mood are differently constituted by different grammarians; (1.) sometimes twofold; as, commanding and entreating; or commanding and wishing; (2.) sometimes threefold; as, commanding, exhorting, and entreating; or commanding, entreating, and permitting; (3.) sometimes fourfold; as, commanding, exhorting, entreating or requesting, and permitting; (4.) sometimes fivefold; as, commanding, exhorting, requesting, wishing, and permitting.

But the *permissive*, logically considered, does not come under the volitive or imperative.

7. Many languages, as the Hebrew, Greek, Latin, German, and English, have a special form of the verb, which, aided by the intonation, expresses these various senses of the imperative proposition; as may be illustrated from the Old Testament.

(1.) To express a command; as, Ex. 10: 1, '*go in* unto Pharaoh.' So Lev. 11: 2. Num. 16: 26. 20: 10. Deut. 10: 1.

(2.) To express an exhortation; as, Is. 55: 1, '*come ye* to the waters.' So Ps. 150: 1.

(3.) To express as entreaty; as, Ps. 6: 4, '*return*, O Lord.' So Gen. 12: 13. 27: 7. Deut. 26: 15. 2 Kings 5: 22. Is. 5: 3.

(4.) To express a wish; as, Dan. 2 : 4, 'O king, *live* for ever.' No Gen. 1 : 22.

(5.) To express a permission; as, 2 Sam. 18 : 23, 'and he said unto him, *run*.' So Is. 8 : 9.

In all these examples, the Greek, Latin, and German versions, as well as the English, also use the imperative, thus showing the coincidence of these languages with the Hebrew, in the use of this mood.

8. With regard to these uses of the imperative mood, we may observe,

(1.) The proper imperative, or the expression of command, requires the falling inflection and abruptness of manner peculiar to the command.

(2.) The hortative, or the expression of exhortation or admonition, requires the falling inflection, but without abruptness.

(3.) The precative, or the expression of entreaty, requires the rising inflection, but is more commonly expressed by the potential.

(4.) The optative, or the expression of a wish, has no peculiar inflection. It is more commonly expressed by the potential.

(5.) The permission does not properly belong to the volitive or imperative, and is more commonly expressed by the potential or subjunctive.

These uses of the imperative depend on the context, and on the tone and gesture.

Aug. 1848.

### *The Hebrew Imperative.*

The Hebrew imperative is always positive, the prohibition or negative command being expressed by the future indicative.

The Hebrew imperative is also used to express a strong assurance, whether arising from prophetic or poetic inspiration; as, Gen. 12 : 2, 'and *be* thou a blessing.'

The Hebrew imperative is also employed to express a conditional promise; as, Gen. 42 : 18, 'this do, and *live*,' i. e. 'if ye will do this, ye shall live.' The first imperative may be regarded as an exhortation, on obedience to which the promise depends.

The Hebrew imperative is also used to express a concessive threatening; as, Job 2 : 9, 'bless God, and *die*,' i. e. 'although thou bless God, yet thou shalt die.' The first imperative may

be regarded as a permission, notwithstanding which the threatening is to take place.

But the promise and threatening do not, logically considered, belong to the volitive or imperative.

### *The Greek Imperative.*

The Greek imperative is employed,

(1.) To express a command; as, Mat. 2 : 13, *φύγε εἰς Αἴγυπτον*, 'flee into Egypt.'

(2.) To express an exhortation; as, Luke 1 : 13, *μὴ φοβοῦ*, 'fear not.'

(3.) To express an entreaty; as, Acts 7 : 59, *δέξαι τὸ πνεῦμά μου*, 'receive my spirit.'

(4.) To express a wish; as, Luke 1 : 28, *χαῖρε*, 'hail.'

(5.) To express a permission; as, Mat. 26 : 45, *καθεύδετε τὸ λοιπὸν*, 'sleep on now.'

The Greek has three forms in the imperative, but not for the designation of time; as (1.) the present, to denote a continuous action; (2.) the aorist, to denote a momentary action; and (3.) the preterite, to denote a momentary action which is to continue done.

This distinction between the imperative present and imperative aorist is said by Pott to exist also in Modern Greek.

### *The Latin Imperative.*

The Latin imperative is employed,

(1.) To express a command; as, '*abi*,' depart.

(2.) To express an exhortation; as, '*nosce te ipsum*,' know thyself.

(3.) to express an entreaty; as, '*ferte misero atque innocenti auxilium*,' bring succor to an unhappy and innocent person.

(4.) To express a wish; as, '*vive felix*,' live happy.

(5.) To express a permission; as, '*esto*,' let it be so.

(6.) To express a promise or threatening; as, '*divide et impera*,' divide and conquer.

To most of these forms of expression, there is a corresponding negative form with *ne* and *neu* or *neve*; as,

(1.) '*Ne aude*,' dare not.

(2.) '*Ne time*,' fear not.

(3.) '*Ne me percutē*,' do not strike me.

(4.) '*Ne mori*,' may you not die.

The Latin language has certain periphrastic forms, by which the emphasis is taken from the command or prohibition, and placed on the thing commanded or prohibited; as, '*cura festines*,' see that you hasten; '*cave nimium festines*,' take care lest you hasten too much; '*noli dubitare*,' be unwilling to doubt.

The Latin imperative has two forms, viz. *ama*, and *amato*, the exact relation of which to each other is still contested. The distinction is lost in the languages derived from the Latin.

### *The French Imperative.*

1. The French language is partial to the first person plural of the imperative; as, '*marchons*,' let us go.

2. The third person of the imperative is supplied by the conjunctive.

3. The French has in popular discourse a past imperative; as, '*ayez abandonné la ville*.' Comp. Gr. *τέθραθη*; Lat. *at vos admoniti este*; Eng. *begone*.

4. Many imperatives become interjections.

### *The English Imperative.*

1. The proper imperative mood in English exists both in the active and in the passive voice, but is found only in the second person; as,

Act. sing. *love (thou);* plur. *love (ye or you.)*

Pass. sing. *be (thou) loved;* plur. *be (ye or you) loved.*

2. The pronoun, when emphatic, is added; but it is placed after the verb; as, *love thou; love ye or you*. When unemphatic, it is omitted.

3. The same forms are also expressed by means of the auxiliary verb *do*; as, *do (thou) love*. The stress or emphasis is then on the meaning of the verb, and not on the command.

4. The other persons, if wanted, are expressed by means of the auxiliary verb *let*; as, *let me love, let him love*.

5. The first and third persons may also be expressed by the auxiliary verb *may*; as, *may I go*.

6. These persons are also expressed sometimes by the conjunctive; as, '*God bless thee*;' '*be it so*;' '*the theme we leave*;' '*charge we the foe*;' '*thy kingdom come*.'

7. In *go* and *begone*, we have something like tense in the English imperative.

8. The varieties of the English imperative are, as stated above; (1.) '*depart thou*;' (2.) '*be comforted*;' (3.) '*forgive me*;' (4.) '*farewell*;' (5.) '*go in peace*.'

March, 1856.

#### ART. LXIII.—ON EUPHONY IN PROSAIC COMPOSITION.

ALTHOUGH the logical relations of prose predominate greatly over the euphonic, yet the latter are far from being unimportant. No one can be insensible to the beauty of a well-turned sentence, or fail to appreciate the difference between careless and tasteful writing. A succinct analysis of the principles of euphony may therefore be useful both in a critical and in a practical point of view.

By euphony is meant pleasant or agreeable sound. Hence the laws of euphony respect, first, the quality of the sound; secondly, the accent; and thirdly, the proportion of the logical parts which make up the whole; and each of these, both in the simple and in the compound proposition.

1. As to *the quality of the sound in the simple proposition*, euphony requires a proper distribution of vowels and consonants, and a suitable variety in these two classes of sounds. Hence the faults to be avoided are,

(1.) The hiatus or weakness of sound, which arises from the concurrence of vowel sounds. Of this we have a remarkable instance in Herodotus, (I. 171.) *καὶ ὅχλῳ ἀνέλοι οὐτοὶ εἰς οἱ ποιησάμενοι πρῶτοι*. The different modes of avoiding this fault, are, besides the choice of another word, elision, crasis, and the addition of a paragogic letter.

(2.) Harshness of sound, when too many consonants of difficult enunciation are brought together; as, '*Smith's Thucydides*.' '*Your healths, gentlemen*.'

(3.) Sameness of sound, when the same sound is repeated; as, '*This is a convenient contrivance*.' '*He is an indulgent parent*.' '*She behaves with uniform formality*.' Even a rhyme which is beautiful in its proper place, is offensive in prose.

These faults, when they occur together, are still more objectionable; as 'Overwhelmed with whirlwinds.'

2. As to *accent in a simple proposition*, euphony or melody requires a pleasing variety of accented and unaccented syllables. Hence the faults to be avoided are,

(1.) Heaviness of sound, when too many accented syllables are brought together; as, 'We saw on the great road large droves of cattle.' This often happens from the accumulation of monosyllables.

(2.) Weakness of accent, when too many unaccented syllables occur in connection; as, 'miserable and execrable fellow.' This often arises from the accumulation of long words.

(3.) Monotony, when accented and unaccented syllables occur in a certain order, approaching to poetry.

What is said of accent in modern languages, is true also of quantity in the ancient languages, as the Greek and Latin.

3. As to *proportion in the simple proposition*, no general law is observable. The logical parts of a proposition are the subject and the predicate, and these may be either simple or modified. The subject and predicate may vary indefinitely as to their comparative length; but the modifications, thrown in between the parts of a proposition, must not be too many, nor too protracted.

4. As to *the quality of the sound in the compound proposition*, the same remarks apply, but in a higher degree, as in the simple proposition. Thus a sentence may be faulty from the recurrence of the same vowel sound; as, 'James was needy, feeble, and fearful.'

5. As to *accent in the compound proposition*, the same remarks apply, but in a higher degree, as in the simple proposition.

6. As to *the proportion of parts in the compound proposition*, a nice regard must be had to the different forms of sentences.

The principle of proportion existing in the human mind, which requires a just relation of the parts to the whole, and which exerts an influence on all the forms of language, is especially efficient in compound propositions, since here the parts are more clearly distinguishable from each other. Proportion properly respects local magnitudes, but as language is conceived of as a structure, and is made up of parts, we are accustomed to speak of proportion and symmetry in language.

In a co-ordinate sentence or period, where the parts have only an external connection, little depends on the comparative length of these parts.

In a co-ordinate sentence or period, whose parts have a close internal connection, these parts must bear a fair proportion to each other.

In a subordinate period, in which the subordinate proposition is annexed to the leading proposition, little depends on their comparative length.

In a subordinate period, in which the subordinate proposition is inserted in the main proposition, the former must not bear too great a proportion to the latter.

In a subordinate period, whose subordinate proposition is placed first, there must be fair proportion between the two propositions.

Whether poetic measure or rhythm can exist in prosaic composition, is a question not easy to be decided.

If by rhythm is intended the proportion of the parts of a compound sentence, as it seems to mean in Hebrew poetry, then, as we have seen above, such rhythm or proportion may exist in prose.

But if by rhythm is intended the regular recurrence of the same measure, whether of accented and unaccented, or of long and short syllables, then there can be only an approximation or tendency to such measure in prose. For a rhythmical proposition would become a verse and constitute poetry. A word, as it stands in prose, is not a rhythmical magnitude. Prose may contain the elements of rhythm; just as chaos may contain the elements of a world, and yet not be a part of a world.

May, 1838.

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#### ART. LXIV.—THE FIGURES OF SPEECH.

THE legitimate use of the figures of speech is to represent to the mind of the person addressed objects and actions in the same way in which they are represented in the first formation of language. There everything is represented as physical or striking the external senses, and as present in time and space. Hence a knowledge of the manner in which language has been formed guides us in judging of the propriety or impropriety of a figure of speech.



In the organic process of language, the person addressed is not a passive recipient of thoughts and ideas from the speaker, but by an independent activity of his own he reproduces the thoughts and ideas out of what is presented to him. This reproduction of ideas by spontaneous action is undoubtedly one of the chief sources of pleasure to the human soul. The figures of speech, properly so called, are especially adapted to renew these sources of enjoyment. These figures consist in not using the customary word or expression, which has, as it were, become stereotyped, for a given idea or thought, but some other which the person addressed interprets into the idea or thought intended. These figures either strike the senses more vividly and thus excite the imagination, or exhibit an antithesis of thought, and thus excite the mind or intellect.

The forms of language are almost endlessly diversified. It is no matter of reproach that numerous technical names have been invented by grammarians and rhetoricians to denote the more unusual of these forms. The difficulty is not that too much attention has been paid to the unusual or abnormal forms, but that too little has been paid to the regular and usual. The full understanding of all the forms of words, and of all the forms of language, is the very object of scientific grammar.

The earlier rhetoricians regarded the figures of speech as something superinduced, or as mere ornaments of language, applicable alike to all kinds of writing. But they are now more correctly regarded as natural developments of the human mind in certain states of feeling and fancy.

Many attempts have been made to classify the figures of speech.

Most rhetoricians have attempted to distinguish *tropes* or *figures of words* from other figures, as *figures of thought*. But the distinction of the two classes is not clear, neither does it possess any practical advantage.

Quintilian divides figures into *figures of single words* and *figures of sentences*, but without any practical benefit.

Adelung divides figures in reference to the faculty of mind concerned into figures of *the attention*, of *the fancy*, of *the emotions*, and of *the wit*. But the discrimination of them is difficult.

Dr. Becker in his *Der deutsche Stil*, Frankf. a. m. 1848, divides the figures of speech into the *figures of the logical thought*, which bring the objects under the immediate intuition of the senses; and *figures of the logical form*, which bring the thoughts, under the antithesis, a category of the understanding. In this Dr. Becker has made some advance. But his classification is far from embracing all the figures of speech.

A good classification is still a desideratum.

There is a vagueness in the use of the term *figure of speech*, some forms of language having a greater, and others a less claim to be thus denominated.

We propose to exhibit the figures of speech in groups, beginning with those that have the highest claim to this appellation. We hope thereby to approximate to a scientific classification.

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#### ART. LXV.—TROPES. THE SYNECDOCHE.

STRENGTHEN the mind, clear the intellect, and give it knowledge in the general branches—develop it philologically, never mind by what specific idiom; prepare it for clear and lofty historical views, never mind whether the history of every nation be known; imbue it with a true spirit for natural history, no matter whether the names of all specimens be known, etc.; and you will prepare the student most practically for life.—*Dr. Lieber.*

*Nihil magis acuit mentem, quam troporum justa explicatio.*

*Nothing is better calculated to sharpen the mind, than the accurate explanation of tropes.—I. J. G. Scheller.*

The proper tropes, or figures of words, bring everything under the immediate intuition of the senses; (1.) by reducing the more general to the more special, as in the *synecdoche*; (2.) by reducing the less obvious to the more obvious, as in the *metonymy*; (3.) by reducing the intellectual and moral to the physical, as in the *metaphor*; and (4.) by giving life to inanimate things, as in the *personification*. Dr. Becker includes them under *figures of the logical thought*.

*Synecdoche*, (from Gr. *συνεδοχή*, comprehension,) is a form of language, in which the comprehension of a word is affected, i. e. increased or diminished. It is founded on the relation of a part to the whole, and that whether an universal, integral, or

essential whole. Hence there are three species or six varieties of the synecdoche.

1. In respect to an universal whole;

(1.) Where a species is put for the genus, or an individual for the species; as, *cut-throat* for *assassin*; *lark* or *nightingale* for *singing bird*; *tiger* or *wolf* for *ravenous animal*; *spear* or *lance* for *warlike weapon*; *money* for *wealth*; *bread* for *food*; — *Cresus* for a *rich man*; *Elysium* for a *pleasant region*.

Ps. 44 : 6, 'For I will not trust in my *bow*, neither shall my *sword* save me;' where *bow* and *sword* denote *warlike weapons* generally. So Is. 2 : 4. Joel 3 : 10.

Rev. 2 : 20, 'That thou sufferest the woman *Jezebel*,' where *Jezebel* means *another Jezebel*, or a wicked and corrupt woman.

(2.) Where the genus is put for a species; as, *mortal beings* for *men*; *to appropriate to one's self* for *to steal*; *to talk to a person* for *to reprove him*.

Mark 16 : 15, 'Preach the gospel *to every creature*,' i. e. to every rational creature.

2. In respect to an integral whole;

(1.) Where a subordinate part or member is put for the whole; as, *roof* for *house*; *hearth* or *fireside* for *dwelling*; *steeple* for *church*; *mast* or *sail* for *ship*; *wave* or *waves* for *the sea*; *head* for *cattle*; *hand* for *man*.

Gen. 22 : 17, 'And thy seed shall possess *the gate* (i. e. the city) of his enemies.'

(2.) Where the whole is put for a subordinate part or member; as, *world* for *earth*; *elephant* for *ivory* or *elephant's tooth*.

Rom. 1 : 8, 'Your faith is spoken of throughout *the whole world*,' i. e. the whole earth.

3. In respect to an essential whole;

(1.) Where a constituent part is put for the whole; as, *soul* for *person*.

Gen. 12 : 5, 'And Abram took *the souls* (i. e. the persons) that they had gotten in Haran.'

(2.) Where the whole is put for a constituent part; as *person* for *body*.

John 20 : 13, 'They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid *him*,' i. e. his body.

The proper synecdoche, however, as a figure of rhetoric, is restricted to the cases No. 1. (1.) 2. (1.) 3. (1.) in which the term expressed denotes something more particular than that

for which it is employed, and the thought is thus brought nearer to the intuition of the senses, and strikes the senses more readily and more vividly.

Hence the examples quoted under No. (2.) severally are not synecdochical figures. The use of *elephant* for *ivory* is an example of Roman magniloquence, which strikes us as novel and strange. The use of *world* for *earth* is rather an hyperbole; the use of *to appropriate to one's self* for *to steal* is an euphemism or softened expression; *mortal beings* and *children of earth* are periphrases to make the idea of frailty more prominent.

In order also that the synecdoche may be an appropriate rhetorical figure, it is necessary that the specific or individual term employed for the more general should be prominent to the imagination, and adapted to the subject in hand; as, *bread* for *food*, because of its importance; *waves* for *the sea*, as being the principal source of danger; *walls* for *a citadel*, because first seen; *hearth* or *fireside* for *a dwelling*, because of its associations; *Cresus* for *a rich man*, because he was very rich; *the hand*, *the eye*, *the foot*, for *the person* in cases where these members or organs are specially concerned. Hence the peculiar beauty of the synecdoche consists in marking the part which is most prominent or important. When the terms are inappropriate, the use of them can no longer be regarded as rhetorical figures.

According to the usual explanation, the figure synecdoche contributes to dignity, vivacity, or energy, by the speciality or particularity of representation. See Ward, *System of Oratory*, I. 385. Lord Kames, II. 237. Campbell, *Philos. Rhet.* 376, 378. H. N. Day, *Art of Rhet.* 264.

According to Becker, the synecdoche contributes to the perfection, and therefore to the beauty of the representation, by reducing the general to the special or particular, and thus coming nearer to that intuition of the senses, the exercise of which is one of the original sources of pleasure to the human mind. See Stil, 24, 42, 97.

We place the synecdoche first, because it respects that faculty of the mind by which we form general abstract ideas.

## ART. LXVI.—TROPES. THE METONYMY.

*Metonymy*, (from Gr. *μετωνομία*, *change of the name*;) is a figure of speech by which a word or name of a thing is *exchanged* for that of another thing, on account of some external connection or relation. So far as mere etymology is concerned, this word is synonymous with metaphor; but in the usage of grammarians it is carefully distinguished from it.

Metonymies are very various, and it is somewhat difficult to make a complete or satisfactory classification of them. We arrange them according to the closeness of the ideas which are substituted for each other.

I. The use of the accident, property, quality, or attribute, for the substance, (or, as it is sometimes called, the use of the abstract for the concrete;) as, tears of *joy*, i. e. of the joyous person; respect for *old age*, i. e. for the aged; God is *love*, i. e. perfectly benevolent.

II. The use of the cause for the effect. Of this there are several species.

1. The author for his work; as, I have read *Milton*, i. e. the works of Milton; a *Raphael*, i. e. a production of Raphael.

2. The inventor for the thing invented; as, *Bacchus*, for wine; *Ceres*, for grain; *Mars*, for war; *the Muses*, for letters; *Venus* and *Cupid*, for love; *Vulcan*, for fire. This species of metonymy, although common in the Greek and Latin classics, is not to be imitated in modern languages.

3. The instrument for the thing produced; as, the *English tongue*, for the English speech. By thy *sword* thou shalt live. The power of the *press*.

III. The use of the container for the thing contained; as, a *cup*, for its contents; a *city* or *country*, for its inhabitants.

IV. The use of a person for what is closely connected with him; as, a *king*, for his subjects; a *general*, for his army.

V. The use of the antecedent for the consequent; as, *to bid farewell*, for to depart.

VI. The use of the sign for the thing signified; as, the *scepter*, for royal authority.

VII. The use of parts of the human body for certain powers or affections of the mind; as, the *heart*, for wisdom; the *reins*, for the inward thoughts.

VIII. The place where an article is made for the article itself; as, *Champagne*, for wine of *Champagne*.

IX. The material of which a thing is made for the thing itself; as, *gold* for money; *irons* for fetters.

Many of these metonymies may be inverted. (2.) The effect for the cause; as, *pale*ness, for fear. (4.) The instrument for the agent using it; as, the production of an elegant *pen* or *pencil*, for the person holding the pen or pencil. (5.) The consequent for the antecedent; as, *to fall*, for to be slain.

It is only when the metonymy reduces the less obvious to the more obvious or striking, that it is of any use as a figure of rhetoric.

The metonymy has been a powerful and operative principle in the formation of language. The metonymical changes are so various, that there are few words whose meaning is not occasionally modified by some one of them.

As connected with the *philosophy of mind*, the metonymy, which is founded on the association of ideas, is interesting, as showing how strong, as well as how universal, some of these associations are.

As connected with *logic*, the metonymy has nothing remarkable.

As connected with *rhetoric* or taste, some of the metonymies, as, for example, the use of the abstract for the concrete, are important, and may be used with good effect. The context, however, should always make the meaning clear.

As connected with *elocution*, the metonymy has no peculiar rules.

As connected with *lexicography*, there is the same need of a constant reference to this figure, as to the metaphor.

As connected with *sacred exegesis*, metonymies occasion less difficulty than metaphors. There are, however, not a few passages, whose correct interpretation depends on a right apprehension of this figure.

Metonymies, then, are an important part of language, and have the same claim as metaphors on the attention of the cultivated and refined.

March, 1838.

## ART. LXVII.—TROPES. THE METAPHOR.

THE metaphor is the proof of the unity of the spiritual and physical worlds.—*Jean Richter.*

*Metaphor*, (from Gr. *μεταφορά*, a transferring,) is a figure of speech, by which a word is transferred from the object to which it properly belongs, and applied to another, to which that object has some resemblance or analogy.

The most natural division of metaphors is into four classes:

I. The use of a physical term for an intellectual; as, *the stars of his merit will shine from the night of the grave.*

II. The use of an intellectual term for a physical; as, *the wrath of the sea, the bountiful earth.*

III. The use of a physical term for a physical; as, *the silver moon.*

IV. The use of an intellectual term for an intellectual; as, *love is a tyrant.*

A distinction in metaphors must be made, analogous to that in synecdoches.

The metaphor was originally, and still continues to be, a powerful principle in the formation of language. Language in its origin was adapted to express merely sensible objects and actions. Intellectual objects and actions could be expressed only by a transfer or metaphorical use of the language of sense, a certain analogy or resemblance being perceived by the mind.

As connected with the *philosophy of mind*, the metaphor which is founded on the perception of resemblances, exhibits to great advantage this wonderful faculty of the mind. The power of analysis which is necessary to the discovery of resemblances in objects so remote as those of the intellectual and physical world, and the rapidity with which it is performed even by uneducated minds, is worthy of attentive consideration from the philosopher.

As connected with *logic* or reasoning, the metaphor is of great importance for illustration; but it should always be borne in mind that illustration is not argument.

As connected with *rhetoric* or taste, a judicious use of the metaphor is one of the greatest ornaments of style. The practical rules for its use are found in most of our books of rhetoric.

As connected with *elocution* or delivery, I do not know that the metaphor has any laws of enunciation peculiar to itself.

As connected with *lexicography*, or the tracing of the different meanings of words, there must of course be an almost constant reference to this figure. The genealogy of words cannot be understood without it.

As connected with *sacred exegesis*, a nice sense of the metaphor is a very important requisite for the interpreter, while the want of this tact has been the source of great error. Some of the most difficult problems of Christianity depend entirely upon understanding the nature of this figure; as the return of the Jews; the millennial reign of Christ; in short, all the prophecies and declarations of God in respect to the future, all the imagery in respect to the invisible world, and all the language in respect to the attributes and actions of the Most High.

Metaphors, then, play an important part in language, and are closely connected with several distinct branches of human knowledge. They deserve attention both from the philosopher and from the man of taste, nor can the study of them safely be neglected by any one who lays claim to mental cultivation and refinement.

Feb. 1838.

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#### ART. LXVIII.—TROPES. PROSOPOPŒIA OR PERSONIFICATION.

*Prosopopœia*, (from Gr. *προσωπονοια*, personification,) is a figure of rhetoric in which we represent inanimate objects and abstract ideas as personal agents. The different species are,

1. Personification of the members of the human body; as, Job 29: 11, 'When *the ear* heard me, then it blessed me; and when *the eye* saw me, it gave witness to me.'

Ps. 35: 10, 'All *my bones* shall say, Lord, who is like unto thee?'

Ps. 51: 8, 'That *the bones* which thou hast broken may rejoice.'

Matt. 6: 3, 'Let not *thy left hand* know what thy right hand doeth.'

This species of personification is peculiarly Shemitish or biblical.

2. Personification of animals; as,



Job 12: 7, 'Ask now *the beasts* and they shall teach thee; and *the fowl of the air*, and they shall tell thee.'

3. Personification of things in the vegetable kingdom; as, Hos. 9: 2, 'The *new wine* shall deceive in her.'

Is. 55: 12, 'And all *the trees of the field* shall clap their hands.'

4. Personification of inanimate objects; as,

Gen. 4: 10, 'The voice of *thy brother's blood* crieth unto me from the ground.'

Gen. 4: 11, 'The *earth* hath opened her mouth to receive thy brother's blood from thy hand.'

5. Personification of peoples and countries; as,

Is. 1: 5, 'The whole head is sick, and the whole heart faint.'

6. Personification of attributes and qualities; as,

Rom. 6: 6, 'Our *old man* is crucified with him.'

Ps. 85: 11, 'Righteousness and peace have kissed each other.'

Personification is natural to children and to the first framers of language.

It is a peculiarity of the *tropes*, so called, that if the word is changed, the figure is destroyed.

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#### ART. LXIX.—OTHER FIGURES OF THE LOGICAL THOUGHT.

BESIDES the tropes, so called, there are other *figures of the logical thought*, i. e. figures which affect the tenor or contents of the thought, which deserve attention; viz. the parusia, apostrophe, hypotyposis, periphrasis, epitheton ornans, hyperbole, and euphemism.

##### *The Parusia.*

The *parusia*, (from Gr. *παρουσία*, presence,) is a figure of speech, by which the present tense is used for the past or future.

1. In narratives of past events; as, 'They dismount, they fly forward to the front.'

It is natural for one to represent past actions in which he had a lively interest, as present. This adds animation and impressiveness to the description. This figure is employed in the pathetic, narrative, and also familiar style, with effect, whenever the importance of the incidents described justifies its use.

2. In the prediction of future events; as,  
Is. 46: 1, 'Bel boweth down, Nebo stoopeth.'

In the biblical style of the old and new testament, the past tense is very often used for the prophetic future.

### *The Apostrophe.*

*Apostrophe*, (from Gr. ἀποστροφή, a turning away,) is a turning away from the persons naturally addressed, and addressing other persons or things.

Some of the leading forms of the apostrophe are the following:

1. A direct prayer to God, arising out of the subject in hand; as,

Neh. 6: 9, 'For they all made us afraid, saying, Their hands shall be weakened from the work, that it be not done. Now, therefore, O God, strengthen my hands.' So Neh. 4: 4, 5.

2. A direct address to one's own soul, arising out of the subject discussed; as,

Ps. 42: 5, 'Why art thou cast down, O my soul? and why art thou disquieted in me? Hope thou in God; for I shall yet praise him for the help of his countenance.' So Ps. 42: 11. 43: 5.

3. A direct address to some third person or persons, arising out of the subject discussed; as,

Ps. 2: 10-12, 'Be wise now, therefore, O ye kings; be instructed, ye judges of the earth.'

1 Cor. 7: 16, 'For what knowest thou, O wife, whether thou shalt save thy husband? Or how knowest thou, O man, whether thou shalt save thy wife?'

4. An address to heaven and earth, and to inanimate nature generally, to witness what is done, as it were, in their presence; as,

Deut. 32: 1, 'Give ear, O ye heavens, and I will speak; and hear, O earth, the words of my mouth.'

Is. 1: 2, 'Hear O heavens, and give ear, O earth; for Jehovah speaketh.'

Here a personification is united with the apostrophe.

5. Direct address to the object meant to be described, whether dead, or absent, or an abstract quality; as,

(1.) Address to one dead; as,

2 Sam. 1 : 25, 'How are the mighty fallen in the midst of the battle! O Jonathan, thou wast slain in thy high places.' So 2 Sam. 18 : 33.

(2.) Address to one absent; as,

'And how shall I answer it to you, my brother Quintus, the partner of my misfortunes, who art now absent?'—Cicero for Milo.

(3.) Address to an abstract quality; as,

1 Cor. 15 : 55, 'O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?'

The apostrophe is natural to any one whose feelings or imagination are greatly excited. It is adapted to the pathetic style.

### *The Hypotyposis or Vision.*

*Hypotyposis*, (from Gr. *ὑποτύπωσις*, a portraying to one's self,) is a figure of speech by which we imagine or represent things as immediately present to the bodily senses. It is natural to do this in reference to things in which we have a deep interest. This figure is appropriate to the pathetic style. It is also called *vision*.

There are various forms of this figure.

1. The poetical vision or imagery is found in English and in the classic writers in the first person, and in the present time; as,

'Is this a dagger which I see before me,  
The handle towards my hand? come, let  
Me clutch thee!'—Macbeth.

'I seem to myself to behold this city, the ornament of the earth, and the capital of all nations, suddenly involved in one conflagration. I see before me the slaughtered heaps of citizens, lying unburied in the midst of their ruined country. The furious countenance of Cethegus rises to my view, while with a savage joy he is triumphing in your miseries.'—Cicero.

2. It is found also in the sacred writers in the past time; as,

Ps. 37 : 35, 36, 'I have seen the wicked in great power, and spreading himself like a green bay-tree; yet he passed away, and, lo, he was not: yea, I sought him, but he could not be found.'

Jer. 4 : 23-26, 'I beheld the earth, and, lo, it was without form and void; the heavens, and they had no light. I beheld the mountains, and lo, they trembled, and all the hills moved lightly, etc.'

Hab. 3 : 7, 'I saw the tents of Cushan in affliction; and the curtains of the land of Midian did tremble.'

Luke 10 : 18, 'I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven.'

3. It is found in the sacred writers also in the second person; as,

John 1 : 51, 'Hereafter ye shall see heaven open, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the son of man.'

Mat. 26 : 64, 'Hereafter shall ye see the son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven.'

4. In the sacred writers it is often left unrestricted, as to the person; as,

Ps. 18 : 7-15, 'Then the earth shook and trembled; the foundations also of the hills moved and were shaken, because he was wroth. There went up a smoke out of his nostrils, and fire out of his mouth devoured: coals were kindled by it, etc.'

Hab. 3 : 3-6, 'God came from Teman, and the Holy One from Mount Paran. Selah. His glory covered the heavens, and the earth was full of his praise, etc.'

Mat. 24 : 29-31, 'Immediately after the tribulation of those days shall the sun be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light, etc.'

It ought to be stated, however, that some distinguished critics, as Rev. David N. Lord and others, seem to deny the existence of this figure in the forms No. 2. 3. and 4.

These three figures of the logical thought, last described, agree in this, that what is not present to the mind of the speaker and person addressed, is represented as present.

### *The Periphrasis.*

*Periphrasis*, (from Gr. *περιφρασις*, a circumlocution,) is a figure of speech by which we express an object in a circuitous way; as, *the king of terrors for death*, Job 18 : 14. *Holy One of Israel for Jehovah*, Is. 12 : 6. *Born of women for men*, Mat. 11 : 11. *The first born of death for a most deadly disease*, Job 18 : 13.

### *The Epitheton Ornans.*

*Epitheton Ornans*, or *Adjective of Ornament*; as, *the cold grave*; *the green meadow*; *the living God*; *the Most High God*.

It is evident that in the periphrasis and epitheton ornans the phrase employed is naturally adapted to strike the external senses.

*The Hyperbole.*

The hyperbole is a rhetorical figure which expresses far more or far less than the exact truth. It arises from the surprise occasioned by the first impressions of things, whether uncommonly great or uncommonly small, and expresses, as it were, our momentary convictions concerning them.

As the hyperbole is a deviation from exact truth, many honest minds have felt a reluctance to admit its existence in the sacred volume.

In this figure, however, as in others, we are to regard not so much what is *said*, as what is *intended*.

I propose to notice some of the more remarkable examples thought to be found in the Bible.

Gen. 11 : 4, 'And they said, Go to, let us build a city, and a tower whose top may reach unto heaven.'—Here the phrase *unto heaven* denotes to a very great height. It is also used by the sacred historian, speaking in his own name. See Deut. 9 : 1.

Gen. 13 : 16, 'And I will make thy seed as the dust of the earth : so that if a man can number the dust of the earth, then shall thy seed also be numbered.'—Abraham's posterity, which was to be exceedingly numerous, is here promised to be as the particles of sand or dust of the earth. A clear case of a hyperbolical comparison, and that in language ascribed to the deity.

Gen. 18 : 27, 'Behold now, I have taken upon me to speak unto the Lord, which am but dust and ashes.' That is, something very vile and insignificant.—This is an example of the *meiosis* or extenuation.

Num. 13 : 33, 'And there we saw the giants, the sons of Anak, which come of the giants; and we were in our own sight as grasshoppers, and so we were in their sight.'—This is a hyperbolical comparison, or rather a *meiosis*; but it is merely narrated.

Deut. 32 : 22, 'For a fire is kindled in mine anger, and shall burn unto the lowest hades, and shall consume the earth with her increase, and set on fire the foundations of the mountains.'—Here the lowest hades and the foundations of the mountains denote a very great depth. The context is highly poetical. The language is ascribed to the deity.

2 Sam. 1 : 23, 'They (Saul and Jonathan) were swifter than eagles, they were stronger than lions.'—This is an example of hyperbolical comparison in a highly poetical song.

1 K. 20 : 10, 'The gods do so unto me, and more also, if the dust of Samaria shall suffice for handfuls for all the people that follow me.'—An example of a hyperbolical comparison, but it is merely narrated.

Ps. 107 : 26, 'They (the waves) mount up to the heaven, they go down again to the depths.'—These words occur in a highly poetical connection.

Ps. 139 : 8, 'If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in hades, behold, thou art there.'—The hyperbole is merely in the supposition.

Prov. 27 : 22, 'Though thou shouldest bray a fool in a mortar among wheat with a pestle, yet will not his foolishness depart from him.'—The hyperbole is merely in the supposition.

Dan. 4 : 11, 'The tree grew, and was strong, and the height thereof reached unto heaven, and the sight thereof to the end of all the earth.'—This language occurs in a symbolical vision.

Am. 9 : 2, 'Though they dig into hades, thence shall my hand take them; though they climb up to heaven, thence will I bring them down.'—This is language ascribed to the deity, but the hyperbole is in the supposition. Comp. Obad. verse 4.

Jon. 2 : 2, 'Out of the belly of hades cried I.'—The language of Jonah alluding to his perilous situation in the belly of the fish.

Compare in the New Testament, Mat. 5 : 18, 29. 16 : 26. 18 : 6. 19 : 24. 23 : 24. 24 : 2, 29. Luke 10 : 4, 18. 17 : 6. John 21 : 25. Rom. 9 : 3. Gal. 4 : 15, etc.

It has been justly observed, that the Bible, as a whole, on a fair appreciation of this subject, contains very few hyperboles. This is owing partly to the fact that the tone of composition in Western Asia was not so extravagant as in Eastern Asia, and partly that the sacred writers, from some cause, have not indulged themselves in the use of this figure, so much as their contemporaries.

Dec. 1849.

### *The Euphemism.*

*Euphemism*, (from εὐφημισμός, fair speech,) is a figure of speech, by which a harsh or offensive word is thrust aside and one more delicate or mild is set in its place; as, *to stop payment* for *to become bankrupt*; *to go* for *to depart out of life*, Mat. 26 : 24.

This is the *opposite* of the other figures of the logical thought.

There are other forms of language, such as the *comparison*, *allusion*, *description*, and *example*, which, when employed for embellishment rather than for illustration, may be considered as figures of the logical thought. These we pass over.

ART. LXX.—FIGURES OF THE LOGICAL FORM.

Dr. BECKER has called attention to a class of figures, which he calls *figures of the logical form*, and which, in his view, serve to enhance the logical worth of the ideas or thoughts in the mind of the speaker. This they do by means of an antithesis expressed or implied. Hence they may be called *figures of antithesis*.

The tropes and analogous figures bring the thoughts or ideas under the immediate intuition of the outward senses; but these figures bring them under the antithesis, a category of the understanding.

The logical worth of thoughts or ideas is naturally expressed by the emphasis or rhetorical intonation; but it is also expressed by several figures of speech, as the *antithesis*, *contrast*, *litotes*, *erotesis*, and *irony*.

*Antithesis*, (from Gr. ἀντίθεσις, opposition,) is a figure of speech by which words or ideas are set in opposition to each other in the same sentence or thought; as, '*Excess of ceremony shows want of breeding.*'

2 Cor. 6 : 8 ff. '*By honor and dishonor, by evil report and good report: as deceivers, and yet true; as unknown and yet well known; etc.*'

*Contrast* is a figure by which thoughts are placed in opposition; as, '*the moon has no light of its own; it borrows its light from the sun.*'

Psa. 115 : 1, '*Not unto us, but unto thy name give glory.*'

2 Cor. 4 : 18, '*The things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal.*'

*Litotes*, (from Gr. λιτότης, plainness,) is a mode of expressing something by denying the contrary; as, '*a citizen of no mean city*,' i. e. of an illustrious city.

John 1 : 11, '*His own received him not,*' i. e. rejected him.

*Erotesis*, (from Gr. *ἐρώτης*, interrogation,) is a figure of speech by which a speaker, in the form of an interrogation, boldly asserts the opposite of what is asked; as, 'Creditis avectos hostes?'

Ex. 6 : 12, 'How then shall Pharaoh hear me?'

1 Sam. 19 : 17, 'Why should I kill thee?'

Job 40 : 9, 'Hast thou an arm like God? or canst thou thunder with a voice like him?'

Ps. 113 : 5, 'Who is like unto the Lord our God?'

*Irony*, (from Gr. *εἰρωνεία*, dissimulation,) is a figure by which a speaker sneeringly utters the direct reverse of what he intends shall be understood; as, 'They must esteem learning *very much*, when they see its professors used with so little ceremony.'

Job 12 : 2, 'No doubt but ye are the people, and wisdom shall die with you.'

Here is a bold antithesis between the idea expressed and the idea intended.

#### ART. LXXI.—FIGURES OF REDUPLICATION.

THE repetition of a word or phrase in the same sense, whether simply, as in the *epizeuxis* or *diplasiasmus*, or with an adjunct, as in the *anadiplosis* or *epanastrophe*, or in the resumption of a subject, as in the *epanalepsis*, adds weight to the thought or idea, and increases its logical worth.

*Epizeuxis*, (from Gr. *ἐπιζευξίς*, a joining on,) is a joining on or repetition of the same word or words with emphasis; as, 'Ah, poor, poor swain!'

2 K. 4 : 19, 'My head, my head!'

Ps. 22 : 1, 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?'

Rev. 18 : 2, 'Babylon the great is fallen, is fallen!'

This figure is also called *diplasiasmus*.

*Anadiplosis*, (from Gr. *ἀναδιπλωσις*, a doubling back,) is the doubling or repeating of the words at the end of one sentence or clause at the beginning of the next with an adjunct idea; as, 'Prize wisdom, wisdom is a precious jewel;' 'He retained his virtues amidst all his misfortunes—misfortunes which no prudence could foresee or prevent.'

Ps. 98 : 5, 'Sing unto the Lord with the harp; with the harp and the voice of a psalm.'



Phil. 2: 8, 'He became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross.' So Rom. 9: 30.

This figure tends much to elucidate.

This figure is also called *epanastrophe*, see Andrews and Stoddard's Lat. Gram.

*Epanalepis*, (from Gr. ἐνανάληψις, a taking up again,) is the repetition or resumption of the same word or clause after intervening matter; as in Virg. Georg. II. 4-7.

The understanding of this figure is very important in the interpretation of the scriptures.

#### ART. LXXII.—PHONETIC AND KINDRED FIGURES.

THE return of the same word or phrase at regular intervals, whether at the beginning of successive clauses, as in the *anaphora*, at the end, as in the *epistrophe*, or at the beginning and end, as in the *symploce*, or at the beginning and end of the same clause, as in the *epanadiplosis*, or in the inverted order, as in the *epanodos*, draws attention to the word or clause thus recurring, and adds sensibly to its logical worth.

*Anaphora*, (from Greek ἀναφορά, a reference or bringing back,) is the repetition of a word or words at the beginning of successive clauses; as, 'peace crowns our life, *peace* does our plenty breed.'

Deut. 28: 3, 'Blessed shalt thou be in the city, and *blessed* shalt thou be in the field.'

1 Cor. 1: 20, 'Where is the wise? *where* is the scribe? *where* is the disputer of this world?'

*Epanaphora*, (from Gr. ἐπαναφορά, a recurrence,) has the same meaning.

*Epistrophe*, (from Gr. ἐπιστροφή, a turning about,) is the repetition of a word at the end of successive clauses; as, 'we are born in sorrow, pass our time in sorrow, and our days in sorrow.'

2 Cor. 11: 22, 'Are they Hebrews? *so am I*. Are they Israelites? *so am I*.'

The refrain seems to belong here: Deut. 27: 15 ff. Ps. 115: 9, 10, 11. ~~xxxvi.~~

*Synchysis*, (from Gr. *συνχίζω*, an interweaving,) is the repetition of a word at the beginning, and another at the end of successive clauses; as, '*justice* came down from heaven to view *the earth*. *Justice* climbed back to heaven and left *the earth*.'

Ps. 136: 1, 2, 3. 118: 2, 3, 4. 1 Cor. 12: 4, 5, 6. 14: 15. 2 Cor. 9: 6.

*Epanadiplosis*, (from Gr. *ἐπαναδιπλώω*, a doubling back or repetition,) is the use of the same word both at the beginning and at the end of a sentence; as, '*Sins* stain thy beauteous soul; forsake thy *sins*.'

Is. 5: 20, 'Wo unto them that call *evil* good, and good *evil*; that put *darkness* for *light*, and *light* for *darkness*.' So Ecc. 1: 2.

Phil. 4: 4, '*Rejoice* in the Lord always: and again, I say, *rejoice*.' So Rom. 8: 24. Gal. 2: 16.

So in longer portions, as Ps. viii. ciii.

This figure is called *epanalepsis* by Glass, Stirling, Fowler, and Worcester.

*Epanodos*, (from Gr. *ἐπανόδος*, a return,) is the return of the same words in an inverted order; as, 'Whether the worst? the child accurst, or else the cruel mother? the mother worst, the child accurst; as bad the one as t'other.'

The recurrence of the same word with a different inflection, as in the *polyptoton*, or of different words of the same origin, as in the *paregmenon*, draws attention to the word thus recurring, and adds somewhat to its logical worth.

*Polyptoton*, (from Gr. *πολύπτωτον*, having many cases,) is the recurrence of the same word in a different case or termination; as, *πῶρος πῶρος πῶρον φέρε*, Soph.

Rom. 4: 18, 'Who *against hope* believed in *hope*.' Here is at the same time an *antanaclasis* and *oxymoron*.

2 Cor. 3: 18, 'We are changed into the same image *from glory to glory*.'

This figure belongs more especially to inflected languages, as the Latin and Greek.

*Paregmenon*, (from Gr. *παρεγμένον*, derived,) is the recurrence of another word derived from the same root; as, Gr. *μήτηρ ἐπὶ δέσμητες*, *my mother yet no mother*; 'ut tum ad senem senex de senectute, sic hoc libro ad amicum amicissimus de amicitia scripsi.'

Eph. 5: 20, 'Giving thanks *always* for *all* things.'

## ART. LXXIII.—THE PARONOMASIA.

*Paronomasia*, (from Gr. *παρονομασία*.) whether it literally denotes 'a change of expression,' or 'a similar expression,' is in usage a rhetorical figure of speech, which consists in the designed use of words, similar in sound, but different in meaning, in the same connection, so as to produce a pleasant effect upon the ear.

The simple paronomasia has reference only to the similarity of sound. When there is also an allusion to the thought or sentiment, the figure is then called a *play upon words*. We are now concerned only with the simple paronomasia.

The resemblance of sound may be either in the beginning of the words, called *alliteration*, as '*weeping and wailing*;' or in the end of the words, called *assonance*, (analogous to rhyme,) as 'the *Cherethites* and the *Pelethites*.'

The related words are sometimes in close union with each other, as in the examples just given; and sometimes farther removed from each other, as 'if ye have no *belief*, ye shall have no *relief*.'

The words related in sound may be either radically distinct, as in the examples given above; or radically connected, as in the example given below from 2 Cor. 9: 8.

The word thus repeated is usually employed to express a different idea; but sometimes it merely denotes intensity, as, 'the *stay* and the *staff*.'

In order to exhibit this resemblance in sound, obsolescent or unusual words or forms are sometimes employed; as, 'with *might* and *main*.' Such cases appear in the original Hebrew, Ps. 32: 1. Ezek. 7: 11. 43: 11. Mic. 1: 8, and in the original Greek, Gal. 5: 7, 8; but of course they disappear in the translation.

The paronomasia must be designed, or at least felt by the writer. A casual or accidental resemblance of sound is not sufficient to constitute this figure.

The paronomasia is a favorite figure with oriental writers, such as the Hebrews, Arabs, Turks, etc. It is found among most nations in the early stages of intellectual culture, and also with children and people in common life generally. But with

us it is offensive, if far-fetched, or used with ostentation, or too often repeated.

That this figure is of frequent occurrence in the original scriptures both of the old and new testament ought not to surprise us. If we consider that many of them have a degree of propriety and beauty, adding vivacity to the expression or emphasis to the thought, and if we make sufficient allowance for the taste of the age, we shall find nothing reprehensible in their use.

This figure for the most part disappears in an intelligible translation. If the translation be perfectly literal, the meaning is obscured; and if the meaning be made clear, then the paronomasia is destroyed. A paronomasia, however, may often be imitated happily in another language; as, *amicus certus in re incerta cernitur*, 'a friend in need is a friend indeed.'

The following are examples of paronomasia in the common English version.

Ps. 121: 4, 'Behold, he that keepeth Israel shall neither *slumber* nor *sleep*.' Vulg. '*non dormitabit, neque dormiet*.' There is no paronomasia in the original Hebrew. So Is. 5: 27.

Luke 15: 27, 'Because he hath received him *safe and sound*.' The phrase *safe and sound*, formed on the principle of alliteration, in imitation of the Latin *salvus sanus*, was introduced by Tyndale and continued in Cranmer's, and the Geneva version. There is nothing in the original Greek, nor in the Latin Vulgate, to authorize the alliteration, or even the compound expression.

2 Sam. 8: 18, 'And Benaiah the son of Jehoiada was over the *Cherethites* and the *Pelethites*.' So in the Septuagint and Vulgate. These words in the original Hebrew are appellatives, denoting *executioners* and *runners*. The paronomasia has been preserved in the specified translations by taking them as proper names. So in other places where these words occur together.

Is. 3: 1, 'The Lord, the Lord of hosts, doth take away from Jerusalem, and from Judah, the *stay* and the *staff*, the whole *stay* of bread, and the whole *stay* of water.' The paronomasia here is a happy imitation of the original Hebrew. An imitation is also attempted in the Septuagint.

Jer. 9: 10, 'For the mountains will I take up a *weeping* and *wailing*, and for the habitations of the wilderness a lamentation.' A fair imitation of the original Hebrew.

2 Cor. 9: 8, 'And God is able to make all grace abound toward you; that ye, *always* having *all-sufficiency* in *all* things, may abound to every good work.' Here the paronomasia, which consists in bringing together words which are radically connected, is readily exhibited in the translation.

2 Cor. 10: 12, 'But they, measuring *themselves* by *themselves*, and comparing *themselves* among *themselves*, are not wise.' The same remark will apply here, as in the last example.

But in the vast majority of instances the paronomasia of the original text is entirely lost in the translation. The following are examples.

Is. 7: 9, 'If ye will not believe, surely ye shall not be established.' The figure is altogether lost in the Greek Septuagint, the Latin Vulgate, and in the common English version. Luther has imitated it: '*gläubet* ihr nicht, so *bleibet* ihr nicht.' So it might be imitated in English: 'if ye have no *belief*, ye shall have no *relief*.' Comp. 2 Chr. 20: 20, where the Septuagint has imitated the paronomasia.

Heb. 13: 2, 'Be not forgetful to entertain strangers; for thereby some have entertained angels unawares.' The paronomasia might have been preserved thus: '*neglect* not to entertain strangers; for thereby you may *neglect* to entertain angels.'

Gen. 1: 2, 'The earth was *without form* and *void*.'

Gen. 4: 12, 'A *fugitive* and a *vagabond* shalt thou be in the earth.'

Gen. 18: 27, 'Which am but *dust* and *ashes*.'

Mat. 24: 7, 'And there shall be *famines* and *pestilences*.'

Acts 17: 25, 'Seeing he giveth to all *life* and *breath*, and all things.'

Heb. 5: 8, 'Though he were a son, yet *learned* he obedience by the things which he *suffered*.'

The words italicised sound alike in Hebrew or Greek. But the resemblance is not easily imitated in English.

Aug. 1845.

#### ART. LXXIV.—THE ANTANACLASIS.

*Antanacclasis*, (from Gr. ἀντανάκλασις, a reverberation,) is in usage a rhetorical figure of speech, which consists in the designed use of one and the same word in two different senses in

the same connection, so as to produce a pleasant effect upon the mind. The Latin term is *contraria significatio*, and the English a *play upon words*.

Sometimes the two words are not exactly in the same sentence; but one of them occurs in a response. See No. 7 below.

The word usually occurs with either meaning; but sometimes one meaning of the word is merely alluded to, see No. 8 below.

The words are usually of the same origin; but sometimes they are radically distinct, see No. 9 below.

If the word have the two meanings in the same clause without being repeated, it is then a case of the *diologia* or *double meaning*, and does not belong here.

The various forms of the antanaclasis depend on the relation in which the two meanings stand to each other.

1. Sometimes a *vox media* is used in an indifferent sense, and then again in a good or a bad sense; as,

1 Cor. 4: 3, 'But with me it is a very small thing that I *should be judged* of you, or of man's judgment, yea, I *judge* not mine own self.' Here the verb *to judge* in its first occurrence is taken as a *vox media* in an indifferent sense, but in its second occurrence in a good sense, as if 'to judge favorably' or 'to appreciate.'

2. Sometimes a word is used literally and then again metaphorically; as, 'Graecia *capta* ferum victorem *cepit*.'

1 Tim. 6: 5, 6, 'Supposing that *gain* is godliness: from such withdraw thyself. But godliness with contentment is great *gain*.' Here *gain* in its first occurrence is pecuniary profit, in its second occurrence it is taken in a higher spiritual sense.

Mat. 8: 22, 'Let the *dead* bury their *dead*;' i. e. let the spiritually dead bury their physically dead.

Sometimes by an ellipsis or contraction, the word thus used is expressed but once; as,

Joel 2: 13, 'Rend your hearts, and not your garments.'

3. Sometimes a word is used both strictly and metonymically; as,

2 Cor. 5: 21, 'For he hath made him to be *sin* for us, who knew no *sin*.' Here *sin* in its first occurrence means a *sinner*.

Gal. 3: 13, 'Christ has redeemed us from the *curses* of the law, being made a *curse* (i. e. one accursed) for us.'

4. Sometimes a word is used both with and without emphasis; as, 'Tum vivimus, vivamus.' 'Talis erat mater, si modo mater erat.'

1 Sam. 1: 24, 'And the child was a child,' i. e. of tender years.

Rom. 8: 24, 'Hope that is seen is not hope.'

Gal. 4: 9, 'But now, after that ye have known God, or rather are known of God.' Here *to be known* is *to be known and approved*.

This form of the antanaclasis is called *ploce*.

5. Sometimes a proper name is used significantly; as, Rom. 9: 6, 'For they are not all *Israel*, which are of *Israel*.'

This form of the antanaclasis is also called *ploce*.

6. Sometimes the two meanings are collateral; as,

Tit. 1: 15, 'Unto the *pure* all things are *pure*;' i. e. unto the *pure* (in a moral sense) all things are *pure* (in a ceremonial sense).

Rom. 5: 17, 'For if by one man's offence death *reigned* by one; much more they which receive abundance of grace, and of the gift of righteousness, shall *reign* in life by one, Jesus Christ.' Here the word *reign* by an antanaclasis is taken in two different senses; viz. (1.) to rule or prevail; and (2.) to reign or be happy.

1 Cor. 3: 17, 'If any man *defile* the temple of God, him shall God *destroy*.' Here the antanaclasis is lost in English.

2 Cor. 6: 12, 'Ye are not *straitened* in us, but ye are *straitened* in your own bowels.'

7. Sometimes the second occurrence is in a response; as,

Acts 23: 2, 3, 'And the high priest Ananias commanded them that stood by him *to smite* him on the mouth. Then said Paul unto them, God shall *smite* thee, thou whited wall.'

This is called *antepidosis*.

8. Sometimes a word or phrase is used in one sense, but with allusion to the same word or phrase in the mind in another sense; as,

Is. 8: 10, 'Speak the word, and it shall not stand: for *God is with us*.' Here *God is with us* refers to the proper name *Immanuel*.

9. Sometimes the two meanings are radically distinct; as, 'Amari jucundum, si modo curetur ne quid insit amari.'

Gal. 4: 24, 25, 'Which is *Agar*. For this *Agar* is Mount Sinai in Arabia.'

This species is called in Latin *traductio*.

The paronomasia and antanacsis have the effect of emphasis or intonation, in enhancing the logical worth of the word or thought.

#### ART. LXXV.—FIGURES OF FEELING.

THE figures of passion or feeling are *the elliptical sentence, the ecphronesis or exclamation, the wish, oath, adjuration, and imprecation.*

These forms of language, although they do not express an antithesis, are yet figures of the logical form. As natural expressions of strong feeling, they operate on the sympathy of the hearer, and enhance the logical worth of the sentiments conveyed.

*The elliptical proposition* arising from strong feeling; as, 1 K. 12: 16, 'To your tents, O Israel.'

Acts 22: 22, 'Away with such a fellow from the earth.'

*Ecphronesis*, (from Gr. *ἐκφώνησις*, exclamation,) is a passionate exclamation or crying out. It has three forms:

(1.) It merely names the object of the feeling or affection; as, 'Oh, dismal night!' 'Oh, sad discovery!' Rom. 11: 33, 'O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God!'

(2.) It takes the form of an elliptical interrogation; as, 'Oh, what fearful preparation!'

(3.) It has the form of a full interrogative sentence; as, Ps. 84: 1, 'How amiable are they tabernacles, O Lord of hosts!'

The feelings expressed by the ecphronesis are very various, as joy, sadness, surprise, astonishment, indignation, reverence.

*The wish* expresses a longing after a desired object; as, 'O that I had never left my home!' Ps. 14: 7, 'Oh that the salvation of Israel were come out of Zion!' Ps. 4: 6, 'Who will show us any good?'

This figure is usually preceded in English by *O that*.



*The oath* is introduced by the formula of swearing; as, Jer. 38: 16, 'As the Lord liveth, that made us this soul, I will not put thee to death.'

*The adjuration* is a solemn charging another on oath; as, 1 Sam. 14: 24, 'For Saul had adjured the people, saying, Cursed be the man that eateth any food until evening.'

*The imprecation* is an invocation of evil; as, Jer. 17: 5, 'Cursed be the man that trusteth in man.'

These figures for the most part have the pathetic intonation, and are often marked with the exclamation point.

These figures are properly used, only when the importance of the subject corresponds to the strength of feeling expressed.

#### ART. LXXVI.—RHETORICAL DEVICES.

THERE are several forms of language which appear like rhetorical artifices or devices (understanding these terms in a good sense;) viz. *anacoenosis*, *aporia* or *diaporesis*, *aposiopesis*, *epanorthosis*, and *paralipsis*.

*Anacoenosis*, (from Gr. ἀνακοινωνία, consultation,) is a figure of rhetoric by which a speaker appeals to his opponents for their opinion on the point in debate, as having a common interest in the right decision of the case; as, 'Were it your case, what would you do?'

Is. 5: 3, 4, 'And now, O inhabitants of Jerusalem, and men of Judah, judge, I pray you, betwixt me and my vineyard. What could, etc.'

Acts 4: 19, 'Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye.'

The Latin term is *communicatio*. This figure argues confidence and fairness in the speaker.

*Aporia*, (from Gr. ἀπορία, a doubting or being at a loss,) is a figure of rhetoric, in which the speaker professes to be at a loss what course to pursue; as, 'What shall I do? must I be asked, or must I ask? Then what shall I ask?'

Luke 16: 3, 'What shall I do, for my lord taketh from me the stewardship? I cannot dig; to beg I am ashamed.'

Called also *diaporesis*. The Latin term is *addubitatio*.

*Apopsiopsis*, (from Gr. ἀποσιώησις, a becoming silent,) is a figure of speech in which the speaker breaks off suddenly, as if unwilling or unable to state what was in his mind; as, 'Whom I—but it is better to compose the swelling waves.'

Ps. 6: 3, 'But thou, O Lord, how long?'

Luke 19: 42, 'If thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace! but now they are hid from thine eyes.'

The Latin term is *reticentia*.

*Epanorthosis*, (from Gr. ἐπανόρθωσις, a correcting or setting right,) is the recalling of a word in order to place a stronger or more significant one in its place; as, 'Most *brave*! Brave, said I! most *heroic* act!'

Prov. 6: 16, 'These *six* things doth the Lord hate; yea, *seven* are an abomination unto him.'

John 16: 32, 'Ye shall leave me *alone*; and yet I am *not alone*, because the Father is with me.'

The Latin term is *correctio*. By this figure the attention of the auditor is roused, and a stronger impression is produced in his mind in regard to what is substituted.

*Paralipsis*, (from Gr. παράλειψις, omission,) is a figure of rhetoric by which a speaker pretends to omit what at the same time he mentions in reality; as, 'I do not speak of my adversary's scandalous venality and rapacity; I take no notice of his brutal conduct; I do not speak of his treachery and malice.'

Philem. 19, 'Albeit, I do not say to thee how thou owest unto me even thine own self besides.'

The Latin term is *omissio*.

## ART. LXXVII.—FIGURES OF ARGUMENTATION.

THERE are other forms of language which may be called *figures of argumentation*, (Lat. *figuræ ad probationem*.) These respect reasoning, a higher faculty of the mind.

The natural form of reasoning is the *inference* or *conclusion*; as, Ps. 18: 48, 49, 'Thou hast delivered me from the violent man. Therefore will I give thanks unto thee.'

The converse of this is called *etiology*, (from Gr. *αιτιολογια*, a giving of the reason;) as, Rom. 3: 20, 'By the deeds of the law shall no flesh be justified in his sight: for by the law is the knowledge of sin.'

But these forms, being the ordinary ones, are not properly figures.

Some of the figures of argumentation are the following:

*Antistrophe*, (from Gr. *αντιστροφη*, a turning back,) is a figure of rhetoric by which we turn the adversary's plea against him; as, 'Had I killed him, as you report, I had not staid to bury him.'

Mat. 12: 27, 'And if I by Beelzebub cast out devils, by whom do your children cast them out?'

The Latin term is *inversio*; the English is *retort*.

*Prolepsis*, (from Gr. *προληψις*, an anticipation,) is a figure of rhetoric by which an objection is anticipated and answered; as, Mat. 3: 9, 'Think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father: for, etc.'

Is. 49: 14, 15, 'But Zion said, The Lord hath forsaken me, and my Lord hath forgotten me. Can a woman, etc.'

Rom. 6: 15, 'What then? shall we sin, because we are not under the law, but under grace? God forbid.'

Also called *procatalepsis*. The Latin term is *occupatio*.

*Epitrope*, (from Gr. *επιτροπη*, permission,) is a figure of rhetoric by which a permission, either seriously or ironically, is granted to an opponent, to do what he proposes to do; as, Rev. 22: 11, 'He that is unjust, let him be unjust still.'

Judg. 10: 14, 'Go and cry unto the gods which ye have chosen; let them deliver you in the time of your tribulation.'

John 13: 27, 'That thou doest, do quickly.'

The Latin term is *permissio*.

But this is rather a figure of *conviction* than of *argumentation*.

*Synchoresis*, (from Gr. *συγχωρησις*, concession,) is a figure of rhetoric by which we concede some point that our opponent wants, and still reason against him; as, 'I admit all this to be true, but what is it to the purpose?'

James 2: 19, 'Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well: the devils also believe and tremble.'

The Latin term is *concessio*.

## ART. LXXVIII.—ON ENGLISH IDIOMS.

THE New York Baptist Advocate, in order to give its readers "an idea of the highly figurative character of the Grebo language," spoken near Cape Palmas, extracts from Rev. Mr. Wilson's *Grammatical Analysis of the Grebo language*, among other examples, the two following :

English.	Grebo.	Translation.
He is drunk,	nah ni na,	rum works him.
He is seasick,	idu ni na,	the sea works him.

Now it requires but little reflection to see, that it is the English language which is peculiar or idiomatic in these phrases, and that the Grebo language, instead of being highly figurative here, has adopted the most simple and natural expression : *rum works or affects him ; the sea works or affects him.*

An English traveller, according to the New England Puritan of Jan. 5, 1844, represents the famous Abbé Sicard as saying, in a public lecture, at the Institution of the Deaf and Dumb, "that his pupils, as they began to learn the means of conveying their thoughts by writing, were constantly guilty of *Anglicisms* ; that it was difficult to make them lay aside idioms purely English, and more so to teach them those which are peculiar to the French or any other language."

It is obvious that a teacher of the deaf and dumb should divest himself, as far as may be, of the peculiar idiom of his own language, whether English or French, and employ simple, natural, and general phraseology. But it is hardly credible that a French *sourd-muet* should adopt of himself an *Anglicism* properly so called.

In every language there are found phrases or assemblages of words, which in use have a different meaning from what would arise from combining the sense of the simple words. These phrases, when confined to a single language, or to a few languages, are called *idioms*. Habit renders us insensible to the idioms of a vernacular language ; but those of a foreign language strike us at once.

The authors of the common English version of the Bible have sometimes employed idiomatic English. Thus

Eph. 5: 18, 'And be not *drunk with wine*, wherein is *encom*.' Other languages speak of *wine* being drunk, but not of *men* being drunk. The phrase, however, is ancient and good English, having descended to our translators from Wiclif; although the thing may be bad for Englishmen and Americans.

Mat. 27: 44, 'The thieves also *cast the same in his teeth*.' There is no allusion either to the teeth or face in the original. This phrase, however, had descended from Tyndale, and is even now very expressive.

Mat. 20: 11, 'They murmured against the *good man of the house*.' There is no allusion to a good or bad man in the original. This phrase, however, had descended from Tyndale. It seems to have originated when good householders had the preponderancy, but has gone out of use in these degenerate times.

Mat. 20: 31, 'Because they should *hold their peace*.' There is no allusion either to peace or war in the original. This phrase had descended from Tyndale.

Mat. 9: 24, 'And they *laughed him to scorn*.' This phrase, which is now obsolete, had descended from Tyndale.

Mat. 21: 46, 'They sought to *lay hands on him*.' There is no mention of hands in the original. This phrase had descended from Tyndale.

Luke 15: 32, 'It was meet that we should *make merry*.' This phrase had descended from Tyndale. Compare Ecc. 10: 19, where these words are used in their natural sense.

In teaching the English language, the analysis of English idioms ought to be an object of special attention.

Jan. 1844.

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#### ART. LXXIX.—ON SYNONYMS.

*Synonymic*, or the explanation of synonyms, is an important part of grammar. Words exactly identical are very uncommon in language, but *synonyms*, so called, are very numerous.

Synonyms arise in different ways.

As a language becomes more cultivated, and the ideas to be expressed thereby become more developed, the words employed to express them approach nearer to each other in signification. Hence they are easily confounded with each other by the un-

learned, and synonymic, or instruction concerning synonyms, is necessary to prevent their misuse. See *infra* Nos. 1-9. In these cases we must look to the etymology of the word, and examine the force of each root as well as of each prefix and suffix.

Different words, originally of the same import, arising from the mingling of different dialects, as in English of the Anglo-Saxon or Teutonic and the Norman-French or Latin, seldom remain exactly synonymous, but gradually acquire different shades of meaning. See *infra* Nos. 10-13. In these cases we must look not only to the etymology, but also to the circumstances under which these synonymous terms were introduced, especially to the relation of the Norman-French and Anglo-Saxon races to each other.

The same identical word, that is, the same root with the same prefix or suffix, or other modification, sometimes acquires two forms, to which, in the course of time, different meanings are attached. See *infra* Nos. 14-17. Many of these distinctions, though apparently arbitrary, are capable of an historical explanation.

Synonymic distinctions, however, should not be carried too far in any language. When made on arbitrary principles, they prove injurious. They obscure the perception of the radical meaning of words, and encumber the speech with many trifling and artificial distinctions. This excess, however, is not natural to any language. It usually arises from the too artificial cultivation of a people or of a community. It seldom exists except in a mixed language, or where the synonymous term is borrowed from a foreign tongue.

It is the business of synonymic merely to notice the distinctions actually existing, not to create them, or to anticipate their origin.

Synonymic should be based as much as possible on etymology. The different meanings of the words should be illustrated by their origin. Distinctions built on mere usage without reference to etymology, often fail to satisfy, and are more or less uncertain.

We may explain the four kindred terms, *wave*, *billow*, *surge*, and *breaker*, thus:

*Wave*, a stem-noun from *wave*, 'to undulate,' means 'an undulation,' generally.

*Billow*, a stem-noun from *bulge*, 'to swell out,' means, 'a large swelling wave.'

*Surge*, a stem-noun from Lat. *surgo*, 'to rise or swell,' means much the same as *billow*.

*Breaker*, a noun of the agent from *break*, means 'a wave which breaks violently against any opposing object.'

So the kindred terms, *flag*, *ensign*, *banner*, *streamer*, and *pennant* or *pennon*.

*Flag*, from root of verb *flicker*, 'to flutter,' used as the generic term.

*Ensign*, from Lat. *insigne*, a flag used for distinction.

*Banner*, from Fr. *bannière*, a square flag.

*Streamer*, a flag floating in the wind, a poetic word.

*Pennant* or *pennon*, from Lat. *pannus*, a small flag.

Synonyms are so numerous and variegated in English, that some mode of classifying them seems desirable. I am not aware, however, that this has ever yet been done. The following attempt at arranging them is to be regarded merely as an approximation to what is wanted.

Synonymous words in English may be :

1. Words having the same root or ground-form, but a different prefix ; as, *assent*, scil. to a statement, and *consent*, scil. to a proposal ; *maintain*, scil. what we have in hand, and *sustain*, scil. what is laid upon us.

2. Words having the same root or ground-form, but a different suffix ; as, *manly*, 'like a man,' spoken of a youth, and *manful*, spoken of a man ; *peaceable*, 'inclined or disposed to peace,' and *peaceful*, 'quiet,' 'undisturbed.'

3. Stem-words radically distinct ; as, *strike*, 'to hit with a quick blow,' and *beat*, 'to strike repeatedly ;' *to do*, scil. an action, and *to make*, 'to bring something into existence.'

4. Words from a different root or ground-form, but having the same prefix ; as, *bemoan*, 'to express grief in moans,' and *bewail*, 'to express sorrow in lamentations ;' *transparent*, 'permitting objects to be seen through,' and *translucent*, 'merely transmitting light.'

5. Words from a different root or ground-form, but having the same suffix ; as, *fracture*, 'the breaking of a hard substance,' and *rupture*, 'the breaking of a soft substance ;' *fearful*, 'impressing fear,' and *dreadful*, 'impressing great fear.'

6. Words from a different root or ground-form, but having the same prefix and suffix; as, *benevolence*, 'a well wishing,' and *beneficence*, 'a well doing;' *desolation*, 'a reducing to solitude,' and *devastation*, 'a laying waste.'

7. Words related to each other as simple and compound; as, *cede*, scil. by treaty, and *concede*, scil. from discretion or courtesy.

8. Words related to each other as primitive and derivative; as, *temper*, and *temperament*, 'constitutional temper.'

9. Derivative words, entirely distinct as to their root and form, which have accidentally approached to each other in signification; as, *acquiescence* and *submission*; *aversion* and *antipathy*. This class is very numerous.

10. Compound verbs from corresponding roots in Teutonic and Latin or Greek; as, *foretell*, a general term, *predict* and *prophecy*, in higher ecclesiastical senses; *forgive*, in a general sense, and *pardon*, in a judicial and formal sense.

11. Derivative adjectives from corresponding nouns in Teutonic and Latin; as, *daily*, in colloquial use, and *diurnal*, used by astronomers; *starry*, 'consisting of stars,' and *stellar*, 'relating to a star;' *fatherly*, 'like a father,' and *paternal*, 'derived from a father.'

12. Derivative substantives from corresponding adjectives in Teutonic and Latin; as, *fullness*, in a more abstract, and *plenty*, in a more concrete sense.

13. Words severally of Teutonic and Latin origin; as, *overcome*, 'to subdue,' and *conquer*, 'to gain by force;' *shepherd*, in a general sense, and *pastor*, in a special metaphorical sense; *nearness*, in a more abstract, and *vicinity*, in a more concrete sense.

14. Stem-words, with slight difference of form; as, *tone*, 'a sound,' and *ton*, with French pronunciation and signification; *corpee*, 'a dead body,' and *corps*, with French pronunciation and signification; *tenth*, in a general sense, and *tithe*, in a special sense.

15. Words differing merely in the form of the prefix; as, *surface*, in the popular sense, and *superficies*, in the mathematical acceptation; *essay*, in a general sense, and *assay*, confined to experiments in metallurgy.

16. Words differing merely in the form of the suffix; as, *humani*, 'belonging to man,' and *humane*, 'kind;' *travel*, 'to journey,' and *travail*, 'to be in labor;' *ingenious*, 'possessing genius,' and *ingenuous*, 'candid.'



17. Derivative words in a more full and perfect form and in a shorter or even mutilated form; as, *sire*, 'a father,' and *sir*, a term of address; *happily*, 'in a happy manner,' and *haply*, 'by chance.'

Other synonyms arise from the combination of these differences.

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#### ART. LXXX.—ON ENGLISH PUNCTUATION.

I PROPOSE to notice some important principles of English punctuation.

1. The members of a compound sentence in the co-ordinate relation, as they both express full thoughts of the speaker at the time of speaking, are separated by a longer pause than the members of a compound sentence in the subordinate relation, where the subordinate proposition is only an idea or notion in the form of a proposition. This is best illustrated by giving the same compound sentence in two different forms.

'Justice shall be done you; do not doubt.' 'Do not doubt, that justice shall be done you.'

2. In co-ordinate compound sentences, a longer pause is required between members standing in the causal or adversative relation, than between members in the merely copulative or disjunctive relation.

'God is to be praised; for he is good.' 'All the rivers run into the sea; yet the sea is not full.' 'One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh.' 'It is so, or it is not so.'

3. In co-ordinate compound sentences, a longer pause is required when the conjunction is omitted, than when it is expressed.

'A faithful friend is a great treasure; he is not to be bought with money.' 'A faithful friend is a great treasure, and he is not to be bought with money.'

4. There is a regular gradation in the value of the pauses, which is best illustrated by examples.

'When God had made all the beasts of the field, and all the fowls of the air; he brought them to Adam, to see what he

would call them: for whatever Adam called every living creature, that was its name.'

'As we perceive the shadow to have moved along the dial, but did not perceive it moving; and it appears that the grass has grown, though nobody ever saw it grow: so the advances we make in knowledge, as they consist of such insensible steps, are only perceivable by the distance.'

It may also be observed here, that the pauses are not intended merely for pausing or taking breath, but in connection with the intonations, (the rising and falling inflections, the suspension pause, the cadence, etc.,) serve to show the unity of the sentence as a whole, and the logical worth and relations of the several parts. They have therefore a higher value and importance, than is generally supposed.

July, 1850.

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#### ART. LXXXI.—THE TRUTHFULNESS OF LANGUAGE DEFENDED.

"WHAT is false in fact may be correct in grammar."—*S. Kirkham's English Grammar*. New York: 1830. p. 45.

This proposition appears to imply that in *certain approved forms of language we affirm what is false*. There is also a floating-idea in the community, that in many forms of speech the mind vacillates between the literal meaning which is false, and the metaphorical which is true; or what is nearly the same, that the mind in some of these cases conveys and affirms a meaning which is false, but which is corrected only by subsequent reflection.

Such views I regard as degrading to the true dignity and worth of language, as injurious in philosophy, and as hazardous in religion and morals.

Those who hold such views overlook or neglect certain important principles in language, as will, I think, appear in the sequel.

I propose, therefore, to notice the principal forms of language which have been thought to give countenance to these perverse doctrines, introducing also some other forms of language for the sake of giving completeness to the subject.

1. When we say, 'the rail-car has stopped,' 'the moon changes,' 'the sun rises and sets,' 'the moon is a great light,' we express important practical truths; although it is found out that the rail-car moves along with the earth, that the moon remains essentially the same, that what we call motion in the sun is caused differently from what appears, and that the moon has fewer particles of matter than a small star. The general principle is this: language originates from the common sense of mankind, is adapted to the common intelligence of the race, and is not to be judged of or restricted by scientific definitions, or subsequent scientific discoveries. It is concerned with actualities rather than with realities. The language of science is a departure from the language of common life.

2. When we say, 'the land draws near,' 'the earth brings forth living creatures,' 'the soil produces trees,' 'the fever leaves the sick man,' the language is that of appearance to the eye. It is a sort of picture-painting, or merely suggestive. It recalls to the mind of others certain phenomena which we have witnessed, leaving them to judge for themselves of their cause or precise nature. This optical description of phenomena is a natural and happy expedient in language.

When we say, 'the sun rises and sets,' a double explanation is possible. First, that the terms are used to express relative motion, thus denoting what is actual, though not real; or secondly, that it is the language of actual appearance, without further explanation.

3. When we say by a metonymy, 'God is love,' i. e. benevolence, or by a metaphor and metonymy united, 'God is light,' i. e. moral perfection, the meaning is evident from the necessity of the case. A quality cannot be confounded with a substance, nor an attribute with a subject. This use of the abstract for the concrete is a beautiful feature in language.

4. When we say, 'science blesses mankind,' 'virtue produces happiness,' we conceive of actions as substances, and predicate of them the attributes of substances. This is a lower form of personification.

When we say, 'the attraction of the sun keeps the earth in its orbit,' we mean thereby 'the sun by attracting keeps the earth in its orbit.' Here the abstract idea is conceived of substantively or as a substance. But as abstract ideas cannot be efficient causes, the literal meaning cannot be intended. This form of expression has its logical or rhetorical value.

When we say, 'murder is wicked,' we do not mean that murder is a moral accountable being, and ought to be punished; and when we say, 'the fire is hot,' and 'the ice is cold,' we do not mean that the fire and the ice are sentient beings, and capable of the sensations of heat and cold. But the expressions mean, by the association of ideas, what lies nearest, viz. that murder involves wickedness in the agent, and that the fire is the cause of heat, and the ice the cause of cold. This figure is called *metonymy*, and exhibits the economy of language.

When we say, 'certain motives lead to specific results,' we ascribe to motives what belongs to mind in view of motives. Motives, being merely mental states, cannot be efficient causes. This is analogous to the preceding case.

In all these cases where an abstract quality or a mere activity is taken substantively, and represented as an efficient physical cause, or as a moral or voluntary agent, the meaning is evident from the necessity of the case, i. e. from the dissonance between essence and attribute.

5. When we say, 'our happiness comes from God,' 'sin has entered into the world,' we give locality or activity in space to intellectual or spiritual ideas. Such language is founded on a secret analogy between the intellectual and physical worlds, which every one feels, but no one has explained. I cannot think that any one is misled by such language.

6. When we say, 'God is our sun and shield,' 'James is a pillar of the church,' we certainly do not mean to be taken literally. It is because the literal sense is not to be conceived of, that the metaphor is admissible. This is an abridged comparison, exhibiting both the beauty and the economy of language.

7. When the Jews, who abhorred idolatry, or when we, as Christians, say, 'The eyes of the Lord are upon the righteous, and his ears are open to their cry,' certainly neither the Jews nor we imply, and hardly have the conception, that Jehovah has physical organs of seeing and hearing. There is indeed a secret analogy here which beautifully illustrates the meaning, but analogy or comparison also implies contrast. This reasoning will apply to all cases of *anthropomorphism*.

8. When we say of a miserably poor speaker, 'he is a great orator,' the circumflex accent on the word *great*, or the circumflex tone which is inferred from the context, shows that we are aware, and are willing to inform our readers, what is our true

meaning. This depends on a general principle, that the intonation is a part, and an important part of language. This reasoning will apply to all cases of irony. Nobody misunderstands irony. So in the ironical words of Job: 'Surely ye are the men, and wisdom shall die with you.'

9. When we say, 'If I had (i. e. were having, our old past tense having been an imperfect,) money, I would give it,' (i. e. were willing to give it,) we mean that we have no money, and do not give it. The inchoative act, in past time, left uncompleted, involves a negation of both parts of the condition in present time—a curious feature in language, but which deceives nobody.

10. The Psalmist says, 'The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God.' In these words there is an affirmation *that there is no God*, but it is not the affirmation of the Psalmist. It is an affirmation put into the mouth of the fool or wicked man. It occurs in continuous discourse (*in conjuncto sermone*.) and is the conjunctive mood or state of mind, whether distinguished by a distinct form, as the Latin subjunctive, the Greek optative and subjunctive, or hardly distinguished from the indicative as in English.

In many of these cases the literal meaning cannot be conceived of by the imagination. How can we mean to affirm that of which we can form no pictorial conception? In some cases the literal meaning is entirely lost to the mental conception, as in the faded metaphor and in the faded metonymy.

If we consult the expert in each branch, who of course is the best qualified to judge, we shall come to the same conclusion.

(1.) The mason, laboring hard to raise a heavy stone, exclaims at length, 'the stone moves.' Surely he does not mean to ascribe to the stone a self-active power.

(2.) The sailer, while laboriously adjusting the sails, cries out at last, 'the land draws near to us.' Surely he is not deceived himself, and deceives nobody.

(3.) The astronomer, fresh from his study, uses the language of common life, 'the sun rises and sets.' Surely he is not deceived, and yet feels that his words have a meaning.

(4.) The physician most conversant with disease, says of a convalescent patient, 'the fever has left him.' Surely he does not mean that the fever has still an external existence.

Children may read what they do not comprehend. Men may repeat by rote what they have merely heard from others. Even men learned in one branch of knowledge, may be very deficient in another, of which they undertake to speak. What speakers mean in such cases is hardly worth the inquiry.

We conclude that language, in its legitimate use, is founded on common sense views which may be just in themselves, although not philosophical in their form; that language is sometimes a picture-painting to recall images to the mind of others; and that language again may aim at conciseness, at force, at elegance, or other ornaments of thought, but the figures of speech, thence arising, as the metaphor, metonymy, anthropomorphism, etc. are always guarded by the circumstances of the case so as not to deceive or mislead. The economy of words is checked by a regard to perspicuity.

Correct views of the truthfulness of language, I am willing to believe, are of more importance than is usually imagined. They lead to clearness and precision of thought, and remove many occasions for doubt, caviling, and sophistry. The opposite views introduce a paradox in language, a solecism in morals, an ambiguity in logic, and a vagueness or indefiniteness in philosophy.

April, 1853.

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#### ART. LXXXII.—METHOD OF INSTRUCTION IN ENGLISH GRAMMAR.

THE child, at first, thinks and speaks without distinguishing between thinking and speaking, and without being aware that, when he speaks, he also thinks. He knows only of the word which he speaks, since that is all which his sense of hearing brings back to him. At a later period, the child learns that before speaking some process takes place within him, which is always connected with speaking, but yet differs from it, and can and often does exist without it. He learns that in connection with the sentence which he utters there is combined in his mind a thought or judgment, and in connection with the word, an idea or notion; and he distinguishes the thought and the idea, as they exist in his mind, from the sentence and the word

which he hears. He has a consciousness, or internal intuition, of his thoughts and ideas, and is now in a condition to make his thoughts and ideas, like the things subjected to his external senses, the objects of reflection. This internal intuition of his thoughts and ideas, and the perception of their relations, is the point to which the pupil is to be led on, and by means of which a full understanding of his vernacular tongue is to be opened to him. The fundamental principle of methodic, that one must let the pupil find out for himself that which he has to learn, is applicable to this branch of instruction only in this way, that the instructor leads the pupil to perceive his own thoughts, and with his thoughts thus perceived to compare language as exhibited to the external senses. All important instruction in language comes back to this, to compare the ideas and thoughts as they exist in the mind with the words and forms of expression in language. After the pupil has learnt to look at his own thoughts and ideas, and to compare their various relations with the expressions for them in language, he will follow out these comparisons spontaneously, and become, as it were, a philologist, and the teacher has now little else to do than merely to guide the mind which has been thus excited.

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Instruction in English, as a vernacular language, should proceed from the consideration of *the thought*, and of *the proposition* as the expression of the thought. The thought is *given* to the pupil by consciousness or internal intuition. The simplest thought is capable of a manifold development, and the simplest proposition is capable of a manifold enlargement. The object of instruction is to bring to the consciousness of the pupil the manifold relations of ideas involved in the thought, and to lead him to understand the special linguistical forms corresponding to them.

The teacher should commence with requiring his scholars to express their thoughts, i. e. their judgments, concerning the things about them; as, for example, 'the dog barks,' 'the horse eats,' 'the oven is hot.' These are naked propositions, i. e. propositions consisting of a simple subject, and a simple predicate. But if the propositions are more complex; as, 'the young dog barks in the street,' 'the coachman's horse eats oats;' then they may be reduced to naked propositions, by removing whatever is not essential for the expression of a thought. The

pupil will soon find that in every proposition there are two ideas, the one an idea of a thing or substance, and the other an idea of an activity, and that the latter is predicated of the former, i. e. referred to it, by a judgment of the speaker. The pupil easily apprehends in the naked proposition, which is the *subject* and which is the *predicate*, which is the *substance* and which is the *activity*, and how these ideas in the act of judging are referred to each other; for he has an internal intuition of the matter before him. The pupil also easily learns the names of the things, which he has thus learnt to discriminate.

The teacher should then direct the attention of the scholar to the *words*, in order that he may distinguish *substantives*, (dog, horse, oven;) *verbs*, (barks, eats;) and *adjectives*, (hot;) also *notional words*, (dog, horse, barks, hot;) from *form-words*, (the, is;) and the *word* from its *inflection*, (bark-s, eat-s.) The pupil is made to understand the import of every word and to know its name.

After the scholar has thus been led to consider and distinguish ideas and words, he must return again to the whole proposition, and observe how in forming the proposition an activity is predicated of a thing, and the judgment or predication is expressed in the predicate by the inflection or by means of a form-word.

His attention may here be directed to the relation of person and number in the subject, to the import of the pronouns, and to the tense and mood of the predicate, and how generally these relations are denoted in the proposition. The arrangement of the parts of the proposition, and the intonation of the several words, may now be noticed. Thus will those ideas, which make the foundation of grammatical instruction, be exhibited to the scholar in the naked proposition.

When these ideas have become familiar to the pupil, he should consider propositions in which first the subject and then the predicate have been enlarged to a compound expression; as, for example, 'the young dog barks,' 'the coachman's horse eats,' 'the dog barks in the street,' 'the horse eats oats.' He will easily see how the idea of a thing or substance is enlarged to an attributive syntactical combination, and how the idea of an activity is enlarged to an objective syntactical combination; and how the attributive and objective combinations differ from each other and from the predicative. It is very important here



that the pupil should have a great number of examples at command, in order that he may not only distinguish the attributive and objective combinations, but also be able to compare and distinguish the particular kinds of attributes and objects, and the forms which correspond to them. Especially must the distinction between the complementary and the supplementary object, and the particular kinds of each, be made clear by many examples.

In connection with the attributive combination comes in the agreement of the adjective, (as, *this, these*, etc) with the substantive; and in connection with the objective combination comes in the use of cases, prepositions, and adverbs.

After the scholar has acquired a distinct view of the three syntactical combinations in their different kinds in the simple proposition, and thus acquired a knowledge of the groundforms of language, the teacher must then proceed to explain every special relation of ideas, and every form of expression, and reduce it under the proper head.

The pupil should then attend to the doctrine of participials. See Art. XXVIII.

The different kinds of subordinate propositions should now be explained. This can easily be done, as they correspond severally to substantives, adjectives, and adverbs, making a beautiful system. See Art. XLII. The forms of the adverbial proposition are very numerous. See Art. XLV. XLVI.

The pupil should now be led to understand the co-ordinating compound proposition, and its three forms. See Art. XLVIII.

Finally, the pupil should study the structure of the period, as the most intricate form in language. He should notice its symmetrical form and logical force. See Art. LII.

There are two kinds of exercises which may be instituted in order to give the pupil a full and ready knowledge of the subject; the first, to let the pupil himself form examples illustrating the different grammatical principles; the other, to let him analyze a series of sentences judiciously selected. Both of these modes may be employed by the teacher with advantage.

## ART. LXXXIII.—THE LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF SENTENCES.

THE proper understanding of language consists in the just apprehension of each notional-word as the factor of some syntactical combination, and thus a part of a sentence, and of each form-word as expressing some relation between these factors, or between the sentences themselves.

There are two modes of analyzing a sentence, which may be distinguished as the *verbal* and the *logical*.

The *verbal* analysis gives the part of speech, as *substantive*, *verb*, *preposition*, *conjunction*, etc., and the inflection, as *case*, *mood*, *tense*, etc. of each word in the sentence, together with the rules of *concord* and *government*.

The *logical* analysis gives the factors of the syntactical combinations, as *subject*, *predicate*, *attribute*, *object*, and their relation-forms, as in the attribute, *the adjective*, *noun in apposition*, *noun in the genitive*, etc. in the object, *noun in an oblique case*, *noun with a preposition*, *adverb*, etc.

The former mode leads to the knowledge of words and their forms; the latter to the understanding of the proposition and of the members of the proposition.

The former mode is evidently subordinate to the second. To pursue the former exclusively or to the disparagement of the latter must be injurious.

There are several advantages which evidently arise from the logical or true analysis of a sentence.

1. This logical analysis of propositions will enable a pupil readily to discover and correct errors in the use of the forms of language. If he is familiar with such analysis, he will clearly understand the relation which he wishes to express, and also know how to express such relation.

2. This logical analysis will help to determine the correct collocation of the parts of a sentence. The collocation of words in a sentence is very important. But the relation of words to other words being understood, their correct collocation is readily perceived.

3. This logical analysis will aid in respect to enunciation. A faulty intonation arises from the pupil's having dwelt too long on the sound of the words to the neglect of their meaning, or from having labored too hard to commit a passage to

memory. The proper remedy is to bring the pupil back to the meaning of the sentence. That being rightly apprehended, he will enunciate correctly of course. Attention is given by teachers of elocution to emphasis, but not usually to the logical worth of propositions.

*Example I.*

- |          |                 |
|----------|-----------------|
| 1. Birds | Subject to 2.   |
| 2. fly   | Predicate to 1. |

Verbal analysis. *Birds*, substantive in plur. nom.—*Fly*, verb in 3 pers. plur. pres. indic.

*Example II.*

- |               |                 |
|---------------|-----------------|
| 1. Constant   | Attribute to 2. |
| 2. boasting   | Subject to 3.   |
| 3. betrays    | Predicate to 2. |
| 4. incapacity | Object to 3.    |

Verbal analysis. *Constant*, adjective.—*Boasting*, verbal substantive in nom.—*Betrays*, verb in 3 pers. sing. pres. indic.—*Incapacity*, substantive in obj. case.

*Example III.*

- |           |                 |
|-----------|-----------------|
| 1. A      | Attribute to 3. |
| 2. burnt  | Attribute to 3. |
| 3. child  | Subject.        |
| 4. dreads | Predicate to 3. |
| 5. the    | Attribute to 6. |
| 6. fire   | Object to 4.    |

Verbal analysis. *A*, indefinite article, or rather the unemphatic numeral for *one*.—*Burnt*, participial adjective.—*Child*, substantive in nom.—*Dreads*, verb in 3 pers. sing. pres. indic.—*The*, definite article, or rather the unemphatic demonstrative pronoun.—*Fire*, substantive in obj. case.

So of the definite and indefinite articles in every case of their occurrence.

*Example IV.*

- |                 |                                 |
|-----------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. The merchant | Subject.                        |
| 2. went         | Predicate to 1.                 |
| 3. to           | Exponent of obj. relation in 4. |
| 4. London       | Object of place to 2.           |

Verbal analysis. *The*, defin. article.—*Merchant*, substantive in nom. sing.—*Went*, verb in 3 pers. sing. past indic.—*To*, preposition, showing the relation between the verb *went* and the substantive *London*.—*London*, prop. name in obj. case.

*Example V.*

- |                     |                      |
|---------------------|----------------------|
| 1. William          | Subject.             |
| 2. having conquered | Attribute to 1.      |
| 3. Harold           | Passive object to 2. |
| 4. ascended         | Predicate to 1.      |
| 5. the throne       | Passive object to 4. |

*Example VI.*

- |                  |                      |
|------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Plato         | Subject.             |
| 2. wrote         | Predicate to 1.      |
| 3. dialogues     | Passive object to 2. |
| 4. magnificently | Obj. of manner to 2. |

*Example VII.*

- |           |                                    |
|-----------|------------------------------------|
| 1. James  | Subject.                           |
| 2. is     | Exponent of predic. relation in 3. |
| 3. worthy | Predicate to 1.                    |
| 4. of     | Exponent of obj. relation in 5.    |
| 5. praise | Compl. object to 3.                |

*Example VIII.*

- |                  |                                     |
|------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1. Jacob         | Subject.                            |
| 2. sent          | Predicate to 1.                     |
| 3. not           | Exponent of negation in 2.          |
| 4. his           | Attribute to 6.                     |
| 5. youngest      | Attribute to 6.                     |
| 6. son           | Passive object to 2.                |
| 7. with the rest | Object of accompaniment to 2.       |
| 8. into Egypt    | Object of place to 2.               |
| 9. since         | Exponent of causal relation.        |
| 10. he           | Subject to 11, 12.                  |
| 11. was          | Exponent of predic. relation in 12. |
| 12. afraid       | Predicate to 10.                    |

*Example IX.*

1. The	Attribute to 2.	} Subject,
2. king	Subject.	
3. freed	Attribute to 2.	
4. from	Exp. of obj. relat. in 6.	
5. all	Attribute to 6.	} enlarged by participial clause.
6. uncertainty	Gen. object to 3.	
7. displayed	Predicate to 2.	} Predicate,
8. a	Attribute to 10.	
9. greater	Attribute to 10.	} completed by passive object,
10. degree	Passive obj. to 7.	
11. of	Exp. of attrib. relat. in 12.	} modified by adjunct of time.
12. vigor	Gen. attribute to 10.	
13. on	Exponent of obj. rel. in 14.	
14. hearing	Object of time to 7.	
15. these	Attribute to 16.	
16. arrangements	Pass. object to 14.	

*Example X.*

1. When we speak of Plato	Adverbial proposition of time
as the ideal philosopher	to 2.
2. we sometime forget	Leading proposition to 1.
3. that the people of Greece	Substantive proposition, ob-
were pursuing ideals	ject to 2.
4. during the whole time	Object of time to 3.
5. in which he lived	Adjective proposition to 4.

*Example XI.*

1. I urged not many things	Leading proposition.
2. which it came into my	Adjective proposition to ob-
mind to do	ject in 1.
3. for I neither wished	Co-ordinate sentence, causative to 1.
4. nor did I feel	Co-ordinate sentence, copulative to 3, and causative to 1.
5. as if I had the right	Adverbial proposition of manner to 4.
6. at an hour of so much in-	Object of time to 7.
quietude	
7. to say ought	Supine, pass. obj. to 3, and attribute to 5.

- |  |                         |
|--|-------------------------|
| 8. to add                                    | Supine, attribute to 7. |
| 9. to the burden already weighing upon them. | Dative object to 8.     |

*Example XII.*

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. The Greeks were disagreed among themselves                | Leading proposition to 2.                      |
| 2. as the enormous host of the Persians approached           | Adverbial proposition of time to 1.            |
| 3. and yet Themistocles managed                              | Leading sentence, adversative to 1.            |
| 4. not only to gain the battle of Salamis                    | Supine, final cause to 3.                      |
| 5. but also to chase Xerxes, the Persian king, out of Greece | Supine, copulative to 4, and final cause to 3. |

*Example XIII.*

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. We hoped  | Leading proposition.                             |
| 2. that the house might escape   | Substantive proposition, object to 1.            |
| 3. and were certain  | Contracted leading proposition, copulative to 1. |
| 4. that it would   | Subst. proposition, object to 3.                 |
| 5. unless it were fired from within                                    | Conditional adverbial proposition to 4.          |
| 6. since the flames from the neighboring buildings could not reach it. | Causative co-ordinate proposition to 1 and 3.    |
| 7. from its isolated position  | Adjunct of cause to 6.                           |

*Example XIV.*

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| 1. As I walked through the wilderness of this world | Adverbial proposition of time to 2.                  |
| 2. I lighted on a certain place                     | Leading proposition to 1.                            |
| 3. where was a den                                  | Adjective proposition to object in 2.                |
| 4. and laid me down to sleep                        | Co-ordinate copulative proposition to 2, contracted. |
| 5. and as I slept                                   | Adverbial proposition of time to 6.                  |
| 6. I dreamed a dream.                               | Co-ordinate copulative sentence to 2 and 4.          |

*Logical Analysis of John 15: 1-10.*

Verse 1. Here we have two co-ordinate thoughts or sentences; combined in the way of description, that is, by their relations in space, by means of the conjunction *and*; without contraction, as the sentences have no common member. The whole is a loose sentence. The relation of the two thoughts to each other consists in their common relation to the thought, 'that Christians are the branches.'

Verse 2. 'That beareth not fruit,' (= not bearing fruit,) is a subordinate proposition, or by-clause, modifying the object in the leading proposition.—'That beareth fruit,' (= bearing fruit,) is another subordinate proposition, or by-clause, modifying the object in the other leading proposition.—'That it may bring forth more fruit,' is a subordinate proposition, expressing the final end or purpose of the main or leading proposition to which it is attached.—The two compound propositions are related to each other antithetically; but their relation to each other is expressed by means of the conjunction *and*, and the whole is in its form a loose sentence.

Verse 3. 'Which I have spoken unto you,' is a subordinate proposition, modifying the objective combination 'through the word' in the main proposition. The whole is a compound sentence or proposition.

Verse 4. 'Abide in me, and I in you,' has the form of a compound co-ordinate sentence. But the clause, 'I in you,' is without doubt logically subordinate, although it may be difficult to determine the exact kind of subordination.—The remainder of the verse is a compound proposition, made up of two propositions, united modally, (scil. by the particle *as*,) each of which again is a compound proposition, made up of two propositions, united conditionally, (scil. by the particle *except*.)

Verse 5. The sentences 'I am the vine,' and 'ye are the branches,' are united copulatively, standing both in the same relation to the sentence which follows.—The remainder of the verse is a compound sentence or compact period, the members of which are united by means of the causal conjunction *for*. The first member again is a compound proposition having for its subject, the compound proposition 'he that abideth in me, and I in him;' in which proposition the last clause is probably subordinate in sense, although co-ordinate in form.

Verse 6. This verse consists of two sentences, united conditionally, scil. by the conjunction *if*. The apodosis, however, is made up of five propositions, united copulatively.

Verse 7. This verse consists of two propositions, united conditionally, scil. by the conjunction *if*; each of which again is compounded of two clauses combined co-ordinately.—The clause ‘what ye will,’ expresses the object to one of these propositions.

Verse 8. The whole verse is a compound sentence united by the particle *so*. The first sentence has a subordinate clause or proposition introduced by the particle *that*.

Verse 9. The first part of the verse is a compound proposition, the parts of which are united modally, scil. by the particles *as* and *so*.—The latter part of the verse is a simple proposition or sentence.

Verse 10. This verse is a compound proposition, whose members are united modally, scil. by the particle *as*. The first member again is a compound proposition, whose parts are united conditionally, scil. by the conjunction *if*; and the latter member a compound proposition, whose members are united copulatively.

### *Logical Analysis of John 16 : 1–12.*

Verse 1. This is a subordinative compound proposition. The latter clause, ‘that ye should not be offended,’ denotes the purpose or final cause, and modifies the former or leading clause.

Verse 2. The latter part of this verse is a compound proposition, having ‘whosoever killeth you’ for the subject, and ‘that he doeth God service’ for the object. This compound proposition is added as a by-clause, or adjective proposition, to the clause ‘the time cometh;’ and the whole compound proposition is added to the first proposition in the way of climax, indicated by *yea*.

Verse 3. Here the two last clauses connected by *nor*, and contracted or abridged, modify the first clause by giving the reason.

Verse 4, first part. Here a compound proposition, having an adverbial clause of time and an objective clause, modifies the leading clause, as denoting the purpose or final cause.

Verse 4, latter part. Here the latter clause modifies the leading clause, by assigning the reason.



Verse 5. This verse is made up of two sentences connected by *and*. The former sentence has an attributive sentence, or by-clause. The latter sentence has an objective clause.

Verse 6. This is a compound sentence commencing with a subordinate clause, giving the reason.

Verse 7, first part. This is a simple proposition.


Verse 7, remainder. The proposition 'that I go away' is a by-clause to the proposition 'it is expedient for you.' 'If I go not away, the comforter will not come unto you,' is a conditional proposition. 'If I depart, I will send him unto you,' is another conditional proposition. These two propositions are combined antithetically, by means of the conjunction *but*, and together form the cause or ground of the main proposition, 'It is expedient for you that I go away.'

Verse 8. This verse is a compound proposition, consisting of a leading proposition and a subordinate proposition of time. The leading proposition is made up of three members, united copulatively, and contracted.

Verses 9, 10, 11. These verses are a distribution of the particulars in verse 8, each item being followed by a causal clause, and the second item by two such clauses.

Verse 12. This is a compound sentence. The restrictive clause shuts out the natural inference that Christ would say those things now.

TAB. I.—CLASSIFICATION OF NOTIONS AS EXPRESSED IN LANGUAGE.



TAB. II.—RELATIONS OF NOTIONS CLASSIFIED.

THIS Table exhibits the relations of notions and thoughts to the speaker and to other notions and thoughts, together with the mode of expressing them.

II. Relations of Thoughts.		I. Relations of Notions.	
2. To other thoughts.	1. To the speaker.	2. To other notions.	1. To the speaker.
		Exist. to Activity.	
Subordination, Co-ordination,	Moods of Assertion.	Exist. to Existence.	Of an existence,
			Of an activity,
		Predictative Relation, Attributive Relation, Objective Relation,	Modality,
			Time,
		Number,	Place,
			Degree,
		Person,	Person,
			Person spoken to,
		Indefinite,	Indefinite,
			Person speaking,
		Personal pronouns.	Personal inflections of verbs.
			Personal pronouns.
		Numerals.	Numerals.
			Indefinite numeral adjectives.
		Personal inflections of verbs.	Personal inflections of verbs.
			Predicate verb 'to be.'
		Location of adjective.	Location of adjective.
			See Tab. III.
		Indicative, Conjunctive, Conditional, Interrogative, Imperative.	Indicative, Conjunctive, Conditional, Interrogative, Imperative.
			See Tab. IV.
		See Tab. V.	See Tab. V.

TAB. III.—FORMS OF THE OBJECTIVE RELATION.

THIS table exhibits the different forms of the objective relation, together with the manner of expressing them.

Objective Relation,	I. Complementary,	1. Passive object,	Objective case.
		2. Dative object,	Prepositions, to, for.
		3. Genitive object,	Preposition, of.
		4. Factitive object,	Objective case. Nominative case. Prepositions, as, for, into, to.
	II. Supplementary,	1. Of place,	(1.) In relation to the speaker, Adverbs of place. (2.) In relation to other exist- ences, Prepositions.
		2. Of time,	(1.) In relation to the speaker, Adverbs of time. (2.) In relation to an activity, Objective case, Prepositions.
		3. Of coetaneous action,	Gerund, Adjective, Prepositions.
		4. Of cause,	(1.) Real ground, from. (2.) Moral ground, from. (3.) Logical ground, from. (4.) Possible ground, with. (5.) Adversative ground, in spite of, notwithstanding, with, against. (6.) Ultimate ground, for, for the sake of, to, from.
		5. Of manner,	(1.) In relation to the speaker, Pronominal adverbs. (2.) In relation to an activity, Adverbs of manner, Prepositions.

## TAB. IV.—FORMS OF SUBORDINATION.

THIS table exhibits the different forms of subordination, together with the particles employed to express them. See Art. XLII.—XLVI and LIV.

Subordinate Proposition.	I. Substantive clause,	1. Abstract,	That.
		2. Concrete,	{ Compound relatives, whoso, what, whatsoever, that.
		3. Quoted thought,	That.
		4. Quoted question,	{ Whether, if, and interrogative words.
	II. Adjective clause,	Relative pronouns and particles.	
		1. Of place,	{ Where ; Whither ; Whence.
		2. Of time,	{ As, when, while ; Before, till ; After, since.
	III. Adverbial clause.	3. Of manner,	As, so that.
		4. Of cause,	(1.) Real ground, or proper cause, because.
			(2.) Moral ground, or motive, since.
			(3.) Logical ground, or reason, expressed only by co-ordinate combination.
			(4.) Possible ground, or condition, if, unless, except, in case that, provided.
			(5.) Adversative ground, or concession, though, although, notwithstanding.
			(6.) Ultimate ground, or purpose, that, in order that, lest.
		5. Of intensity,	As ; than ; the—the ; so—that.

TAB. V.—FORMS OF CO-ORDINATION.

THIS Table exhibits the different forms of co-ordination, together with the particles employed to express them. See Art. XLVIII.—LL and LIV.

Co-ordinating Compound Proposition,	I. Copulative,	1. Simple Copulative,	{ And, besides, likewise ; As well as, both—and ; Nor ; neither—nor ; Moreover, furthermore.
		2. Progressive,	But also, yea, nay.
		3. Partitive,	Partly—partly.
		4. Ordinalive,	{ First, secondly, thirdly, again, then, lastly.
	II. Adversative,	1. Antithetic,	Not—but, on the contrary.
		2. Restrictive,	{ But, yet, nevertheless, not- withstanding, however, albeit, still, only.
		3. Disjunctive,	{ Or, either—or, else ; Whether—or.
	III. Causal,	1. Causative,	For.
		2. Illative,	{ Therefore, wherefore, then, accordingly, consequently, hence, of course.









